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In my dissertation project, I examine the role of kinship groups and other non-state actors in 
shaping the boundaries between the state and society, people’s experience with the state, and the 
nature of the state itself. I analyze the construction of local/state boundaries in Pakistan, and 
argue that Pakistan is a country that presents a compelling case to examine this construction 
given its relatively recent history of state formation. My research is guided by three main 
questions: 1) how do kinship groups reproduce themselves in contemporary Pakistani societies; 
2) how do kinship groups shape state/local boundaries; and 3) how do kinship groups mediate 
between their members and the wider society? First, by emphasizing the agency of kinship 
members, I suggest that kinship groups are constructed through practices, including gift-
exchange and other reciprocal exchanges. Through the lens of practice, I explain why some 
kinship ties are more salient than others and how kinship groups instrumentalize their 
relationships with the state to remain salient. Second, I show how kinship groups shape or 
subvert the work of key state institutions such as law enforcement and the judicial system to 
match their expectations. Finally, I explore important local political communities that lie at the 
intersection of family and the state by problematizing the public/private dichotomy. My focus on 
the construction of state boundaries highlights the role of non-state actors in kinship-based 
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societies, but I also emphasize the relevance of the lens of boundary management for the 
Western world, where there are a plethora of partnerships between state and non-state actors that 
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biraderi brotherhood, refers to wider kinship networks of people who claim 
 to have a common ancestor 
 
dera a place of sitting, central gathering place in the village associated 
with a particular landlord 
 
deradar   the host of a dera 
 
deradari   the process of managing a dera 
 
dhara    factions 
 
dhara-bandi   factionalism 
 
numberdar land revenue collector, a title bestowed to landowners during the 
British colonial era 
 
khoji    a customary tracker 
 
Syed    honorific title for families that claim descent to the 
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For much of the 20th century, the idea of the state has played a dominant role in sociology’s 
imagination, especially with the end of the age of empire and the rise of newly independent 
states in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Functionalist, structural accounts have 
influenced much of the analysis of the state (Durkheim 1984/1933, Weber 1978/1922). At the 
heart of this conceptualization is the classic public/private dichotomy, which references Émile 
Durkheim’s (1984/1933) understanding of society. In his discussion of modernization and the 
evolution of complex societies, Durkheim (1984/1933) highlights a division of labor between the 
institutions that govern intimate relationships or the family from public institutions or those that 
govern the wider society. This dichotomy has influenced our understanding of the state and 
modern society in contexts outside of the West. Scholars have characterized as modern these 
rationalist-bureaucratic societies, where the public/private boundary is clearly delineated, and 
others where this boundary is blurred as traditional or patrimonial (Gellner and Breuilly 2008, 
Weber 1978/1922).  
In the last twenty years, scholars writing in a variety of traditions have pushed back 
against this characterization. In describing the Western world, scholars have written about the 
overlap between personal networks and politics, illustrating how nepotism is pervasive even 
within rational, bureaucratic states (Gilens 2012, Hacker and Pierson 2010). In reference to states 
that received their independence following World War II, scholars writing in the subaltern 
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tradition have sharply criticized the legacy of colonial rule in the study of politics. They have 
refuted the teleological argument regarding the evolution of traditional to modern societies. They 
have also shown how the construction of what is public is steeped in the politics of colonial rule 
(Allen 2012, Chatterjee 1993, Guha 1999). To bring forth a unique, grounded understanding of 
state formation and politics, they suggest that we should examine local actors and practices and 
underscore the importance of symbolic practices and discourse in examining the state as a 
construction (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, Hull 2012, Naregal 2002). I locate my dissertation 
project within this subaltern tradition and incorporate its chief critique, namely problematizing 
the public/private dichotomy, when studying the construction of the state in other non-Western 
contexts. 
By problematizing the public/private dichotomy or the boundaries between state and the 
family, we can bring to the fore: 1) important local actors; 2) how these actors shape the state; 
and 3) how they work to form the contours of a political community. My dissertation project 
seeks to highlight the role of non-state actors in kinship-based societies. But my focus on the 
construction of state boundaries is also relevant for the Western world, where there are a plethora 
of partnerships between state and non-state actors that reveal aspects of boundary management 
that have not been explored (Clemens 2006, Mayrl and Quinn 2016). 
 
 
1.2  DESCRIPTION OF MY CASE 
 
 
I examine the construction of local/state boundaries in Pakistan. Pakistan presents a compelling 
case to examine this construction given its relatively recent history of state formation. As Damon 
Mayrl and Sarah Quinn (2016) argue, it is difficult to ascertain the role of non- state actors in 
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western states that present a “mature category and organizational form (5).” That is, it is difficult 
to study the dynamics of boundary-management in western societies as the overlap in state 
institutions and their frameworks as well as how they have changed over time obscures 
boundaries. In contrast, Pakistan gained independence from British-held India only in 1947. 
During the independence process, the wider Indian Subcontinent was partitioned into Muslim 
and Hindu majority areas, which were incorporated into the territories of Pakistan and India 
respectively. When Pakistan was formed, a significant portion of the country’s administration 
and other governance structures were left in India (Jalal 1994). In other words, Pakistan’s 
relatively recent statehood allows us to better understand the assumed boundaries of the state.  
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Figure 1 Map of Pakistan (CIA 2010) 
 
 
1.2.1 The Pakistani State   
It is important to contextualize Pakistan’s state formation within its extensive history of military 
rule. Military governments have ruled Pakistan for the following periods: 1958-1972; 1977-
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1987; 1999-2007 (BBC 2016).1 In each of the periods, the military has dismissed democratically 
elected governments on charges of corruption or incompetence. Even during periods of civilian 
government, scholars claim that the military has ruled from behind the scenes, framing important 
security, economic, and legal policies (Haqqani 2005). For instance, the military’s activities 
extend to the agricultural, banking, financial, manufacturing, and service industries (Siddiqa 
2016).The military’s dominance has been further legitimated by the North American Treaty 
Organization (NATO)’s “war against terror” in Afghanistan in which Pakistan has served as a 
strategic ally. While this alliance is an uneasy one —NATO forces claim that Pakistani support 
for Islamist fighters undermines NATO interventions in Afghanistan and the Pakistani 
government decries NATO’s drone attacks within Pakistani borders— it has created international 
legitimation for the military.  
Even periods of civilian rule have not closed the gap between the Pakistani state and its 
citizens. Two political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)2 and the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP), have dominated periods of civilian rule. While the PPP and PML resemble modern 
political parties with the PPP espousing a socialist narrative and the PML a broadly neo-liberal 
agenda, their political legacy has fueled a cult of dynastic politics privileging the Bhutto and 
Sharif families respectively (Talbot 2016). Their policies have not made much difference to the 
lives of the people in the villages. Much of the government’s development funds are spent in 
high profile monument-making projects where they can score easy political points and receive 
media coverage. For instance, the Punjab government has invested significant development                                                         
1 The military has sought to gain legitimacy by holding referendums that have been widely criticized as 
unconstitutional and flawed. For instance, in 1958, General Ayub declared martial law and became President 
through a referendum in 1960. Similarly in 2001, General Musharraf named himself President while still serving as 
head of the army. In 2002, General Musharraf won another five years in office through also through a referendum 
(BBC 2016). 
2 The PML has splintered into many factions since its inception. The current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz 
Sharif, has led the dominant faction. 
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funds in building fancy flyovers or bridges and setting up a metro bus service in urban areas 
while there are villages in the rural areas that don’t have access to gas, electricity, or clean water. 
The government provides little in terms of public services. At present, education comprises 2.1 
percent of the gross domestic product (of which 18 percent remains unspent) and there are an 
estimated 24 million children out of school (World Bank 2012, Dawn 2016). Private companies 
run eighty percent of the country’s health services, and in fact, the National Department of 
Health was abolished in 2011 and healthcare was devolved to the four provincial governments, 
suggesting that it is a low-level national priority. Based on 2008-2009 estimates, sixty-five 
percent of women delivered their babies at home and today Pakistan ranks 149th in the world 
with a maternal mortality rate of 299 per 10,000 births (Borgen 2016, Junaidi 2015, World 
Health Organization 2013).  
There is little evidence of the state in rural areas. The Police Station House Officer is the 
ranking government official at the sub-district level with usually a handful of deputies under 
him. These police stations are poorly staffed and outfitted, and the officers complain that they 
don't have sufficient manpower or fuel to patrol the areas.  
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Figure 2 Police Station, Jaranwala Built in 1913    
During my field work, the government started a police community patrolling initiative but as one 
of my interviewee exclaimed, the police operate more like thugs: 
The government provides the policemen with a good salary and a petrol supply, but they 
don’t do any work. They only bother the innocent. If I ride pass them on my motorcycle, 
they’ll grab me, a kammi man [a derogatory term to refer to someone from a service-




People have little to no expectations of the government, especially the police. Interviewees often 
reported that they could not count on the police during an emergency. Even if they had a genuine 
case, the police could not be trusted to act without receiving a significant payoff. Individuals 
from the service-providing groups, one of the main categories of kinship groups, believe that 
they would likely be harassed by the police, and would need to count on favors from a landlord 
to even approach the police. In the urban areas, the government has made some efforts to 
introduce reforms within the police. In the mid-2000s, the Punjab government provided bright 
blue uniforms to a new crop of well-trained, accountable traffic police in Lahore, a police force 
that had been known to be notoriously corrupt. But very quickly people decried that they were 
the same police in new uniforms. 
 Rights groups have severely criticized the Pakistani government for the deterioration in 
national security linked to the rise of Islamic extremists since the mid-2000s. The Pakistani 
government has strategically supported militant organizations to launch covert operations and 
attacks in India, especially in Kashmir since at least the 1980s (Rashid 2002). But, attacks within 
Pakistan became more prevalent in the mid-2000s. These attacks are not only in the border areas 
near Afghanistan, as militants have also attacked major government sites in urban areas. For 
example, in July 2007, there was an open siege against a militant complex in the heart of 
Islamabad, the capital. Since then, there have been a series of militant strikes against government 
and civilian targets, including an attack by the Pakistani Taliban against an army public school 
killing 141 children in 2014; a suicide bombing in a city park on Easter Sunday killing 75 people 
in 2016; and a bomb blast outside the provincial assembly in Lahore in 2017. There are a 
plethora of militant organizations, some that have spun-off from the Afghanistan Taliban, others 
who claim allegiance to the Islamic State, and other organizations that had been leading a holy 
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war in the region since the 1980s. While the government has launched a national action plan 
against militancy after the attack on the army public school, the central coordinating body of the 
anti-terrorism plan remains under-staffed and under-funded and there is an ongoing turf battle 
between the military and civilian government regarding who leads the country’s security 
policies. Further, newspaper accounts point to government’s reluctance to arrest militants, such 
as Hafiz Saeed, the head of the militant organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), held responsible 
for the Mumbai attacks, even though the government officially banned LeT in 2001. Until his 
house arrest in February 2017, Saeed openly organized rallies with tens of thousands of 
supporters in urban centers and his militant training camps operate along major highways.  
Pakistan today has a modern state infrastructure, such as a planned capital city and new 
roads linking parts of the country, as well as an extensive telecommunications network. But 
much of the country, including its rural areas, remains physically, economically, and politically 
isolated. There is increasing evidence that several regions of the country are not under direct 
jurisdiction of the state. Militant actors control several regions in the north and southwest 
provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Iran and Afghanistan respectively, 
where the military and police are reluctant to tread. In Sindh, the southern-most province, and in 
parts of Southern Punjab, militant organizations have also established training camps and large 
feudal landlords continue to dominate the economy and political system. While the government 
has a presence and control in urban centers of these areas, militants or landlords increasingly 
have de facto control over the countryside. Some landlords may be sympathetic to the militants, 
but it is not clear whether they are directly involved in their activities. James Scott’s (2009) 
concept of Zomia or areas that remain outside of the state’s jurisdiction is relevant here. Scott 
specifically examines how the cultural practices of groups living in remote regions have evolved 
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due to their physical isolation and their desire to evade state control, an argument that can be 
extended to parts of Pakistan. There, distance from the state brings to the fore the role of non-
state actors, like kinship groups, in developing parallel state-like structures as a result of the poor 
state infrastructure, the rise of violent extremism, and the mountainous terrain.   
1.2.2  Kinship Groups in Pakistan   
I focus on the role of kinship groups as key non-state actors shaping boundaries with the state 
within Pakistan. There are dozens of national kinship groups in Pakistan today. Hamza Alavi 
(1972), one of the foremost authorities on these groups, defines kinship groups as wide 
patrilineal networks that claim a common ancestor (real or mythical). Kinship groups are often 
described as biraderi, a Punjabi word meaning a brotherhood (Alavi 1972, Eglar 1960, Gazdar 
2007). The origin of these kinship groups is disputed. Christophe Jaffrelot (2004) suggests that 
the word biraderi is Persian and that the present day form of these social networks emerged in 
the 18th century. Others argue that their evolution is even older and can be linked to the ancient 
kingdoms in India. For example, groups like the Rajputs, present in Pakistan today, may have 
originated from the Hindu caste groups and converted to Islam over time.3 The idea of caste is 
also associated with the widespread use of the term zaat, which translates into caste and is 
synonymous with the term biraderi. However, zaat also can refer to social or ethnic groups or to 
a group’s geographic origin. In Pakistan today, there are three layers of kinship, including family 
or people with whom you share ties (through blood or marriage), wider social networks of people 
who share common ancestors, and caste groups. In most instances, I refer to wider social 
networks when referring to kinship. It is also important to note that close kinship relationships 
can also be constructed. Often people will refer to members of their wider kinship group as                                                         
3 Personal Interview with Jai Prakash, Hindu Scholar in Pakistan, October 9, 2015. 
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brother, sister, or cousin, which points to the importance of interaction in establishing familial 
ties.  
The stigmatization of service-providing kinship groups in Pakistan, such as cleaners, 
butchers, and other professions in which people work with their hands, also supports the theory 
that kinship has been partially influenced by caste. The caste-like connotations of kinship have 
often been underplayed in the literature, especially given the role that Islam has played in the 
construction of nationhood in Pakistan (Gazdar 2007). As Muslims, all citizens are meant to be 
equal. However, in reality, there is a sharp social division between landowning and service-
providing groups. It is also important to underscore that Islam brought its own social structure, 
including groups like the Syeds, who claim that they are direct descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
In his study of social categorization during the colonial era, Brian Caton (2004) 
underscores how the British colonial period indelibly shaped the organization of kinship groups 
as it created a phenotype associated with kinship, ascribing characteristics to groups, such as 
nobility to landlords and martial characteristics to the tall plains people.  The colonial 
administration furthermore graded the service-providing groups as “‘vagrant, menial,”’ given 
their habit of ‘“eating carrion and vermin, and lax social mores”’ (Gazdar 2007: 89, Ibbetson 
1916). The British colonial administration equated the agriculturalists with the English gentry 
and provided these kinship groups with economic and political opportunities—to ensure both 
social order in the countryside as well as a steady stream of tax revenue for the colonial state. 
This state-led social organization also created mechanisms of ascription, as kinship groups 
scrambled to declare themselves as agriculturalists, so that they could access land. The colonial 
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administration and later the Pakistani governments, in some cases, formalized these attempts at 
ascription—underscoring the historical construction of kinship (Caton 2004).  
1.2.3  The Dera   
The institution of the dera is an important part of my case, as it is a key site of interactions 
within the village. Deras are literally defined as a “place of sitting” and are associated with 
prominent landlords and community leaders. There are usually two-three deras within a village, 
but there is great variation across the country. The kinship leaders whom I interviewed explained 
that, historically, formal deras had multiple functions including: welcoming visitors to the 
village; providing accommodation for travelers; and serving as a central meeting place for men, 
typically from the land-owning kinship groups, to discuss politics and other issues related to the 
governance of the village (see also Lyon 2004). Indeed, for me or anyone visiting the home of a 
landlord in rural Pakistan today, the dera, which is often located in an open courtyard, is the first 
physical space that they encounter.4 I draw on exchanges within the dera, a key site of local 
interactions and as a link to the outside world, to consider the state-like role of kinship groups as 
well as the construction of local political communities. While the dera is critical to interactions 
within the village, it is important to note that its boundaries are ephemeral. Some deras are 
informal, and are simply comprised of a small number of chairs placed outside the front door of a 
residence. As a dera is tied to its host or deradar, it can be reconstituted in multiple places. Other 
deras are more formal, and are housed in a separate building.  
  
                                                        
4 People in the village use the term dera to refer to the open courtyard or an enclosed reception area where the 
landlord receives his guests. Some landlords have separate buildings, in which case, dera refers to the entire set-up. 
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1.2.4  Deradars   
Deradars or hosts of deras indeliably shape the boundaries and practices within a dera. The families of some of the deradars whom I interviewed had historically maintained a dera in the village, some dating back to the 18th century. While some deradars assumed this position based on their family’s history, these positions are not entirely inherited. For example, Nayyar became a deradar, as his father was one. But, as his older brother was not interested in living in the village, Nayyar decided to take on his father’s role, suggesting that agency is important even for the more formal deras. In other instances, people assume the position of a deradar based on their reputation, their deeds, and political connections. While social status and material wealth are important in asserting a claim for deradari, it is not sufficient. My interviewees emphasized the need to maintain a local presence in the village and social ties.  
   
1.3 MY FIELD SITE 
  
I study deras in the peri-urban and rural areas around the district of Faisalabad in the province of 
Punjab. Faisalabad has a population of 7.4 million of which approximately 42 percent reside in 
urban areas (Punjab Development Statistics 2015). The British colonial government established 
Faisalabad, originally known as Lyallpur, as a planned agricultural colony in 1892. Today, 
people compare the urban areas of Faisalabad, a hub of Pakistan’s textile industry, with earlier 
decades in Manchester, in the United Kingdom. The surrounding areas remain agricultural and 
produce cotton, wheat, sugar cane, and fruits and vegetables. When selecting my field site, I was 
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cautioned that kinship structures had eroded in areas of central Punjab, such as Faisalabad, due to 
urban development. Instead, people suggested that I do research in the Southern part of the 
province where kinship networks are more firmly entrenched due to the persistence of a large-
land based economy. However, I selected Faisalabad, as I was interested in understanding the 
role of kinship in Pakistan’s broader evolving society, not only in areas where it was more 
entrenched. I also selected Faisalabad as it was accessible, a two-hour bus ride from my home 
town of Lahore and a relatively secure part of the country, as Faisalabad has not seen significant 
militant activity. 
Within Faisalabad, I conducted field work in the three main sub-districts: Chak Jhumra, 
Jaranwala, and Samundiri. I selected these sites as they help me to operationalize Scott’s concept 
of Zomia. Like Scott, I hypothesize that distance from the state is integral to understanding the 
role of kinship groups as gatekeepers. For the Pakistan case, I define distance from the state as a 
combination of geographic distance, economic isolation, and presence of a state infrastructure. 
Chak Jhumra, in spite of being the site of a special economic zone, is the poorest and farthest 
from the state compared to the other two sites. It used to have a grain market before the 
independence of the country, but today, there is limited agricultural development because of the 
high salinity in the ground water. At the time of my field work, it was not evident how the 
government’s zoning status would enhance Chak Jhumra’s economic development. Aside from 
connecting it to a major highway, the government has not done anything to develop its markets. 
It has a small police outpost and a family and welfare center, but limited medical facilities. In 
spite of the highway, based on its deep economic isolation and high level of crime, it remains 
deeply neglected (Azeem 2013). In contrast, Jaranwala, the second largest sub-district of 
Faisalabad, is a fertile, relatively more prosperous area. It produces rice, wheat, sugarcane, and 
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vegetables. Based on the 1998 census, 90 percent of its population live in rural areas 
(Government of Pakistan 1998). I selected Jaranwala as it is somewhat closer to the state as 
compared to Chak Jhumra given its economic prosperity. However, physical access to it is still 
difficult as much of Jaranwala is rural with poor infrastructure. I characterized Samundiri, my 
third site, as closest to the state as it is directly connected to the urban areas of Faisalabad as well 
as the other major cities of Pakistan. In comparison to the other two sub-districts, it supports ten 




1.4  MY RESEARCH FOCUS   
Sociological scholarship on Pakistan, much of it from the 1960s and 1970s, has emphasized 
structure in analyzing both kinship and the state. In contrast, I examine how key gatekeepers and 
common practices constitute both structures, illuminating nuances of kinship and the state that 
are obscured in a focus on structure. My research is guided by three main questions: 1) how do 
kinship groups reproduce themselves in contemporary Pakistani societies; 2) how do kinship 
groups shape state/local boundaries; and 3) how do kinship groups mediate between their 
members and the wider society? First, by emphasizing the agency of kinship members, I suggest 
that kinship groups are constructed through particular practices, including gift-exchange and 
other reciprocal exchanges. Through the lens of practice, I explain why some kinship ties are 
more salient than others and how kinship groups instrumentalize their relationships with the state 
to remain salient. Second, I show how kinship groups shape or subvert the work of key state 
institutions such as law enforcement and the judicial system to match their expectations. Finally, 
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I show how problematizing the public/private dichotomy reveals important local political 




1.5  DISSERTATION OUTLINE   
In the next chapter, I focus on my research methods and mode of analysis. In particular, I 
describe the importance of interlocutors, including my research assistant and other gatekeepers in 
gaining access. I discuss how my access shaped my methods and also consider ethical concerns. 
In Chapter three, I discuss the role that kinship groups play in contemporary Pakistani 
society. I discuss three main mechanisms of reproduction: 1) reciprocity, 2) boundary-
management, and 3) performance. To operationalize the construction of kinship ties, I use Max 
Weber’s (1978/1922) discussion of class status and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of social 
capital. Through this lens, I detail the underlying practices that constitute the wider kinship 
structures. I illustrate how kinship groups earn capital by managing the local/state boundaries. I 
also show how performances are key to constructing capital. 
In Chapter four, I examine how kinship groups construct state/local boundaries. I draw on 
structural/institutional and cultural depictions of the state and state boundaries as well as 
anthropological approaches. I suggest that state/local boundaries are symbolically constituted by 
the dera, as the site of local authority. I identify the key gatekeepers, which provides insights 
into the boundaries themselves. I show how these boundaries vary by examining issues related to 
dispute resolution—as it is a major area where the jurisdiction of kinship groups and the state 
overlaps. I underscore how boundaries are redrawn based on the issue, the gatekeeper, and the 
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audience. In this way, I highlight how negotiations between the central and local elite shape what 
we understand to be public and private. 
In Chapter five, I turn to the public sphere to understand how problematizing the 
public/private dichotomy sheds lights on local political communities, such as the ones housed in 
the dera. In contrast to Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) focus on how the public sphere created 
opportunities for citizens to articulate their political opinions and lobby for their rights, I discuss 
how aspects of the public sphere are obscured by its link to the state. Finally, I show how the 
public sphere contributes to shaping local social ties in Pakistan.  
In Chapter 6, I highlight how my project can inform future areas of research including: 1) 
understanding the role of kinship within institutions of the state; 2) exploring how physical 
distance contributes to shaping local/state boundaries; and 3) drawing on the exclusion of women 




1.6  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Through this project, I seek to contribute to sociological literature of the family, state, and the 
public sphere. While Western sociological scholarship has focused on the construction of family 
through interactional concepts such as relatedness, kinship outside of the western context is 
largely treated as a bounded social structure, due in part to the influence of colonial era methods 
of classification that persist in scholarship today. I uniquely apply Bourdieu’s (1977) idea of 
social capital to show the construction of kinship in Pakistan and understand the transitory nature 
of social ties. In contrast to sociologists who studied kinship groups in the 1960s and 1970s and 
emphasized the latent nature of kinship ties through terms such as the “limits of recognition” or 
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depicted kinship as transactional ties (Alavi 1972, Eglar 1960, Gilmartin 2003), social capital 
provides a theoretical framework to understand how these latent ties are activated. Unlike 
Bourdieu, however, I problematize the idea of social capital as resources contained in a network, 
focusing instead on the instrumental use of resources and strategies to foster social ties. My 
research also extends the concept of social capital to consider interactions, drawing from Erving 
Goffman’s (1959) theory of interaction and theories of performance that also reveal more 
coercive, exclusionary aspects of social capital.  
By using kinship groups as my unit of analysis, I also provide insight into how state/local 
boundaries are constituted. In particular, the Pakistanixs case reveals how boundary-management 
needs to be understood structurally and interactionally. For instance, while a structural 
perspective points out the salience of kinship groups as well as the role that they have played 
historically in dispute resolution and other forms of local governance, an interactional lens points 
to the agency of gate-keepers in undertaking dispute resolution. This also underscores the agency 
of local landlords in demarcating boundaries or what Barth (1969) calls ascription. In other 
words, landlords evoke boundaries for certain issues, especially where they can earn capital, 
while for other more contentious cases, these boundaries are dissolved. My research also 
provides an empirical test of Tilly’s (2004) work on social boundaries, highlighting two 
mechanisms of boundary management: 1) demarcation and 2) policing.  
 Finally, I contribute to the literature on the public sphere by examining the salience of the 
public sphere as a local political community outside of its relationship with the state, 
underscoring the fungibility of this concept. While sociologists have criticized how Jürgen 
Habermas’ (1989) concept of the public sphere is based on the structural exclusion of women 
and minorities, its ties to the state have not been examined critically. In contexts outside the 
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West, I show that the links between local public spheres and the state are less salient, as the state 
is not necessarily a target of public advocacy. Instead, the public sphere is where kinship groups 
demonstrate social ties. By emphasizing how social ties are constructed within the public sphere, 












The state became such a dominant theoretical construct after World War II that it was taken for 
granted by scholars (Migdal 2001, Mitchell 1999). Veena Das (2007) refers to this as state magic 
or the “illegibility” of the state. My project seeks to demystify the state by focusing on how 
people experience it in their everyday lives. In this chapter, I discuss how I operationalized my 
study of people’s lived experience with the state and other state-like actors. I begin by detailing 
challenges related to access, especially as a Pakistani woman and reflect on my relationship with 
my gatekeepers, who were integral to my negotiating access and also shaped my understanding 
of local relationships. I then outline how my pre-test in Pakistan informed my methods. I offer a 
brief discussion of the importance of theorizing relationality in the field. Finally, I detail my data 





2.2  DISCOVERING KINSHIP 
 
 
Even though I was born and raised in Pakistan, I had little tangible knowledge of kinship groups 
while growing up. Lahore, my hometown, had a population of five million according to a 1998 
census (it is currently estimated to be double that) (Demographia 2016). My primary ties in 
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Lahore were to my immediate family.  My parents were liberal, non-religious iconoclasts, and 
never made reference to kinship except when they were bickering. My parents are actually from 
different kinship groups, something they never seemed to care about except when they fought. I 
also attended an international school, and had peers from all around the world. In my classroom, 
nationality was more salient than kinship. In fact, I didn’t know much about my own kinship 
group until 2004 when I was studying community citizen boards under the auspices of a Soros 
Foundation grant.  Community boards were set up as mini nonprofits that could access state 
funds to undertake community projects, such as paving roads or building bridges. During my 
field work, I found that many such boards were organized around kinship lines—my first 
exposure to the concept. At the time, when I asked people about the role of kinship at the village 
level, where the majority of the boards operated, people often remarked that the influence of 
kinship was dying out because of shrinking land-holdings and urban migration. Nonetheless, my 
experience with community boards made me wonder if and how kinship groups were evolving 
given wider changes in society. 
I was not able to follow-up on this question until my Master’s project seven years later, 
which mapped kinship groups in the rural areas of Faisalabad. I wanted to assess the extent to 
which kinship was still a social phenomenon, especially as it had not been studied formally since 
the 1970s. If kinship still mattered, I wondered, what was their salience in people’s lives? This 
research yielded three findings. First, kinship groups were not only still active; they played a 
critical role in mediating people’s interactions with the state. Second, a range of actors played an 
important role in kinship networks. Finally, the dera was the site of key village-level events in 
which kinship relationships developed through interactions.  
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My master’s research shaped my dissertation questions. Based on my Master’s findings, I 
wanted to further investigate why some kinship ties were more salient than others and how they 
were shaped by performances. I also wanted to focus on when and how kinship groups 
delineated boundaries between their jurisdiction and that of the state. Finally, I was interested in 
how the dera mediated interactions within the wider village community. My master’s research 






2.3  NEGOTIATING ACCESS 
 
 
Access to my field site was routinely challenging to me as a Pakistani woman. In the village, as 
most women observe purdah or reside in a part of the house reserved only for women and their 
closest male kin, I was an anomaly. At best, people stared or were reluctant to talk to me; at 
worst, I felt physically unsafe, as women who cross over into the public sphere are considered to 
be of low moral virtue and easy victims of sexual harassment. I was lucky and did not experience 
harassment in the field, but it was something I constantly thought about. 
While such phenomena as soccer clubs are considered male-dominated, villages in 
Pakistan present an extreme version of gender exclusion. Women are almost entirely invisible in 
the public spaces of the village, as evidenced by a story that Sobia, a soft-spoken woman, told to 
me one afternoon. She complained with a smile that her mischievous four-year old throws her 
shoes over the wall of her house into the street, but she dare not wander into the street to retrieve 
them lest she set off her husband’s ire and the gossip of the village. Instead, she asks her younger 
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brother-in-law to get back her shoes, or she waits for her husband to come home at night and 
asks him.  
These boundaries between the private and public sphere vary for some women, but for 
the majority, they are strictly enforced.5 The only exceptions were women who worked. One is 
named Nargis. She teaches in the village school, and is heavily veiled on the short walk to her 
school. Another woman, Bano, runs a fruit business where she imports fruit from the South to 
sell in the central plain region. Her mobility is unusual and comes at a cost--- many consider her 
to be a woman of low moral virtue. These boundaries are even sometimes applied in the more 
liberal, urban areas. My assistant’s wife, who lives in Faisalabad, walked to the corner store 
herself, although she is heavily veiled. Her mother-in-law missed no opportunity to let her know 
that it was not appropriate. These boundaries ease as women age. Once their hair has greyed, 
some begin to walk, without hesitation, to the corner stores. Only once did I see an aged woman 
negotiate employment for her son, in public, sitting with a deradar. Such examples were not the 
norm. 
Given the absence of women in the public sphere, establishing myself in the field was a 
challenge. My meetings in the village often began with a shock: I had assistant who made my 
appointments on my behalf, and when I arrived to the meetings, the men whom I met often 
expected that I would also be a man – not a youngish Pakistani woman, traveling 
unaccompanied, and meeting with people who were not my kin. A common response was: “How 
did your parents let you do this?” Explaining that I was a graduate student from America did not 
improve my access. A few people dismissed me with the comment: “Oh, this is some thesis 
related requirement--”and suggested that they had little time to help me with “school                                                         
5 Nicolas Martin (2015) notes, women from service-providing groups have greater mobility in some areas, as they 
have to leave their homes to collect firewood or work in the fields. 
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homework.” Others fixated on the fact that I was based in the United States, and immediately 
asked me what agency I worked for—a code word for spy. I never understood how serious such 
comments were. But, given the strictly policed boundaries of the village, such comments 
highlighted my outsider status and overall trust deficit. 
Since I grew up and completed high school in Pakistan and later worked in the nonprofit 
sector in the capital, Islamabad, for two years, I anticipated some of these gendered issues of 
access. However, my time in Pakistan also created a false expectation that I had enough Pakistan 
experience to navigate my field site. I speak the national language, Urdu, fluently, had previously 
traveled to villages in numerous provinces, knew how to dress the part, and how to follow social 
cues. However, I had not spent continuous time in rural areas. Further, my previous work 
experience, working and traveling with a professional team, was different than working as an 
independent researcher and asking questions about sensitive political relationships. When I told 
people that I was interested in kinship, they would invariably make one of two remarks: “Child, 
why are you asking us when you are from Pakistan yourself—don’t you know about our 
traditions?” or “Why don’t you work on something useful like poverty.” It became clear that 
even though my childhood home was 2-3 hours away from the field site, I did not have the 
necessary tools and capital to conduct research in the villages around Pakistan. 
My ability to gain access, therefore, was largely shaped by working with a few key 
gatekeepers, such as my assistant, Asghar. I had initially thought to recruit a research assistant 
for security. While Faisalabad is fairly safe overall, I was traveling to new areas, and wanted to 
have a local guide. Initially I advertised for an assistant in the local agricultural university as well 
as through the local nonprofits. I did not have much luck with the advertisements. While I was 
waiting to recruit someone, I met Asghar at the nonprofit where I was initially based for my pre-
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test. I had volunteered at the headquarters of this nonprofit in 2005, and they graciously allowed 
me to be based out of their regional office. This regional office had little to do with my research, 
as its work centers on bio-gas, but it provided me with a base in Faisalabad and agreed to 
introduce me to some of their bio-gas clients in the villages as an entry point. While I was 
waiting to recruit someone, Asghar offered to help me organize a few field visits. He was their 
communication officer and had also covered the local politics beat for a national, Urdu-language 
newspaper. As result, he was interested in the substance of my project. When the nonprofit 
closed its local office, I continued to work with him during my field work, as he was interested in 
local politics and wanted to continue to keep a foothold in reporting. Further, Asghar saw this 
opportunity to work with me as a means to hone his own research and English language skills, 
and over the course of our collaboration, I mentored Asghar on his own writing projects. Finally, 
his willingness to help me was also based on the strong camaraderie and positive working 
relationship we established over the course of the research. 
 The role that Asghar played in my research underscores the relational aspect of access.  
In Islam there is a concept called mahram, which defines permissible relationships between men 
and women. In this concept, women are only able to associate with their own immediate kin as 
well as those of their husband’s. Asghar was neither my husband nor my kin, but he was the right 
age to play a brother-figure for me. His presence during my field interviews helped put my 
interviewees at ease. With a male, brother-like escort, I was less of an anomaly than I was on my 
own.   
Asghar also played a key role in negotiating physical access to the dera, the central focus 
of my study. Whenever I entered into a dera, men from the village would peak in, marveling at 
the absurdity of a woman in this space. Once, when I was starting to conduct an interview in a 
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dera, I even saw men and women standing on neighboring rooftops peering down. Over the 
course of the fieldwork, Asghar and I developed a way to feel our way through tough points of 
access. He would scout out the dera while I waited in the car, swaddled in numerous shawls and 
layers of clothing. While we had a pre-arranged appointment, access to the dera was fluid, and 
people dropped by unannounced. Asghar would check to see who was in the dera and discuss 
with the landlord whether it was acceptable for me to come. Sometimes, there were larger male 
gatherings, and the deradar would ask that I sit within the women’s quarters while Asghar would 
sit in the dera. He became my eyes and ears into this men’s world even when I was not able to 
enter.  While in the dera, Asghar would also negotiate my ability to join the gathering, reassuring 
the landlord that I would not take offense at being among men. Though we emphasized that I 
was interested in seeing the interactions within the dera itself, the men had a visceral reaction to 
my crossing that boundary. As a sign of their respect, deradars would not want to “expose me” 
to the men in the village, and instead invited me to their homes. Part of the negotiation involved 
Asghar explaining my project to these landlords. These interactions allowed them to ask 
questions and to become comfortable with the idea. As Asghar was from the region, male, and, 
in some cases, known to the interviewees, he was a much better spokesperson for the project than 
I could have been.  
Through Asghar, I met other gatekeepers who similarly served to mediate between the 
deradars and me. Tahir was another gate-keeper. He was Asghar’s mentor from a time when 
they were both participating in local politics. As Tahir was in his 60s, he had a much wider range 
of contacts, including some of the deradars that I interviewed. Tahir, who ran a travel agency in 
the city, was a native of Faisalabad and had met these deradars through school and then through 
their various business interests. Tahir initially joined the team as a favor to Asghar, but over 
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time, he became invested in the project as well, given his interest in politics. Like Asghar, he 
helped to set up meetings and mediated my interviews, often alongside Asghar. Having two male 
escorts boosted my legitimacy. Through Tahir and Asghar, I was also invited to a few informal 
social events like a Sunday lunch that provided me greater access to observe interactions. In 
areas where Asghar and Tahir had fewer contacts, I also worked with local journalists, known to 





2.4  RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
My research methods were intended to elucidate different aspects of kinship. In contemporary 
debates on methods, scholars argue that narrative accounts, such as those generated in 
interviews, help us understand events that we cannot witness and allow us to tap how our 
informants make sense of their social landscape (Cerulo 2014, Jerolmack and Khan 2014a, Katz 
1999). However, Colin Jerolmack and Shamus Khan (2014a) caution against using talk as a 
proxy for action as people may change their answer based on their interaction with the 
interviewer. They emphasize that observation of interactions provides a better understanding of 
the strategies people draw on to navigate their landscape, that is the interactional order 
(DiMaggio 2014, Jerolmack and Khan 2014a, Jerolmack and Khan 2014b). I designed my 
methods to bridge this methodological debate and triangulate my findings both through narrated 
accounts and observations. Karen Cerulo (2014) argues that we are limited by our access. To 
navigate my limited access as a woman, I had to rely on narrated accounts of the dera and 
kinship to examine how people construct and present the logic of kinship. These articulated 
experiences underscore people’s agency in making sense of illegible structures like the state. I 
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also conducted observations to better understand how social ties were shaped through 
interactions and analyzed my interactions with my informants.  
 
2.4.1  Pre-test    2.4.1.1 Interviews During my pre-test, conducted from May-August 2012 in Faisalabad, 
I developed and tested a semi-structured questionnaire.  I conducted 65 interviews with residents 
of Faisalabad, mainly the sub-districts of Jaranwala and Chak Jhumra with clients of the bio-gas 
program and other kinship leaders known to Asghar and Tahir. I asked people what they meant 
by kinship, when such relationships would become visible, and when they mattered less. These 
semi-structured interviews provided a narrative account of when kinship was salient for the 
villagers (Blee and Taylor 2002, Geertz 1973). For instance, I found that kinship was most 
salient during: 1) rituals such as weddings and funerals; 2) dispute resolution; and 3) negotiation 
with the state. I conducted the interviews in Urdu and Punjabi, a regional language that my 
parents spoke while I was growing up. In some instances, my informants only spoke a local 
dialect of Punjabi, which I largely understood but some words were not familiar to me. Ashgar 
helped translate for me when necessary.  As Asghar was translating a few words or rephrasing 
some of my questions, his interventions did not change the flow of the conservation. After the 
interview, Ashgar helped me translate these transcripts, which I then coded. 
My pre-test helped me to identify and target the actors who played a critical role in the 
dera, and who maintained kinship ties more generally. Such actors included local deradars or 
landlords, members of service-providing groups, and villagers who had participated in the 
dispute resolution process. This kind of purposive sampling greatly helped me to gain an inroad 
to a particular community. My gatekeepers were key in establishing contact with these deradars 
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initially. Sometimes, they directly knew the person in question. Other times, they could identify 
contacts who were connected to these deradars, and could refer me in turn. I found snowballing 
critical to expanding my initial list of contacts. As Haroon, one of the journalists with whom I 
worked commented, “These communities are pretty small, and relatively easy for someone like 
him to navigate.”  
Meeting villagers outside of the deradar was more difficult. My point of access to a 
village was usually a prominent landlord. These deradars, in turn, introduced me to other people 
in the village, including local residents who had experienced the dispute resolution process, and 
members of the service-providing groups. It was very difficult for me to meet local residents 
without an introduction from the deradar. For instance, I tried meeting with one local barber 
independently of the local landlord. He met with me briefly out of politeness, but was very 
uncomfortable having me in his house. I didn’t have a chance to find out why, but later learned 
that, through the village spy network, the deradar would have found out that I had gone behind 
his back to meet someone. In the same way, it was initially difficult to talk with people who had 
processed their disputes through the dera. Local landlords partly protected the identity of these 
people and also didn’t want me to have an independent relationship with them, as they were 
sensitive about criticism. Asghar and I also tried to make inroads into a village through residents 
who had participated in the bio-gas program. This strategy helped us make independent 
connections to villagers in some occasions, but it was still difficult to get around the landlord. In 
each village I also interviewed the wives, daughters, and sisters of individuals who participated 
in the dera. 
Through the pre-test, I identified state actors that local kinship leaders interacted with to 
build capital. These actors also supported deradars on occasion with local cases. These state 
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actors included: 1) elected officials; 2) members of the local police force; 3) judges of lower 
courts, especially family courts; 4) lawyers; and 5) officials who worked in the land registry 
office (given the prevalence of land disputes) 
 2.4.1.2 Observations Given my findings on the importance of kinship interactions in the 
dera, my pre-test also pointed to the need to incorporate observations into my methods. An 
interaction order emphasizes the tools, strategies, and practices that people draw on to maintain 
ties (Goffman 1959, 1983, Rawls 1987). An interaction also highlights visceral aspects of social 
ties and helps us identify the counter-factual to what we are studying or when things don’t occur. 
Interviews are less helpful in this regard, as they typically point to what has already occurred and 
thus, foreclose the discovery of alternate pathways. However, the local landlords greatly 
mediated my access to the dera, limiting my opportunities for observation. Further, whenever, I 
did have access, it was during unusual times, such as in the middle of the day. Most villagers 
frequent the dera at night, when they are free after work.  In spite of experiencing the dera 
during these extraordinary times, I was still able to witness its interactions. The news of my visit 
often spread within minutes, and, on occasion, people would come to see the woman sitting in 
the dera. In this way, I was able to develop a contextual understanding of the dera, one shaped 
through my own access as a woman.  
2.4.2  Dissertation Research Methods   
2.4.2.1 Interviews Under my dissertation research, I conducted an additional 102 semi-structured interviews that lasted 2-3 hours each. A breakdown of interviews by each sub-district is included in Table 1. 
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Location Faisalabad Chak 
Jhumra 
Chiniot Jaranwala Samundiri Total 
Number of 
Interviews 
21 28 4 37 12 102 
Number of 
Deras 
5 11 2 11 5 35 
Table 1 Interviews and Deras Visited by Location 
  
In these interviews, I asked people further about when kinship was salient; probed individuals 
regarding particular rituals that I learned about during the pre-test; and explicitly focused on the 
relationship between kinship groups and the state. While my pre-test interviews yielded data on 
key kinship practices, the majority of accounts depicted kinship and the dera in very formal 
terms. For example, people often legitimated the dera through an Islamic lens, underscoring the 
sanctity of family in the religion. Hearing about kinship through this lens was very useful in 
understanding the construction of kinship, but it did not necessarily help me understand the lived 
reality of the dera. Such formalistic depictions of the dera made it seem highly rule-bound. Yet 
what I was seeing was the opposite.  In part, the depiction of the dera in formal terms reflected people’s unease in talking with me. For example, during my pre-test, Asghar and I learned that people were nervous about 
the interviews with a “foreign researcher.” They feared that they would give the wrong answer or 
end up sounding provincial. They also feared that I would judge the local dispute resolution 
system, so during my interviews, landlords narrated how the system was supposed to work, but I 
found it difficult to learn about the strategies that landlords could draw on when things didn’t 
work. However, as landlords became more familiar with me and my project, once in a while, 
they let their guard down and talked more plainly about their day-to-day issues. Landlords were 
also reluctant to speak about their wider political allegiances to provincial and national-level 
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figures. However, as my research took place over four years, over time, I was able to map out 
allegiances by attending meetings, rallies, and talking to a wide range of people.  
One strategy that I adopted during my dissertation research to understand the lived reality 
of the dera was to ask people to share stories, gossip, and local myths as a means to better access 
people’s experiences (Bruner 1997). This strategy helped me to develop an easier rapport with 
my informants. Asking people about their stories created a more conversational dynamic, and 
was much more fruitful than the more formalistic interviews. I ended up collecting dozens of 
accounts of cases involving kinship members that were being adjudicated in local courts. I heard 
about fights and rivalries. I also collected local folk legends that people drew on when they 
referenced kinship. Such narratives pointed to how people made sense of and drew on kinship, 
an understanding that was much richer than their formal accounts in response to my questions. I 
asked follow-up questions when needed but largely let my informants follow their own narrative 
arc.  
In my dissertation research, I conducted additional interviews with state officials who I 
identified as linked to deras in my pre-test. I wanted to understand how kinship shaped the inner 
workings of the state. I asked state officials if and when they encountered kinship in their line of 
work and specifically about the role of kinship groups in dispute resolution. I asked law 
enforcement officials about their role versus that of kinship groups and whether kinship leaders 
had helped them with particular cases. Organizing meeting with such individuals was easier, as 
they had formal offices and more of a public presence. I was able to meet them directly through a 
local gatekeeper. As I worked with local journalists, people were more willing to meet with me, 
as they thought this would allow them to cultivate a relationship with a local journalist. In other 
words, I drew on the social capital of the gatekeepers to access these individuals. These meetings 
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were limited by time. When I would interview a police officer at the station, there were usually 
100s of people waiting to see him, so at best, I had 30 minutes. I organized several visits to the 
police station to gather case history, but officers were reluctant to talk about particular cases. 
I recorded 89 of the interviews; translated them from Urdu or Punjabi into English, and 
then transcribed them. My contacts at the NGO and gatekeepers had initially advised me not to 
record conversations as people are suspicious of outsiders and might be reluctant to talk to me if 
I made recordings. As I result none of my pre-test interviews were recorded, However, I tested 
this approach during my dissertation research and most individuals, other than the state officials, 
did not balk at my request. They seemed to agree to the recording in part as a courtesy to the 
gatekeeper. Also, as I worked with local journalists, my request for recording seemed reasonable, 
as they often carried recording equipment. On the few occasions, when people were not 
comfortable being recorded, I took hand-written notes, which I later typed.  
2.4.2.2 Observations Based on my pre-test, I found it difficult to justify hanging around 
a dera unless I had a defined role. To that end, during my dissertation research, I played the role 
of a formal researcher to gain more time in the dera. This strategy emerged one day during an 
interview when a young kinship leader asked with great excitement to see my “survey” 
instrument. There is limited social science research in Pakistan overall. But people are more 
familiar with formal research tools, like surveys used by nonprofits and others in the 
development industry. After this, I often relied on a checklist, asking closed-ended questions to 
extend my time in the dera and to conduct observations. In other words, my status as a “western-
trained” researcher appeared to mitigate some of my status as a Pakistani woman. Finally, as I 
developed a greater familiarity with the deradars, I would ask their permission to drop by their 
dera on Sunday when they would be mediating cases. Some of the deradars let me witness the 
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proceedings from their internal offices, and others allowed me to sit within the dera. Given the 
gender barrier, I was not able to immerse myself in these gatherings, but such incidents provided 
me with the opportunity to gain contextual knowledge (Fernandes 1997). Over the course of my 
research, I spent nearly 59 hours purely observing interactions. For the more formal observations 
on Sunday, I took detailed notes by hand, and then wrote up short memos. For the more social 
gatherings, I took mental notes as note-taking would have undermined the informality and flow 
of the conversation. I later documented these in a short note to myself. 
2.4.2.3 Focus Group Discussions During my dissertation research, I also conducted 
focus group discussions, a practice that evolved from my interactions in the dera. Often when I 
would be conducting an interview, the interviewee would invite his wider kinship group to 
participate.  Also, as the dera is an open space, villagers would come to see who was visiting. In 
order to respond to the group dynamic and not to exclude anyone, I developed these sessions into 
focus group discussions. As my comfort level with Asghar grew, I often let him ask questions, so 
that I could observe. Such discussions would allow me to witness interactions between people in 
the dera as well as allow people to bring up issues that were important to them. I kept these 
interviews pretty open-ended and would introduce a broad topic, such as people’s experience 
with the local police, elections, the system of deradari, and let the discussion evolve naturally. If 
this discussion required a follow-up, I would ask a clarification question or conduct a follow-up 
interview. Focus group discussions to a certain extent also allowed me to observe how 
interactions were structured and what they revealed about my informants. In addition, as Jennie 
Munday (2006) argues, the interactive dynamic of focus group discussions can also reveal 
insights into the formation of identity. In particular, the presence of the deradar’s kin 
emphasized the importance of kinship as a collective identity. I conducted 25 focus group 
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discussions, which lasted 1-2 hours each, and recorded and transcribed some of these 
discussions. 
 I also conducted informal group discussions with Asghar, Tahir, and other local 
journalists. I lived approximately an hour to two hours away from the villages where these took 
place. And, on our drive home, we would discuss what we had heard, clarifying and comparing 
data points. As Asghar and others had experienced the dera previously, I could channel things 
they took for granted and those that they found anomalous to triangulate my own findings. I 





2.5  CONSIDERING RELATIONALITY 
 
 
In classic ethnographies, relationality is often depicted in terms of access and legitimating the 
role of the researcher in the field (Geertz 1973, Geertz 2000, Marcus and Fischer 1999). Since 
then, there has been an increasing focus on how the different subjectivities of the researcher 
shape field interactions (Kondo 1986, Narayan 1993, Rosaldo 1993). However, much of this 
discussion falls shorts of theorizing relationality itself. I will briefly touch on these issues here 
given the centrality of the gatekeepers to the selection of my methods and process of analysis.  
Given the strict social boundaries in Pakistan, the role of gatekeepers like Asghar is 
pivotal to qualitative research projects like mine.  In addition to providing access through his 
contacts, I drew on my relationship to him to shape the dynamics of my fieldwork. First, by 
playing this brother-like role, Asghar helped to legitimate my presence. This was only possible 
given the trust and camaraderie that we cultivated. Second, as an outsider, the boundary between 
the dera and me was sharply delineated. To learn more about everyday experiences of kinship 
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groups at the dera, I relied on the relationship between the gatekeepers and their friends. In other 
words, as an outsider, I realized that the trust I could cultivate on my own was limited. However, 
Asghar and his journalist friends provided a channel of legitimacy. This underscored that in a 
place like Pakistan, access is inherently relational. Third, my interactions in the field, for 
example during interviews, provided situational knowledge. For instance, the idea of boundaries 
and boundary management emerged from my interaction in the field as a woman. Similarly, my 
focus group discussions and reliance on more formal research tools evolved out my interactions 
in the field. For instance, closed-ended questions gave people more comfort and also allowed me 
to extend my time observing interactions in the dera. Similarly, while the presence of a larger 
group at the dera was initially difficult to manage, adopting the format of a less structured 




2.6  ANALYSIS 
 
 
I employed both inductive and deductive analytic strategies for the project. I transcribed 45 out 
of the 89 interviews that I recorded, which along with my field notes yielded over approximately 
seven hundred pages of data. First, the analytic framework and coding structure came out of the 
concepts that people in the field emphasized. I drew on themes such as gift-giving and the dera 
that emerged during my fieldwork to code my data6. In addition, I simultaneously developed 
deductive codes based on my literature review. I read through the transcripts and coded line by 
line in MAXQDA, qualitative analytic software. During the analysis process, I looked for 
overlap between my inductive and deductive codes. For instance, the code of gift-exchange and                                                         6 In the dissertation, I use the original Urdu word for key concepts, such as the dera, but I use English translations 
for others when the translation does not change the meaning or for terms that my informants used less frequently. 
 37 
deradari was one that emerged from my data findings that resonated with the theoretical idea of 
social capital. This allowed me to compare two different practices under the same theoretical 
rubric. I was able to develop higher level coding themes through this strategy as well as tested 
the validity of my findings. 
In addition to overlap, I also looked for inconsistences. For instance, while themes of 
social capital pointed to trust and closed connections, other deductive concepts, such as unna or 
pride associated with social rupture did not fit within this characterization of kinship. These 
points of rupture enabled me to examine the counterfactual to my earlier findings. For example, 
they allowed me to understand instances when social capital deteriorated. These inconsistences 
provided me with an opportunity to engage with and contribute to the theoretical material. In 
addition, to coding my findings, the analysis process was an iterative one that involved writing 
shorter papers and memos that helped me frame my overall research questions. 
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2.7  RESEARCH ETHICS 
 
 
My research presents no institutionally defined ethical concerns, but in this section I consider 
possible issues arising from my interactions in the field and concerns regarding the application of 
this research. My project was reviewed and approved by the University of Pittsburgh’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). During the review process, I discussed the project extensively 
with colleagues in my department and in Pakistan to ensure my interviews did not put any of my 
sources at risk. In line with my IRB approval, all of my sources were anonymous7 and 
participated voluntarily. During the interview, I emphasized that they did not have to answer any 
questions that made them uncomfortable. Further, I received their verbal consent for recording 
the interviews and taking pictures. In instances when consent was not given, I took notes by 
hand. Further, many of my interviewees were public figures, so what they told me was not 
privileged information.   
While I have kept my sources and the material they gave me confidential, my research 
did not take place in a vacuum. A Pakistani village is a small area with an active gossip network. 
Local sources mostly likely reported the visits that I took privately, such as my trip to the 
barber’s house, to the local landlord. In this case, I left as soon as I realized that the barber was 
uncomfortable. But, it is important to acknowledge that the landlord may have asked the barber 
what he told me after I left. In settings like the villages where I worked, no one is entirely 
anonymous. And, it is possible that my research could contribute to exacerbating relationships, 
especially between the landowning and service-providing groups. To mitigate this risk, I made 
every attempt to follow the protocol within the village and seek the permission of the kinship 
                                                        7 I use pseudonyms to protect the identity of my sources. 
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elite prior to talking to anyone. This arrangement is not ideal from a research perspective, but 
having the landlord’s blessing did allow for greater protection of my informants.  
Finally, there is the risk that research is used in the way that it was not intended. Research 
about Pakistan is read by a wide audience, many of whom are not academics but development 
practitioners or working in the field of national security. Such people may read my research and 
consider its application in development programs. For instance, someone may read about the 
connections between the dera and the public sphere and consider the dera a part of the civil 
sphere. I made careful note not to draw any parallels between village-level structures and 
normative assumptions about state-building or democratization. I flag these concerns here to 
underscore that this research is intended to present an academic study and not intended to 










3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Anthropologists, studying social organization of people living in non-western societies, have 
historically studied kinship. We assume that kinship plays less of a role today in urbanizing, 
contemporary societies. A structural perspective suggests that as people re-locate and move away 
from rural areas, physical distance and new configurations in the division of labor threaten to 
weaken kinship structures. However, an interactional lens – one that privileges social ties over 
structure – suggests that kinship still matters. I explore the interactional construction of social 
ties by examining practices within the dera. The dera again is literally defined as a place of 
sitting that usually is located in the landlord’s courtyard. It is an important public space in 
Pakistani villages, where information is trafficked and disputes are resolved.   
Through my discussion of practices, I seek to demystify kinship and discuss the role it 
plays in everyday life. As such, kinship networks are important social safety networks.  Social 
capital cultivated through kinship can be exchanged for economic favors, including jobs or loans, 
and for votes during elections. In this chapter, I show that practices that occur within the dera are 
key to generating social capital. Through this discussion, I seek to emphasize the importance of 
an interactive lens on to the construction of capital.  
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I also discuss social rupture or when capital breaks down through the concept of unna, 
defined as ego and pride. I explore how the construct of unna emerges from the politicization of 
social ties. Concepts such as unna also reveal the gendered aspect of capital. A broader 
discussion of gender in maintaining kinship ties is beyond the scope of the chapter, but I consider 
how gender shapes social capital here. While women often bear the burden of maintaining social 





3.2.  LITERATURE 
 
 
The study of kinship as synonymous with family has been influenced by the biological sciences 
and often straddles the dichotomy between biology and society (Gellner 1960, 1987). In this 
literature, kinship is defined by biological ties or lineage and studied based on how it reproduces. 
A study of kinship also includes a focus on cultural mechanisms and practices that elucidate its 
reproduction (Carsten 2000). For example, for Ernest Gellner (1987), kinship is biological, based 
on either maternal or patrilineal lines such that social kinship relationships are a direct function 
of the physical relationship. In contrast, Louis Dumont (1980) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969) 
drew on the unit of kinship to understand the wider cultural system. For Lévi-Strauss, the micro 
unit was both a structural and metaphorical component of a wider society through which you 
could understand the rules governing society. Contemporary approaches have largely discarded 
such structural functionalist approaches as static, rule-bound, and ignoring the agency of actors. 
Max Weber (1978/1922) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977) emphasize the importance of 
understanding kinship structure through the lens of status and practice respectively. Their focus 
on the evolution of social norms and practices creates an analytic bridge between kinship 
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structure and the actions of members. Max Weber’s (1978/1922) concept of status groups has 
two important insights for the study of kinship. First, Weber’s idea of status groups allows us to 
see kinship groups as a construction, bound by class and practice. That is, like Weber’s construct 
of status, kinship membership can allude to a socioeconomic hierarchy, but at the same time, 
membership is defined by knowledge of rituals and customs. Second, Weber also alludes to the 
idea of closure, or groups that are defined by social boundaries. The two concepts together 
underscore the importance of understanding how kinship practices structure social difference and 
boundaries. 
 Pierre Bourdieu (1977) operationalizes Weber’s idea of status through the concept of 
capital. Capital for Bourdieu arises out of a class-based position or kinship. While status points 
to an understanding of social norms, Bourdieu goes further with his idea of capital. He argues 
that your understanding of social norms provides you with common attributes or currency that 
you share with others in your group. In other words, if you are elite, you’ll have currency among 
your group based on sharing particular tastes, membership to the same clubs, access to good 
schools, etc. Further, according to Bourdieu, there are different kinds of capital – social, 
economic, and political – and these are interchangeable. For instance, social capital attained from 
attending someone’s wedding could then result in your being able to ask for that person’s 
support during a political election.  In this way, for Bourdieu, the idea of social capital refers to 
particular networks as well as to the resources people can draw on based on their membership.  
 While the use of social capital in more contemporary literature does not pertain to kinship 
directly, I draw on it to examine the construction of social ties in kinship. Robert Putnam (1977) 
defines social capital as ties among individuals, a prerequisite for the formation of civil society. 
Capital for James Coleman (1990) includes resources that are accessible to members of a social 
 43 
network. Mark Granovetter’s idea of embeddedness captures the idea of both resources and the 
social ties shared when people are in a similar social network. While not explicitly looking at 
social capital, Albert Hirschman (2004) operationalizes how the nature of group ties shapes 
people’s participation in the group. His discussion of the coercive aspects of social ties points to 
the potentially negative effects of social capital (see also Waldinger 1995). For Alejandro Portes 
(1998), social capital fosters collective identity where failure of the individual is seen as failure 
of the entire family. Portes’ discussion of a powerful collective identity resonates with Tilly’s 
(2005) concept of a trust network that includes social groups such as kinship in which 
individuals take on a collective risk and hence group membership becomes part of their 
collective identity. Tilly focuses more on boundaries of these groups and their exclusion from 
society, but he discusses implicitly how members of a closed group also possess knowledge, 
skills, and capital that the network can share.  
 Michèle Lamont’s (1992) discussion of social boundaries is useful in understanding how 
kinship groups are bounded. She operationalizes Weber’s idea of status and Bourdieu’s 
discussion of capital to define social boundaries. In particular, she discusses how the elite 
distinguish themselves from others based on symbolic boundaries, such as cultural attributes or 
access to various forms of capital. Lamont’s work on boundary management brings to the fore 
the agency of particular individuals whom she calls gatekeepers in maintaining their social 
position. Such boundaries, especially when established by key gatekeepers, help to define the 
social norms espoused by the wider social group including kinship. 
Erving Goffman’s (1959) interactive lens reveals how boundaries are interpreted 
emotionally and can shape identities. Goffman uses the metaphor of front/back-stage 
performances to illustrate how social relationships are recast in different settings. For instance, 
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Goffman discusses how servants may appear subservient to their employers in the “front-room,” 
whereas they may mock or poke fun at their employers in their own time. According to Goffman, 
such performances and interactions reinforce social boundaries. In addition to boundary 
management that defines how people distinguish between their respective social positions, 
Goffman (1991) focuses on the concept of stigma achieved through interaction. Stigma is not 
unlike Weber’s idea of status, but for Goffman, it is shaped through interaction instead of social 
position. Further, social interactions are also subject to interpretation, pointing to the importance 
of gatekeepers in developing boundaries. This kind of boundary-making is not unlike Elijah 
Anderson’s (2006) depiction of a  “nigger moment,” or racially charged interactions between 
people that cement racial boundaries.  
 Janet Carsten’s (2000) concept of relatedness applies the idea of social ties to kinship. In 
contrast to the early work on kinship, Carsten treats kinship as a construction. According to 
Carsten, relatedness comprises obligation and association within kinship. As a concept, it brings 
to the fore the fluid nature of kinship ties where ties are activated through practices and familial 
rituals. Examining when ties are activated provides insights into the mechanisms of boundary 
management. For instance, she argues that households are domains or social fields bounded by 
mutual need.  
 Along with Carsten, a range of scholars emphasize how practices are as, if not more, 
important as ties. These scholars don’t discount the importance of kinship structure, but allow for 
more agency. For instance, even in a context such as India, where strict caste boundaries persist, 
Helen Lambert (2000) emphasizes the role of practice. Lambert underscores that women develop 
ties to a local mother figure through a milk-drinking ritual. This custom allows women to 
construct primary ties in their husband’s villages where typically they have been outsiders. 
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Lambert’s discussion of constructing family ties is not unlike Hamza Alavi (1972) and Zekiye 
Eglar’s (1960) discussion of gift-giving in Pakistan, a practice they call vartan bhanji. According 
to Alavi and Eglar, ties within immediate family units and the wider kinship groups are activated 
based on gifts exchanged during particular social rituals such as weddings, birth of a first child, 
and other social occasions. The emphasis on practices allows us to see family as a social 
construction.  
 Practices reveal how actors, including the family and the state, shape social ties and 
socialize their members. For David Morgan (2011), practice not only constructs social ties but 
can socialize family members. In his use of practice, he links particular actions to emotions. That 
is, family rituals create visceral reactions that further cement social ties. One example of practice 
includes parents establishing themselves up as an authority figure by setting a good example. 
Such identities are not only constructed in the sphere of the family. Beth Roy (1994) discusses 
that states strategically employ metaphors of the family during communal rioting, and in this 
way, states and wider communities have an opportunity to inscribe private identities. Similarly, 
Laura Ring (2006) in her ethnography about a housing complex in Karachi, Pakistan, writes 
about how men’s relationships, fractured by communal politics, also shaped the relationships of 
women within the housing complex. While women were not free to leave their apartments, they 
drew on the experiences of the men in their household to make sense of politics. In this way, 
even women, who are excluded from public life, are shaped by collective attempts to influence 
identities.  
 The contemporary literature on kinship has moved away from examining kinship 
structure and means of reproduction toward highlighting the salience of social ties within 
kinship. In order to examine how social ties are maintained within kinship networks, I highlight 
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the lens of social capital, which Bourdieu (1977) shows is an analytic bridge between structure 
and agency. In the next section, I illustrate how social capital reproduces kinship ties in Pakistan 
 
3.2.1 Exploring Kinship Through Social Ties 
 
 
In this chapter, I focus on understanding the construction of kinship ties in Pakistan. Kinship in 
Pakistan has largely been depicted as structural or tied to an idea of patrilineal descent. Alavi 
(1972) delineates kinship into the following categories based largely on class and occupation: 
landlords delineated by the size of their landholdings and service-providing groups such as 
carpenters, iron workers, butchers, etc. Alavi’s distinctions between the two groups draw heavily 
from a Marxian class definition and are linked to the group’s means of production. He is less 
interested in the caste-like elements of kinship groups, including the stigma attached to service-
providing groups. While Alavi’s focus is structural, he makes two useful amendments to his 
definition. First, he notes that due to poor genealogical records, kinship has been practically 
defined by the “limits of recognition” or that people construct kinship ties based on their living 
memory (Alavi 1972: 2). Second, he acknowledges that kinship is also defined as a “fraternity” 
between particular households. Through the idea of fraternity, he allows for ties that are activated 
by participating in ritual exchange. In this way, he allows for the social construction of kinship. 
Given the evolving, undefined structure of kinship, social construction is a more fruitful 
lens than is a structural understanding. I draw on Weber’s (1978/1922) concept of status, 
Bourdieu’s (1977) focus on capital, and Lamont’s (1992) understanding of social boundaries to 
examine how kinship is constructed.  And, I also apply Weber’s discussion of status groups to 
understand how kinship ties are activated and maintained. The idea of status is more pertinent 
than class to the Pakistani case because the concept of kin in Pakistan is not perfectly consistent 
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with the definition of class (Marx and Engels 1975). For instance, while several kinship groups 
are characterized by ownership of land, they are not necessarily classified in the same class based 
on how much land they own and their choice of profession. However, even landowners with 
small landholdings continue to have a measure of status. The idea of status allows us to 
understand the practices and mechanisms that maintain these group boundaries (Barth 1969, 
Weber 1978/1922). 
 I draw on Bourdieu’s (1977) discussion of capital to examine the importance of Alavi 
(1972) and Eglar’s (1960) depiction of gift-giving in the maintenance of kinship ties. I am 
particularly interested in the broad range of reciprocal exchanges that contribute to generating 
capital. While for Bourdieu the idea of capital is intrinsically tied to class position, the generation 
of capital is more instrumental in Pakistani kinship, and the social ties created by capital can also 
be coercive as Hirschman (2004) suggests. That is, while a certain amount of capital comes with 
people’s social position, such as entry to particular deras, capital is cultivated through strategic 
practices. This helps to examine why certain ties exist and others are missing. In this way, I 
depart from more traditional understandings of capital, which link social capital to the 
development of civil society and democratization. Instead, I see capital as strategic use of 
resources and practices that foster social ties.  
Lamont’s (1992) discussion of boundary-management is relevant to how capital can lead 
to social closure. For instance, kinship groups have gatekeepers that manage boundaries between 
the local community and the state, thus allowing kinship groups to develop autonomy and status. 
Therefore, capital emerges from the ability of kinship groups to manage boundaries between the 
local community and the state (see also Portes 2014).  
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By highlighting the role of practice and interaction (Goffman 1959) in the construction of 
social ties, I move us away from a structural understanding of kinship and show how ties are 
more fluid. I don’t discount the importance of structure, but given the overwhelming attention to 
kinship structure in the literature, I focus on how kinship interactions support and give rise to the 
wider social structure (Duck 2015). The use of boundaries, practices, and emotions elucidates 
Carsten’s (2000) discussion of relatedness or how kinship groups are constructed and 
reproduced.  In the context of Pakistan, an understanding of how kinship groups are constructed 
is highly linked to understanding the delineations between family, local communities, and the 
state. 
I discuss the practices linked to producing various forms of capital, with special focus on 





3.3  THE CONSTRUCTION OF KINSHIP 
 
 
3.3.1 Activating Ties 
 
 
In much of the literature on Pakistani kinship, kinship groups have been treated as durable 
structures (Alavi 1972, Chaudhary 1999, Mohmand and Gazdar 2007) in part due to an 
understanding of the Indian caste system, which has contributed greatly to shaping the Pakistani 
kinship structure (Gazdar 2007). But, a structural approach is too rigid as kinship networks are so 
vast and complicated. Although they have not been mapped, kinship networks are nation-wide 
with an undefined membership and some ties that are salient whereas others remain inactive. 
More recent scholarship points to kinship networks may even extend transnationally (Akhtar 
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2013). An interactional lens helps us understand when these ties become salient. For example, 
Alavi (1972) and Eglar (1960) suggest that kinship is a loose structure that is made salient 
through particular rituals, such as gift-giving. This idea of practice highlights the agency of the 
actors and elements that are critical to the construction of kinship ties.  
 Marriage serves as a key mechanism that activates or constructs kinship ties. There may 
be two segments of a kinship group that have never had any interaction before they are 
connected through marriage. Many people in the village report that as women in the village gain 
more education, it is more difficult to find suitable matches locally with men who have the same 
level of education, as educated men leave the village and women are expected to marry with men 
with at least the same, if not higher, level of education. So, through family connections they find 
suitable proposals within the wider kinship group, often from the city. In essence, marriage 
enables a form of ascription between different branches of the same kinship group.8 Marcel 
Mauss (1954) notes in Polynesia, where there are incidents of cross-cousin marriage, the 
exchange of a child among families is considered a familial channel for support to flow. In other 
words, the exchange of children symbolically joins family together and, through gift-exchange, 
material wealth is also transferred. In this way, family relationships are embedded in and 
symbolized by the gift exchange. 
Marriage within kinship group creates a form of social capital. Almost all the people 
whom I interviewed emphasize the importance of marrying within their kinship group. It was 
difficult for people to articulate why, and many were even surprised that as a Pakistani woman I 
would even question the sacredness of kinship boundaries. The fact that people take for granted                                                         8 Some families report that they do extensive genealogical research to make sure that people their children marry are 
from the same kinship group, as there are many frauds around. For instance, a professor of sociology in Faisalabad 
noted that a certain faculty member will change his family name on his children’s wedding cards to suggest that he 
comes from the same kinship group as the current dean. While this is an unusual case, marriage enables ascription to 
a varying extent. 
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marriages within kinship groups underscores the durability of this practice. And, the lack of 
discussion gives it a sacred quality. Women in Pakistan do marry outside of their kinship group, 
and that does occur sometimes in two dichotomous segments of the population: the educated 
upper classes or the service-providing groups. The upper classes have enough capital to break the 
rules and the service providing classes may not have a choice.  
The extent to which people marry outside their kinship group is not known, but in the 
villages where I was working it was still discouraged. A woman from an iron-workers’ kinship 
group provided me with the only explicit explanation of this practice. According to her, women 
lack protection in their new households, as any hint of marital trouble would be a source of 
shame for the family and a separation or divorce would not be an option. Therefore, people 
prefer to marry their daughters within the same kinship group if not the same family, so that they 
have a measure of security.9 Her explanation underscored that marrying within the same kinship 
group is not only about maintaining “the bloodline” but also about cultivating reciprocity. That 
is, if women marry within their kinship group they will have the same status and capital as the 
other women in their family. However, if they marry into another, they will be considered 
outsiders. As outsiders, they will not have access to the same capital or protection within their 
new family (see also Zaman et al. 2013). This form of capital can be activated to mitigate 
domestic violence. For instance, if there are problems within the marriage, the wider kinship 
group can intervene and exert social pressure to maintain peace. This form of capital underscores 
the coercive, exclusionary forms of capital, as women from other kinship groups are 
discriminated against (see also Portes 2014). 
                                                        
9 Nadia Agha (2016) argues that marriages within families, such as first cousin marriages, are preferred as family 
members will not require a dowry, perhaps as they have existing capital among them. However, based on my 
findings such results are mixed. Certain families may waive a dowry, but others, even close kin, will continue to 
have expectations. 
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 Wata-sata marriages or exchange marriages provide an extreme example of how 
marriage is used to construct reciprocal ties (see also Zaman et al. 2013). In such marriages, two 
families exchange their daughters in marriage, so that if one marriage ends in divorce, the other 
one will as well. A woman from the barber kinship group mentioned she had a wata-sata 
marriage. She left her husband because her in-laws tortured her. However, her brother had to 
“send back” his wife as well because her marriage had failed. Exchanging daughters, on one 
hand, exemplifies an act of trust or an attempt to curry a high form of social capital. At the same 
time, it suggests that even within kinship groups, with sharply defined boundaries, levels of trust 
are fairly low, so they have to literally exchange their daughters to foster trust. Kinship groups in 
Pakistan represent Tilly’s (2005) trust networks, but, as this example suggests, the capital 
between members does not extend to women. Further, as I discuss below, kinship groups often 
blame women for the breakdown in social ties between kin.  
 Gift-giving, which is an important part of marriage rituals, contributes to the construction 
of social ties. The idea of gift-giving becomes most important during the wedding of a daughter. 
Regardless of which kinship groups to which people belong, individuals will begin preparing a 
dowry for their daughters well in advance of an actual wedding. When Mrs. Ghazanfar, the wife 
of a landlord, gave me a tour of her house, she showed me the room that stored the dowry of 
their youngest daughter who was still in school. In the darkened room, which had no windows as 
a means of protection, I could make out steel trunks filled with clothes, bedding, and large pieces 
of heavy furniture. Similarly, when I visited with her new daughter-in-law, she also pointed out 
the matching bedroom set that she had received from her parents. Many women I’ve interviewed 
have underscored that the dowry helps to attain respect in the household of their in-laws. One 
woman explained that as the in-laws have the responsibility of caring for the daughter-in-law, a 
 52 
good dowry ensures her place of respect or capital in the home. For this reason, a dowry places a 
disproportionate financial burden on families, and many service-providing families go into heavy 
debt to their landlords to finance a dowry. Aftab Nasir and Katja Mielke (2015) suggests that, in 
some cases, the lack of ability to provide a dowry will result in people marrying outside of their 
kinship group, a loss of honor, or will lead to intense social isolation. In addition to gift-giving 
during a time of marriage, the girl’s parents will offer a gift for the birth of their first grandchild, 
either a piece of jewelry or a cash gift. The gift is usually more lavish for a grandson as 
compared to a granddaughter—as a grandson will carry on the family name, and his birth is a 
more noteworthy event for most families.  
 The lack of gift-giving can also severe ties. Two sisters from a service-providing group 
blamed the lack of a dowry on the abuse by their in-laws. They claimed that they were married 
with only an extra pair of clothes to wear as their father and older brother had died. They said 
that as a result, they had the lowest position in the household and were made to do all the 
housework. In this way, wedding gifts are also symbolic as they simultaneously confer 
importance to the woman as well as honor the in-laws. Parents hope that gifts will offer their 
daughter protection in the new household and will build respect between the two families. It is 
important to emphasize that gift-exchange is not only about an exchange of material wealth for 
protection. As Mauss emphasizes, gift-giving also signifies obligations between two groups and 
“produces a friendly feeling” (Mauss 1954: 18). That is, the gift encapsulates a symbolic 
relationship between giver and receiver. Bourdieu (1977) similarly notes that a gift is not simply 
a material transaction, but given the dimension of time, is a commitment to a long-term 
relationship. We can see the gift as a means in which to activate ties as well as build capital with 
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the recipient. For the two sisters, the lack of gifts severed ties between the families and thus, 
contributed to their abuse.  
 The gift-exchange can also activate ties within the wider kinship group. When children 
get married, women keep registers, large cardboard-bound accounting books, where they (or 
educated members of the family) keep track of how much money people gave to their children, a 
common wedding gift (see also Nasir 2015). When they attend other weddings, they will have to 
give the same amount as the original gift with a little extra added. Women whom I interviewed 
claimed that returning the same amount is seen to be rude, while adding to the initial gift is an 
investment in that relationship. Gift-giving, like wata-sata marriages, introduces a fairly strict 
measure of reciprocity. Not meeting your gift-giving obligations can cause tensions if not break 
apart a relationship—again underscoring the importance of reciprocity in maintaining kinship 
ties (See also Mauss 1954). 
 Reciprocal practices also play an important role in the construction of familial ties. Often 
when my interviewees referred to people they were close to as brother, cousin, sister, often not 
distinguishing between their actual kin through blood relations or marriages and  other close 
acquaintances. Their usage of familial terms to refer to outsiders further reinforces the idea that 
kinship ties are constructed. 
 
3.3.2  The Symbolic Value of Tea  
 
 
In addition to gift-giving, there are a range of practices and rituals that build social capital and 
allow groups to maintain ties. Such practices are not limited to a particular kinship group, but 
also play a role in activating ties between groups, a concept known as dhara-bandi or 
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“grouping.”10 For instance, when I asked landlords what kind of people could become deradars 
or hosts of deras, their answer was almost universally “people who were in a position to provide 
tea or water.” This phrase has connotations of material wealth or a class- based status as well as a 
reciprocal exchange or interaction. The deras that I entered were usually set up in concentric 
circles with a hookah or water pipe filled and lit for passersby. Holding his hookah in one hand, 
Tasawar, a landlord with large land holdings exclaimed: “this is deradari.” The act of running 
deras and associated hospitality is known as deradari. He implied that hospitality is integral to 
maintaining a dera or influence in the village. In other words, an individual’s social status alone 
is insufficient in maintaining capital.  
As Bourdieu notes, cultivating capital is essentially reciprocal—it requires offering and 
receiving. Trips to almost every dera that I visited entailed a cup of tea, which was usually 
served with small snacks. I often felt a sense of imposition as my visit to the dera not only took 
people’s time but also required that they make preparations for the visit. Many deras are not 
linked to people’s houses, so when my visits were arranged, local households went to 
considerable trouble to host me. The women of the household would make a meal in advance, 
and the youngest son or a servant would walk a distance carrying the food and drink. When I 
shared my concern with one of my hosts, he exclaimed that it was just the opposite. “Guests 
come to the house of the person who has God’s grace upon him. These are issues (pointing to my 
unease) for you, but they are nothing for us.” In other words, deras gain influence or capital 
based on the number of visitors. And, a visit by “a researcher from America” contributed, at least 
in a small measure, to the capital of that particular deradar. 
While women are rarely visible at a dera, they play an important role in managing the 
hospitality. Tasawar exclaimed: “the secret behind every powerful deradar is his wife.”                                                         
10 Dhara is not related to the space dera here, and refers to the process of constructing a group. 
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According to Saeed, another local leader, before his guests have even sat down, his wife has 
counted the number of guests and sent her son to the corner shop for some snacks. His wife is so 
fast that the tea and snacks arrive before he has had a chance to ask for them. Similarly, women 
also keep track of the gift exchange during weddings, and ensure that their family fulfills their 
obligations. While Tasawar acknowledged the role of his wife to me, in general the labor of 
women in maintaining social ties is not visible. In fact, given the strict boundary between the 
dera and the private sphere of the family, gender relations are incredibly strained. 
 Access to the dera is asymmetrical. Members of service-providing groups often are 
summoned to a dera but not treated to the same level of hospitality. A man from the barber’s 
service-providing group grumbled to me as he was summoned to the dera: “when the fat men 
(referring to the landlords) call, I have to run.” During his visit, he was not invited to sit, have 
tea, or join the conversation. Based on my observations, in some deras, the members of the 
service-providing groups will sit on the floor or some will sit on the edges of the gathering, their 
physical place signifying their status. Some will share the communal pipe, but will almost never 
be offered tea or snacks, which are reserved for the important guests. Some landlords will 
reserve a separate set of dishes for the people from service-providing groups. Here, their status is 
shaped and sharply delineated by these interactions. Boundaries shaped by such stigma seem 
impenetrable and reinforced through interactions. Such interactions again emphasize the 
inadequacy of seeing social boundaries from purely a material perspective.  
The lens of social capital helps to explain asymmetrical access to the dera. Bourdieu’s 
(1977) idea of social capital suggests reciprocity among equals. That is, individuals who have 
access to the same network have equivalent social capital. But, in Pakistan, landlords do not need 
to cultivate capital with members of the service class, as they can dominate such relationships 
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more directly. Most service-providing groups who remain in the village are dependent on the 
landlord for their livelihoods.11 Some members of the service-providing group live within the 
landlord’s dera and receive a small amount of grain or wages for their services that they provide 
around the clock. Others may lease a small parcel of land for which they share a percentage of 
the agricultural yield with the landlord. And some may farm their own small piece of land, work 
on daily wages, or rely on the wages of a child in the city. Most of them will owe substantial debt 
to the landlords as the landlords serve as the only social safety net to which they have access (see 
also Martin 2015).  
 Kinship boundaries are intractable even if kinship members gain access to greater 
material wealth. This again points to the salience of status as a lens to understand social 
boundaries (Weber 1978/1922). There are examples of members of service-providing groups 
who moved to the city. However, their social boundaries remained, emphasizing the importance 
of social norms and rules over material status. For example, Sheraz, a landlord, and his uncle 
relayed his interaction with a barber’s son, Adil, who had left the village, gone to university, and 
now worked as an education officer at a district level—a job with prestige. Sheraz recalled a 
sense of indignity that he felt when he learned that Adil from their village was working as a 
government official. In spite of their scorn for Adil, they were compelled to visit him when they 
needed a favor. They were trying to place someone from their village as a school teacher in his 
district and needed him to pull strings. Against their will, they visited Adil, who treated them to a 
lavish tea service in his office, customary among people of similar rank. Even though many 
years had passed since the incident, the landlords were perturbed to this day and described how 
                                                        
11 Martin (2015) notes that many members of the service-providing groups have migrated to the city and are 
employed in various service sectors. It is difficult to assess the extent to which urban migration has taken place. My 
research suggests that while the younger generation may have migrated, the older generation remains behind in the 
village. 
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the education officer had the audacity to serve them fancy cream puffs— an extravagant city 
dessert not available in the village. “We could barely choke them down,” they exclaimed. Even 
though as an education officer, Adil was now well-established, and possibly with greater income 
than these two landlords, it was still uncomfortable for them to accept his hospitality, almost as if 
that would put them on equal footing. They felt that if anything a visit to his office was 
bestowing him with enough honor but with the cream puffs, they were clearly in his debt, which 
was untenable. In addition to status, this incident relays the salience of the interactive lens. They 
were uncomfortable approaching Adil as they came from different status groups. But, their 
revulsion was also visceral—revealed in their inability to swallow the cream puffs. It is only 
through their interactive lens that we can understand the deep social fissures between the kinship 
groups. Alavi (1972) argues that kinship groups are not caste groups, as they lack the purification 
rituals that you see in the Hindu caste system. But as this interaction illustrates, relationships 
between kinship groups are circumscribed in a way that suggests caste-like relations.  On a 
similar issue, another landlord exclaimed: “villagers can't forget where people came from, and 
they continue to treat them based on that status.”  
3.3.3  The Importance of Reciprocity 
 
 
Keeping your hookah warm will activate ties, but landlords engage in myriad transactions to 
generate capital, illustrating the importance of reciprocity. Deradars hold regular hours and 
provide a range of services that include anything from helping people find jobs, linking people to 
state officials, and arranging marriages. Providing mediation for disputes is an important way to 
generate capital, and I discuss it further below. Alavi (1972) and Eglar (1960) don’t include these 
additional activities under their discussion of maintaining ties, but I argue they work in a similar 
way as gift-exchange. That is, helping people trouble-shoot a problem serves as an investment in 
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a future relationship or a form of capital. Most deradars can be found at their deras all day on 
Sundays and often on week-day evenings. Very few deradars can survive economically by 
working the land, so, the time spent in their deras is in addition to their day-time jobs, 
underscoring the importance of deradari. It is striking that the role of the deradar has evolved to 
address the myriad claims made by local residents and members of his kinship group. This 
emphasizes the multi-faceted position of the deradar, including a state-like role, which I discuss 
in the next chapter.  
Local presence and access are key to cultivating ties. According to Sheraz, landlords who 
leave their villages over time lose influence. This supports the idea that your kinship status may 
bring you a measure of access, but ties have to be strengthened through reciprocal exchanges. To 
this point, Nawazish Shah, another landlord, emphasized: “people come to me because I am 
present. And, even if I am not here, my dera is always open for people who want a smoke or a 
place to stay.” In essence, local presence serves as a form of capital in itself.  
 As important as local presence is the deradar’s willingness to entertain local residents 
and kinship members, reinforcing the idea of reciprocity. Often times, deradars do not have the 
means to find people jobs. However, a common feeling they expressed was “if we do not 
entertain their requests, they will remember during election time.” In most instances, deradars 
simply listen to the petitioner. If it is a close connection, they may refer them to a representative 
who may have the authority to recommend them for a government job. When I sat at Nayyar 
Shah’s dera, his younger brother and other assistants kept track of the crowd to ensure that 
everyone had time with him. At the end of a long day, Nayyar wanted to break for lunch, but his 
brother reminded him that a woman had been waiting since the morning, so he met with her 
briefly before leaving. At least in these public gatherings, individuals will make sure that they 
 59 
meet everyone. The kind of capital cultivated here is not only based on what the deradar can do 
for the claimant.  Instead it is based on the quality of his interactions. It is through such 
interactions with people that deradars are able to draw moral boundaries between their 
communities and the state.  
 While Alavi (1972) emphasizes the importance of reciprocity and gift-giving in 
activating kinship ties, I argue that such exchanges contribute to reproducing kinship. Through 
gift-giving, individuals enter into a similar social field, which brings to the fore the salience of 
kinship. Given how vast kinship networks are, the concept of kin can be elusive. So people 
report that their wider kinship network is less important than their families, relatives, or more 
local connections. In other words, people largely consider these local, accessible connections as 
kin. In addition to biraderi or kinship, people also reference a concept known as dhara-bandi or 
grouping. Dharas usually comprise of your kin but also close associates from other kinship 
groups of a similar social status. Such dhara-bandi is the output of gift-giving and reciprocity, 
implying that close ties that are kin-like can be extended beyond your actual kinship group. 
There is a limit, however, to the construction of kinship ties. For instance, as described above, 
the social boundary between the service-providing and landowning groups is durable, so even 
though the barber’s son had become an education officer, his attempts to enter into a reciprocal 
relationship were untenable. Similarly, members of landowning groups can enter into the same 
dharas or groups, but they do not enter into marriage contracts. 
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3.4  BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
 
 
One way that the landlords build capital is by emphasizing the boundaries between their 
community and the state—an arrangement that allows them to emphasize their own salience. 
One landlord revealed how a passenger had come to him after his suitcase was stolen on the bus. 
The passenger had reported the theft to the local police, but nothing came of it. Frustrated, he 
turned to his landlord, who knew the brothers who managed the informal bus system that the 
passenger had taken. According to the landlord, he reached out through his connections, 
requesting the brothers to track down and retrieve the man’s suitcase. In another case, a father 
approached a local landlord to help him retrieve the dowry of his divorced daughter. According 
to him, while the court had granted the divorce and decreed that her dowry be returned, the 
family was unable to access it, and the police were not being helpful. In contrast, the landlord 
contacted a member of his kinship group who was based in the same village, and through him, 
was able to extract the dowry. There are three elements that are working together to build capital: 
1) access to the landlord and the quality of his interaction; 2) the breadth of his local contacts; 
and 3) ability to resolve the situation. The landlord’s willingness to help in contrast to the 
kleptocratic state emphasizes his moral capital and his ability to construct boundaries between 
his community and the state. The re-telling of this narrative contributes to strengthening those 
boundaries and building capital for the landlord among the wider community. This performance 
again emphasizes the interactive quality of capital. 
Dispute resolution also provides an opportunity to build social capital between kinship 
groups. Kinship members play a central role during the dispute resolution process. Sometimes, 
they serve as a zaman for their kin, or someone who provides a character witness. The position 
of a zaman carries some risk. If the defendant is guilty and unable to pay the fine, the zaman may 
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become liable. When I asked why someone would take on this risk, deradars explained, “kin 
don’t have much of a choice, especially if you want to maintain that relationship.” For theft 
cases, defendants have to provide a financial guarantee in the amount of the theft while the trial 
is ongoing. Many villagers would be hard pressed to raise this money on their own. Through 
their participation in the trial and collection of the guarantee, many kinship members end up 
absorbing collective risk for their kin. This collective risk suggests that kinship networks operate 
like trust networks. And understanding the risk also suggests why people manage boundaries so 
carefully.  
In addition to providing alternatives to the state, deradars offer serve as liaisons between 
the local community and the state—in part to preserve their influence. In the first instance, many 
landlords whom I interviewed noted that when people seek their help in filing a case in court, 
they dissuade them. They often told me, “We compel them to address the matter locally.” This is 
partly because direct access to the state may undercut a landlord’s influence. However, when 
particular cases go to the state, deradars continue to mediate—influencing the state-run 
procedure. Ijaz relayed a story of how he represented Bilal, a member of the service-providing 
group from his village, at the local police station. A neighboring landlord had accused Bilal of 
stealing a cow. According to Ijaz, there was no social capital to be gained from representing 
Bilal; in fact, if anything he would develop enmity with the opposing landlord. However, he felt 
that it wasn’t right that another landlord and the police were intervening in his village, so he felt 
compelled to represent Bilal. In the end, according to Ijaz, the landlord withdrew the feud as he 
didn’t want to challenge Ijaz. This case presents an example of how Ijaz generated capital by 
protecting his local jurisdiction. It also reveals how Ijaz is able to influence the proceedings of 
the state. 
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3.5  CASHING IN THEIR CHIPS 
 
 
According to Bourdieu (1977) various forms of capital are exchangeable, illustrating how the 
elites rely on the social capital of their networks to maintain power. In a similar way, cultivating 
social capital through reciprocal exchanges and undertaking dispute resolution is integral to the 
ability of landlords to generate political capital. Pervaiz, a former head of the union council, 
stated the link between dispute resolution and political capital most clearly. “I am greedy for my 
area’s voters.” The gate of his dera, located within the city limits of Faisalabad, is mounted with 
statues of lions. The lion is also his electoral symbol, and the day I met him, his hair was dyed in 
the same reddish tinge as a lion’s mane. However, he did not have much of a roar that day as he 
had recently lost the last local election. While the campaign period for a local election is 
relatively short, the preparation begins months in advance. Electoral success is based on a 
deradar’s long-term relationship with the local community. That is, according to Pervaiz and 
other local representatives, the selection of a local candidate is based not on their links with 
national parties but on their relationships with local kinships groups and dharas (see also Wilder 
1999). Typically when an election is announced, members of kinship groups will hold meetings 
with their wider membership and within particular neighborhoods to select a local candidate. 
Kinship leaders play a critical role in identifying local candidates, and some will negotiate 
among their kin to ensure that there aren’t competing candidates from the same kinship group. 
For example, when Nayyar Shah decided to run, his uncle negotiated with his other kin who 
typically had represented their family. In this way, the social capital within kinship groups is key 
to local elections. 
Support from your kinship members may grant you access to a local election, but 
reciprocal ties with individual members and other villagers matter. According to Raj, a local 
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deradar and lawyer, the connections with your kin will only get you so many votes. “In the past, 
it was only necessary to speak to the local leader or kinship head who could deliver the votes of 
the village but now each person has to be convinced.” In other words, kinship is an important but 
not the only factor in determining votes. In this way, Raj links the culture of deradari and the 
social capital gained there to the activation of political capital. That is, deradars’ hospitality, 
willingness to give people audience, and mediate their disputes is critical to their ability to win 
elections. And, perhaps Pervaiz, who had a reputation as being particularly inaccessible was not 
able to cultivate sufficient capital. Wilder (1999) notes the link between kinship ties and voting, 
and underscores that kinship is an important condition to entering elections but not sufficient to 
garnering votes. Other factors such as links to political factions and relationships with national 
political leaders are important as well. 
 While not all landlords enter into deradari to run for elections, the political capital they 
earn allows them to develop influence locally. For instance, Ali, my assistant’s father, regularly 
helped his community resolve issues. It is due to this service that he is considered a community 
leader and asked to serve on the local mosque committee and host political candidates. Similarly, 
Saeed, a local business man, runs a neighborhood charity organization that collects money for 
funerals and widows. He too, participates in dispute-resolution. Ali and Saeed are active during 
elections, but not interested in running themselves. Instead, they help mobilize votes for their 
candidate. Ali helps his candidates undertake outreach in his community. As political candidates 
don’t necessarily come from local communities, without Ali, it would be difficult for them to 
campaign in his neighborhood. Community members might not receive them in their homes or 
offer them respect as they are outsiders. If Ali’s candidate wins, then he has a direct contact in 
government who can help him further down the line.  In essence, the capital built by Ali at an 
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interpersonal level in his community is what allows him to network individuals at a higher level 
of government. This arrangement does not represent a typical patronage relationship as it shows 
how local relationships and practices are as important as and necessary to maintain connections 
to national leaders.  
 The relationship between Ali and the political candidate is one often described as a 
classic patron-client relationship (Foster 1963, Kaufman 1974, Scott 1972). In this literature, 
individuals of a lower socio-economic standing provide labor and loyalty for their patron of a 
higher status in exchange for a social safety net, including access to a means of subsistence as 
well as protection. However, in this model, reciprocity is a function of the socioeconomic 
reliance that clients have on their patrons. However, the patron-client model does not adequately 
capture how social capital is constructed in the Pakistan case. As discussed above, while there 
may be an expectation of socio-economic gain, the construction of social capital is not so 
instrumental. Often the connection to a national leader does not result in material benefit, but is 
used to build local status—a way to show up your neighboring deradar. Instead, it is better 
understood through the interactive lens that reveals features such as status, local access, and 
reciprocity. Examining relationships from a traditional patron-client lens obscures the nuanced 




3.5.1 Generating Capital Through Votes   
While capital is cultivated by deradars over a period of time, the evidence of these social ties are 
seen clearly during election season. Much of the organization around elections takes place 
locally through door-to-door canvassing, neighborhood meetings, and small rallies. The support 
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during these elections is not provided through financial donations for the most part, as people 
reported that they provided resources in kind, such as making banners for the candidate, 
organizing a corner meeting, or lending someone their car. Such kinds of exchanges underscore 
the importance of inter-personal relationships during elections. I attended several meetings and 
rallies during the 2015 local elections. In many instances, these meetings are not held within 
people’s own deras, but hosted within the community itself or within a sponsor’s dera. Such 
meetings serve to highlight the social capital or ties between the candidate and the sponsor. This 
dynamic is also visible in the style of the speeches. Speech-making is kept very short during 
these occasions. Individuals introduced themselves and why they were running, but most 
importantly, these meetings provide an occasion for the host to say a few words. That is, the 
relationship between the host and candidate is as much on display as the candidate himself. 
Candidates or their supporters often sponsor degs or cauldrons of rice for their political 
supporters, making such gatherings very festive. In essence, these occasions seem to re-create the 
hospitality seen within the deras.  
 Door-to-door campaigning between the candidate and his supporters becomes an 
important part of the election process, underscoring the nature of reciprocal ties. During the 
election season, candidates and their local advisors will map out the households of the village to 
identify who among the village will support them. The deradar’s ability to deliver the promised 
number of votes to the local candidate is critical in maintaining their political capital. The 
average electorate of a union council is about 8,100 people and local elections are won by 100s 
of votes, so every vote counts. According to Sheraz, “we have our network of spies,” so they 
know where people’s loyalties lie. The local campaigners will go to every household convincing 
people to support them. Here the households of fellow kin become important, as kinship is an 
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easy vote bank. Local campaigners will mobilize the houses of his kin to deliver a certain 
number of votes, involving even the women. While women’s mobility is limited in general, they 
set out to vote based on the instructions of the men in their families—here their mobility, 
contrary to gender norms, is allowed to build capital for their families.12 Landlords count on their 
kin, but kinship ties are insufficient to win elections (see also Martin 2015, Wilder 1999). 
Kinship members often have to network outside their kinship groups, drawing on capital they 
have fostered through their deras. Local landlords also count on support from the members of 
service-providing groups. According to one woman, the local landlord usually rounds up people 
who work for him in a truck and takes them to the local polling station. Actual voting is done on 
paper ballots, and several people referred to ways that voting fraud takes place, including a 
complicated system of swapping unfilled paper ballots with ones that are already filled. 
However, in addition to those fraudulent strategies, the local landlord knows how many have 
promised him a vote through this spy network. If his count falls short after the election results are 
announced, he will have his suspicions as to who might not have voted for him.  
 Elections can factionalize ties in the village and undo social capital cultivated over years. 
According to deradars, local elections rarely impact the resources allocated to the village or 
union council. So materially landlords rarely stand to gain by supporting a political candidate. 
But regardless, a loss is a great source of shame and can fracture social ties. The lens of status 
and symbolic interaction helps us understand why. In his case, status refers to the landlord’s 
symbolic position within the village. According to a landlord, “votes are not the problem of the 
candidate, but become a question of our honor.” In this way, capital serves as the building blocks 
                                                        
12 As Khan and Ghazdar (2007) note that women’s mobility does not extend to voting in parts of the country 
bordering Afghanistan, but, in my field site, the majority of women voted. There have not been extensive studies of 
how women vote, but based on my research, the women vote to support the candidate that their families are 
supporting. 
 67 
of a social network. An electoral loss could signal a rupture with the candidate as well as his 
local supporters. That is, lack of votes could suggest to a landlord that that his investment in 
maintaining ties within the village has not resulted in votes. The fragility in social ties suggests 
that capital is finite. An electoral loss could suggest a deradar’s loss of status to both the 
villagers and the candidate. This is a public source of shame, and landlords often claim that after 
an electoral loss “they will no longer be able to hold their heads high.” This phrase suggests that 
the loss is felt within local interactions, which may impede further reciprocal exchanges. 
Sometimes, the candidate is from the deradar’s kinship group, so this could disrupt relationships 
within the wider kinship network. The social fissures revealed during elections point to the 
fragility of kinship ties and the social capital generated. People refer to this intense kinship 
rivalry and polarization as unna, which directly translates as ego and pride. I discuss it next as it 





3.6  UNNA—THE OTHER FACE OF CAPITAL 
 
 
In this section, I draw on the concept of unna to examine incidents when capital erodes. The 
erosion of capital also points to aspects of ties. My interviewees often refer to unna when kinship 
ties dissolve. A mediator referenced unna to explain the motivation behind a fight between 
neighbors that initially broke out over spilled water. While cleaning, a woman had poured her 
dirty sweeping water in front of the neighbor’s property. The neighbor grumbled to her husband, 
who then had the altercation with the other woman’s husband. That evening both sides 
assembled their kin, some with weapons when an angry stand-off ensued. People again point to 
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unna when parents go into debt during their daughter’s wedding lest their preparations seem 
inadequate compared to their neighbors. Election violence is also attribute to unna. During the 
last local elections, two people were killed at a rally I attended after fighting broke out between 
two opposing dharas or groups. 
 While in some respects kinship groups have durable ties, not unlike what Tilly refers to 
as trust networks, unna suggests the opposite or the fragility of ties. The breakdown in ties in 
spite of the fact that members have taken on collective risk for each other is difficult to 
understand. To examine how unna can exist simultaneously with strong social ties—I draw on 
Sheraz’s narrative about the nature of dhara-bandi, which literally translates as grouping and is 
considered a faction. Paul Brass (1984) defines a faction as groups within a patron-client 
network. Wilder (1999) also considers it “ ‘a secondary group super-imposed on other primary 
groups [of kinship, family, and caste] (175).’” My data suggests that joining a dhara may be 
more instrumental. Sheraz argues that some people develop a natural connection or relationship, 
for example, because their lands are adjoining and they share a common irrigation channel. 
Further, he adds, “when you have a natural connection with someone, you will automatically 
support them against their enemies.” Sheraz’s analysis of dhara-bandi in part points to social 
capital itself. Maintaining social capital or reciprocal ties necessitates supporting members of 
your group or kinship in spite of all odds. That is, as members of a closed trust network, group 
members have a high expectation that other members will publically support them, for example 
during disputes or local elections. Due to the closed village boundary, there is little tolerance for 
members who do not comply.  
This group dynamic highlights the importance of interaction to understanding social 
capital. In other words, social capital is not only a dynamic between the giver and the receiver, 
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but often it is something that is displayed to others. For instance, when people attend dispute 
resolution mediation, they usually bring members of their dhara including their kin and other 
supporters. Often the majority of people present during such occasions are people who are not 
even directly involved. This show of strength reflects three dimensions of social capital. First, 
through a physical display of support, a supporter builds social capital for the claimant. Second, 
the physical display is a show of strength to intimidate the other side. Finally, the supporters’ 
presence is a display for the wider village. This suggests no matter what the dispute, you win a 
sort of moral victory due to the backing of your group. In this way, capital is not only something 
associated with your social position but something constructed from interactions within your 
dhara as well as the wider community. The existence of unna within these trust networks is 
difficult to explain without the lens of interaction. 
The concept of unna also illustrates how social capital is linked to boundary 
management. As demands to maintain social capital within your group are so high, they often 
create fissures with others. Such boundaries are not only between different kinship groups but 
dhara-bandi can cause fissures within the same kinship group. Kinship groups provide a loose, 
connective social tissue, but unless ties are activated, kinship ties are not solidified or 
reproduced.  In such instances, the dhara becomes more important.  According to Arif: 
Grouping also exists in the same family like when one brother supports one party and the 
other supports another. The main factor of jealousy in the inner family is very small – 
like if one brother and his children are educated and the other remains uneducated. He 
will get jealous even from his brother and his family and try to create problem for him. 
This is also necessary for his ego (Field Notes February 25, 2015). 
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Arif is articulating a similar sentiment as dhara-bandi more generally. That is, for the 
uneducated brother, there is a certain symbolic capital to be gained by undermining his other 
brother, often on moral grounds. Kinship in the literature often exemplifies close social ties, but 
much of the ties are constructed by maintaining social boundaries. As a result, these strict 
boundaries can also polarize relationships. Dhara-bandi and the protection of social boundaries 
suggest that social capital in Pakistan is a zero-sum game. That is, if social capital is based on the 
maintenance of boundaries, one group cannot develop social capital without the other side 
losing. Given the high pressure to support members of your group, the promotion of social 
capital can create fissures that last for decades and may even lead to loss of lives. In several 
villages where I worked, there were examples of enmity between families where multiple 
members had been killed. The enmity passed on from generation to generation, with each side 
compelled to retaliate. This suggests that like social capital, battles of unna can also be inherited. 
Unna points to how deep social ties and boundaries can co-exist. 
 
 
3.6.1  Unna and Gender 
 
 
The lens of boundary management provides important insights as to how gender shapes social 
capital both materially and symbolically. While most of my interviewees emphasized the 
importance of reciprocity in maintaining social ties, women are associated with the loss of social 
capital. First, as discussed above, women’s marriages require a huge outlay of capital. Fathers 
have to save up for a dowry. Many will go into debt during their daughter’s weddings. Further, to 
ensure good relationships between families, the expense of gift-exchange continues even after 
marriage. In contrast, as parents of a boy, families are the recipients of capital—underscoring 
that gender relationships are not reciprocal. Second, people often say that when they marry off 
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their daughter, their honor or pride belongs to the other family. There may be examples where 
marriages have created a social alliance between families, but in many of my interviews, fathers 
consider daughters as a source of vulnerability. One interpretation of this is that they have 
limited means to offer their daughter social protection if there are problems within their 
marriages. Some fathers defend their daughters in troubled relationships and insist upon a 
divorce, but, nonetheless, a divorced daughter sitting in her parents’ home is a source of shame.  
In addition to the loss of capital during a daughter’s marriage, women are also associated 
with the loss of property or change in class status. Muhammad Chaudhry argues that the practice 
of first-cousin marriages as well as marriages within kinship groups have evolved so that 
property stays within the family. Holding on to property allows families to maintain their status, 
as class status is intrinsically tied to land ownership (Chaudhry 1999).  Given the fears regarding 
the sub-division of property, Chaudhry suggests that women’s marriages and roles within 
families have become politicized. As women, especially in the rural areas, live within a joint-
family system, they are blamed for discord within the family. A common narrative is that women 
create feuds between brothers, as they want to take a brother away from his family and keep his 
property and earnings only for themselves and their children.  Chaudhry (1999) writes:  “The 
elders who are approached to effect a division of the property . . . usually advise them to stay 
together and keep their women in control” (Chaudhry 1999: 43).  
Women’s morality and chastity are considered as a source of family honor, illustrating 
how policing family boundaries builds capital. According to Chaudhry: “Women’s behavior 
becomes a matter of male Muslim identity because the way women act directly impacts on 
ghairat, men’s gift of personal integrity from God (…) (Chaudhry 1999: 68). That is, according 
to Chaudhry family honor is constructed from the strict policing of private/public boundaries that 
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I describe more in the next chapter. Boundary management includes policing women’s chastity 
or the control of female bodies. Women who have any interactions with men outside their 
immediate family or raise the rumor of such interactions are a source of shame. This idea of 
family honor within women was expressed frequently in my interviews. One landlord exclaimed: 
“Mostly disputes arise due to women because they are our honor.” A fuller discussion of the 
construction of family honor is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the strict policing of 
boundaries has politicized gender relations to the extent that discord or loss of capital is 
attributed to transgressions by women.  
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3.7  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The lens of social capital presents an important understanding of how kinship groups reproduce. 
Unlike structural accounts of kinship that emphasize how groups reproduce along patrilineal 
lines, my use of social capital suggests that kinship ties are instrumental and activated 
strategically. By examining reciprocity among kinship groups in the construction of social ties, I 
show how social capital is constructed through gift-exchange and other reciprocal exchanges 
within Pakistani villages. For instance, landlords build social capital through local presence and 
access. Drawing on Goffman, I show how it is important to see social capital through an 
interactional lens rather than in the classic Bourdieuian or Weberian understanding which 
attributes capital to social position. While my focus on interaction does not preclude position, it 
highlights the performative dynamic of capital. For instance, during dispute resolution, social 
capital is generated through performances for the entire village.  
I also extend Lamont’s (1992) idea of boundaries to show how social capital is linked to 
boundary management between groups as well as the state which results in social capital for 
landlords by emphasizing their local autonomy and influence. The lens of boundary management 
is critical to understanding how reciprocal social ties between kinship groups can result in either 
social capital or social rupture, as collective ties that promote social cohesion can also erode 















Building on the discussion of boundary management in the last chapter, I focus here on how 
local kinship elites in Pakistan manage boundaries with the state and how they distinguish 
between the sphere of the official state or government and the village community. Examining 
when and how local elites manage boundaries can help us understand dynamics of local 
communities as well as the state (Beissinger 2001).  
My discussion of boundary management has three critical implications for the study of 
states. One, I show how, through boundary management, local elites play a state-like role. This 
suggests that state formation is a continual process shaped by the contestations between local 
actors and the national elite. Second, my research points to how the local elites instrumentalize 
institutions of the state in order to manage boundaries. In other words, contestations around 
boundaries are a source of political power (Reed 2013). Finally, in many contexts, these local 
elites greatly shape or serve as a substitute for people’s experience with the state. The state-like 
role of local elites underscores how the public/private dichotomy that has shaped scholarly 
understanding of the state is not as relevant in Pakistan. In Pakistan and other kinship- based 
societies, kinship networks intersect with and shape state institutions. The lens of boundary 
management reveals when and how people draw boundaries, which allows us to see the 
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public/private distinction as a construction— one that is manipulated by local elites to leverage 
their political capital. In this way, the lens of boundary management illuminates people’s lived 
experience and, thus, the construct of the state itself.  
A theoretical discussion on how boundaries between the state and society are managed is 
sparse (Mayrl and Quinn 2016) and comes from the study of state formation in Western Europe. 
Some scholars focus on the external boundaries of the state in the context of the development of 
the nation-state and nationalism (Anderson 2006, Calhoun 2007a, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). 
Others discuss the boundaries between state and society or what Foucault calls the disciplinary 
powers of the state (Foucault 1977, Mayrl and Quinn 2016).  
Our understanding of the mechanisms of boundary management outside of Western 
Europe is especially limited since the contestations between communities and the state in non-
western contexts are often local and therefore are not well documented. As Partha Chatterjee 
(1993) argues about peasant resistance in India, protest in rural areas and in small personal 
circles can pass unnoticed compared to protest in central, urban areas with state surveillance. 
Ranajit Guha (1999) further attributes the erasure of such protests to the elitist nature of public 
records, such as police records, administrative accounts, which privileges the central state’s 
narrative of maintaining power and control. Finally, Asef Bayat (1997, 2000) argues that in 
many places, such as Iran, acts of collective resistance has been under-studied, as it consists of 
phenomenon that is sometimes difficult to see, such as encroachment, which include the 
strategies of the poor to acquire resources and space they need for survival. While they do not 
openly challenge the state, their widespread use underscores the need to examine them as a form 
of contentious politics. 
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Boundary-management in Pakistan similarly points to the need to re-conceptualize 
resistance. As Bayat suggests, resistance in Pakistan often comprises actions by individuals. 
However, given the uniformity of practices across my field site, I argue that such strategies 
represent a common understanding of boundaries. However, unlike the situation described by 
Bayat, such forms of resistance against the state are not led by the poor but by local elite, such as 
landlords. One way historically that the local elite have resisted the state is by maintaining their 
own form of dispute resolution known as the panchayati system or disputes adjudicated by a 
council of elders (Gilmartin 2003).  In the areas where I worked, the panchayati system does not 
exist in the same historical form with a formal council of elders who formally adjudicate village 
disputes, but kinship leaders continue to mediate disputes on an individual basis and assert their 
autonomy from the state. In this way, through boundary management, local elites seek to 
reconstitute their pre-colonial powers and influence that is undermined by the legal framework of 
the Pakistani state (Nelson 2011). In this chapter, I document particular cases of dispute 






4.2  LITERATURE 
 
 
Sociologists have consistently emphasized the importance of studying boundaries, namely how 
people categorize each other, behaviors, and places in order to make sense of reality, what 
Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár (2002) refer to as symbolic boundaries. These symbolic 
boundaries can often solidify into “objectified forms of social differences,” or social boundaries 
that shape an inequitable division of resources (Howard and Gaztambide-Fernandez 2010, 
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Lamont and Molnár 2002:168, Lareau 2000). This chapter will discuss boundary-making in the 
context of the state.   
The literature on state formation discusses how states emerge from the actions of the 
central elite and in this way are integrally shaped by society (Migdal 2001, Skocpol 1979, Tilly 
1992, Tilly 2005). While scholars focus on the impact of the state on society, there is no 
framework to explore the actual state/society boundary (Charrad 2011, Gramsci and Boothman 
1995, Mayrl and Quinn 2016, Skocpol 1979, Weber 1978/1922). In the contemporary literature, 
limits of the state have been depicted by weak institutions (Migdal 2001). For instance, in much 
of the developing world, the state/society boundary is delineated by the urban/rural distinction. 
That is, state institutions, such as the police and municipal services, are evident in central, urban 
areas, but disappear in rural or peri-urban areas. It is the absence of the state that establishes the 
boundary between the state and society.  I am less interested in the performance of state 
institutions or state failure than the agency of local actors in limiting the expansion of the state.  
In this section, I discuss three distinct literatures on boundaries. I first focus on the 
classical structural approaches to understanding state boundaries, including a discussion of Max 
Weber’s (1978/1922) categorization of states. Second, I discuss scholars who employ a cultural 
lens to depict how our understandings of the state are socially constructed, illuminating the 
limitations of the state (Anderson 2006, Mitchell 1999, Steinmetz 1999).  Finally, I turn to 
scholars who work within a more anthropological tradition to illustrate how particular social 
groups, including ethnic and kinship groups, shape and subvert boundaries to influence how their 
own group is recognized (Barth 1969, Scott 2009). I draw from this discussion of social 
boundaries to identify mechanisms relevant to the management of state boundaries. 
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4.2.1 The Processes of State Formation   
Institutional/structural approaches of the state draw on Émile Durkheim’s (1984/1933) model in 
which state boundaries demarcate an external border as well as an internal division of labor. For 
instance, Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen (1975) and others characterize the formation of 
the state as dual processes of penetration and integration (Tilly 1975). That is, state formation in 
Europe was marked by efforts of the central, often urban-based, elite to incorporate the local elite 
as well as the people residing in their jurisdiction into the enterprise of the state. This involved 
accessing both local natural resources and human power. In order to manage its fast-growing 
assets, the state drew more local manpower into the central state institutions and levied taxes 
from the population. According to historians, these institutions grew more diversified and 
specialized over time to meet the widening functions of the state (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1975, 
Tilly 1992). This understanding is consistent with Durkheim’s functionalist account in which the 
institutions of the state evolve organically to exert social order and facilitate the smooth running 
of society (Durkheim 1984/1933). While Durkheim distinguishes between institutions in modern 
or organic society, for the most part, he treats the state as a monolithic category, one that is 
enmeshed with society, a lens that obscures the process of boundary formation between states 
and society.  
A wide range of sociological literature on the state also obscures the boundaries between 
state and society by emphasizing the centralizing nature of state power and the complex ways in 
which the state can control or shape the population that resides within its geographic boundaries. 
This includes Michel Foucault’s (1977) idea of governmentality; Karl Marx’s (1975) 
understanding of social change; and Benedict Anderson’s (2006) depiction of the nation-state. 
According to the Foucaultian definition of power, the state’s power is pervasive and nearly 
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impossible for the individual to resist (Foucault 1977). Karl Marx’s (1975) depiction of the state 
in terms of bourgeois class interests as well his idea of social change also blurs the line between 
society and the state (see also Abrams 1988). Marx (1975) envisioned that the rise of the 
proletariat would do away with the state, establishing the proletariat society as the state. For 
Anderson (2006), the concept of the nation-state similarly blurs the boundary between state and 
society. He largely considers the state boundary to be an external, geographic boundary, which is 
critical to his understanding of the nation-state.  
4.2.2 An Institutional Take  
While Max Weber (1978/1922) does not directly reference state boundaries, he offers an implicit 
understanding in his discussion of how the nature of leadership shapes the relationship between 
the state and society. For instance, Weber argues that states that are ruled by a charismatic leader 
have more diffuse state/society boundaries than other states as they are shaped by the leader’s 
discretion. Similarly, he depicts modern states run by rational, bureaucracies as having 
boundaries that are clearly delineated by laws. Yet the Weberian idea of state assumes the 
conceptual integrity of the idea of statehood, and in doing so, ignores the role of sub-state actors 
in shaping the boundaries of the state, and indeed, the state itself.  
The limitation of the Webarian model also carries forth into adaptions of Weber’s ideal 
type to understand the more contemporary formation of statehood. For instance, Mouira Charrad 
(2001, 2011) extends Weber’s (1978/1922) discussion of patrimonialism, when rulers use 
personal ties to govern as opposed to laws and rules, to examine the processes of state-formation 
in the three countries of the Maghreb (see also Charrad 2011). Charrad examines how the state 
used strategies of marginalization, integration, or a combination of these to gain control over the 
local elite, such as kinship groups, which indelibly shaped the legal framework of countries in 
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the Maghreb. Charrad’s discussion of the role of kinship group usefully points to how the legal 
code was an important mechanism to control kinship groups. Such a legal code can serve as a 
mechanism of boundary management (Tilly 2004). However, like Weber, Charrad assumes the 
integrity of the state, and so does not focus on how the local elite interpreted, shaped, and 
influenced the legal framework. Therefore, we have only half a picture of what the processes of 
state formation entail. 
Weber’s (1978/1922) depiction of boundaries as “social closure” and Pierre Bourdieu’s  
(1977) subsequent theory of practice contribute to our understanding of boundary management. 
By social closure, Weber refers to how social groups delineate boundaries through the 
monopolization of resources and an emphasis on social difference based on a common ancestry 
and culture. Weber’s operationalization of ethnic boundaries is not unlike his focus on class 
boundaries. While his understanding of class includes the idea of a socioeconomic position, it 
also includes the associated practices of class, such as membership to social clubs, education, 
and a cultivated manner of speaking. Weber’s idea of status influenced Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) 
focus on practice. Bourdieu argues that a person’s class shapes their dispositions and associated 
lifestyle practices.  Weber’s and Bourdieu’s ideas of status or practice are similar to what Mayrl 
and Quinn (2016) refer to as objects demarcating boundaries. Again while Bourdieu and Weber 
are not referencing state boundaries, their discussion of how social differences are maintained 
through practices and other attributes can be adapted to study practices that contribute to 
maintaining state boundaries. 
Tilly’s (2004) work on boundaries moves us from objects demarcating boundaries to 
mechanisms that reproduce them. While Tilly is examining the theoretical construct of 
boundaries more widely, his mechanisms can also be used to study state boundaries. Tilly 
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usefully delineates between mechanisms that cause and constitute boundaries. For instance, he 
describes how boundaries may develop from mechanisms of imposition or when institutions such 
as the state extend their control to where it did not exist before. Tilly underscores two important 
mechanisms: 1) the demarcation of boundaries through inscription or erasure and 2) boundary 
management or activation and deactivation (see also Mayrl and Quinn 2016). As Mayrl and 
Quinn (2016), echoing Weber’s idea of closure, underscore, boundary management can lead to 
politicization or allow some actors to further their own self-interests. 
The institutional approach to state boundaries emphasizes how boundaries are shaped by 
the nature of political systems—delineating between traditional and modern structures (Weber 
1978/1922). This discussion of boundaries takes for granted the idea of a state and its structural 
focus obscures important local structures and actors. Weber (1978/1922) and Bourdieu’s (1977) 
discussion of particular attributes and practices that contribute to shaping boundaries is more 
useful as it points to factors that provide evidence of boundaries. Finally, Tilly’s (2004) 
discussion of mechanisms is important as it forces us to consider what allows boundaries to 
persist. His typology is an important start that needs to be refined through more empirical work.  
4.2.3 Cultural Conceptions of the State 
 
Scholars focusing more on cultural aspects of the state treat the state as a cultural construction 
bounded through symbols, rituals, and practices. But, this literature stops short of providing a 
theoretical framework to examine when/how state boundaries are activated. According to George 
Steinmetz (1999), while the state is a system comprised of institutions, it is also an idea, 
emphasizing how state power is conveyed and constructed through rituals (see also Abrams 
1988). For instance, Timothy Mitchell’s (1999) classic example of military parades shows how 
military rituals demonstrate state power and foster a sense of nationalism. Other rituals that 
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connote statehood include the pledge of allegiance, symbols, such as the flag, and other practices 
of the state, such as record-keeping (Cohn 1983, DiMaggio 1997, Geertz 1980, Joseph and 
Nugent 1994, Kertzer 1989, Mitchell 1991, Mitchell 1999). In addition to rituals, the 
construction of the state rests on local culture more generally. For instance, in discussing the 
construction of German nationhood, Rogers Brubaker (1992) emphasizes  how the central elite 
drew on and celebrated local culture, such as the German language and the communal pub-
culture. 
State boundaries also have cognitive and perceptual dimensions that are shaped by 
culture. These dimensions illustrate how the boundaries between the state and society are 
enmeshed and are critical to the state’s construction. For example citizens’ experience of military 
parades shape their future association with and expectations from the state (see also DiMaggio 
1997, Mayrl and Quinn 2016).  In this way, rituals link state structures to an individual’s 
cognitive schema, reinforcing the idea of states as constructions and their pervasive influence on 
society. Similarly, Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that the idea of a nation-state was partly 
conceived by envisioning boundary lines on a map—pointing to literally how boundaries 
contributed to making the idea of a state more tangible for its citizens. Berezin (1999) focuses on 
the cognitive dimension by discussing how the Italian state evoked the idea of state as a family to 
inspire loyalty among its citizens. This example suggests how the manipulation of state and 
family boundaries contributes to the state’s construction. Finally, Joseph Gerteis and Alyssa 
Goolsby (2005) show how American national identity was shaped by the concept of race, 
illustrating how state boundaries reflect wider racial and social boundaries.   
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 2014) depiction of states holding “meta-capital” illustrates the 
economic, cultural, and political dimensions of boundaries and the how states structure society. 
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Bourdieu is less interested in the mechanisms by which such boundaries are erected than on how 
states structure practices through its institutions. For instance, Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of doxa 
or beliefs that we take for granted points to how the structures such as the state exert an 
unconscious discipline on its citizens. Doxa is reproduced through class-based socialization. 
Therefore, to some extent, Bourdieu suggests that your relationship with the state will evolve 
differently based on your class position. However, given the immense capital of the state, it 
influences individuals across classes.  
Cultural accounts of the state emphasize how states are constructed through rituals, 
practices, and languages. In this way, we can see how state boundaries are enmeshed with 
societal ones, illustrating the pervasive influence of states. While cultural accounts of the state 
allude to boundaries by showing how states are constructed, the nature of the boundaries and 
how they shape people’s experience of the state remains elusive. For the most part, cultural 
theorists also neglect how racial and social boundaries shape the construction of states. 
4.2.4 Drawing from an Anthropological Tradition  
Unlike the sociological literature on state or class-based boundaries, the anthropological 
literature highlights the agency of social groups. There are two main approaches. First, Fredrick 
Barth’s (1969) classic model on maintaining ethnic boundaries emphasizes difference over 
cultural cohesion. James Scott (2009) makes a similar argument in his recent work on South-east 
Asia. He discusses how social groups have resisted the encroachment of states through social and 
cultural practices, such as not developing a written language and adopting nomadic economic 
practices. Second, some scholars, such as Collins (2004) and Goffman (1959) emphasize the 
micro-processes that promote social cohesion with the group, another form of boundary-making. 
 84 
Barth (1969) makes two critical theoretical contributions to our understanding of 
boundaries. One, he defines ethnicity as the ability of groups to maintain boundaries rather than 
groups defined by a particular form of cultural practice (see also Verdery 1994). While Barth’s 
thesis is widely accepted now, at the time he wrote, questioning the importance of culture was 
controversial. Barth argues that as cultural practices change and become similar among ethnic 
groups, it is insufficient to understand ethnicity by studying culture. Instead, it is also important 
to understand how ethnic difference is constructed and maintained through boundaries. Second, 
Barth emphasizes ascription or the ability of citizens to choose where they belong.  In this way, 
Barth emphasizes a continual process of boundary-formation. Through his study of Pathans, a 
social group in Pakistan, he illustrates how boundaries were shaped by demographic pressures, 
cultural mechanisms that promote ascription, as well as individual and group agency. Barth 
(1969) also underscores the importance of interaction between social groups—for example, how 
boundaries are shaped by group interdependence. Boundaries for Barth can be symbolic (Lamont 
and Molnár 2002) but at the same time can lead to social closure (Weber 1978/1922). Such 
boundaries can also lead to the formation of collective identity (Pachucki, Pendergrass and 
Lamont 2007) . 
The state’s construction of national identity as well as how citizens resist such efforts 
help scholars conceptualize boundaries. Katherine Verdery (1994) applies Barth’s discussion of 
ethnic boundaries to how states ascribe identity to effect a measure of political control. 
Therefore, she argues that an understanding of politics is necessary to show how states reproduce 
ethnic boundaries. For example, according to Verdery, states in the former Soviet Union forced 
their subjects to select a single national identity, undermining their regional and communal 
identities.  In Tilly’s terms, this would be a form of demarcation (Tilly 2004). Similar to 
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Verdery, Lynn Williams (1999), examining nationalism in Great Britain and Spain, emphasizes 
how states construct identities through language. Michael Herzfeld’s (1993) study of Greece 
similarly concludes that a local understanding of national identity is not the same as that 
promoted by the government, providing evidence of inter-state boundaries (see also Brubaker 
2004) and indicates why resistance provides a salient moment to examine state boundaries. 
Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (1990) in writing about state formation in the 
Middle East extend Barth’s discussion of ethnic difference to how tribes maintain boundaries 
from the state.  For them, tribe refers to a loose social organization, which may organize 
politically, where “kinship is the dominant idiom (Khoury and Kostiner 1990: 5).” They 
highlight how the constructions of state and tribes maintain boundaries by noting that “ ‘tribes 
and states have created and maintained each other’ ” (1990: 5). First, they acknowledge that 
there are a myriad of state actors, including tribes that play a political role and become state-like 
to maintain their autonomy (see also Cohen and Service 1978, Migdal 2005). In this way, the 
authors show how states and social groups residing within their boundaries develop symbiotic 
practices that continually influence boundaries with the state. This resonates with Mayrl and 
Quinn’s (2016) discussion of politicization because it illustrates how boundary management, 
referring to both the reinforcement and dissolution of boundaries, is a strategy to protect the self-
interest of tribes. Second, they discuss how living in deserts or mountainous areas allowed tribal 
groups to maintain autonomy—suggesting the importance of physical distance to boundary 
management (see also Scott 2009).  Third, they find that local elites have struck various deals 
with government in order to maintain local control—suggesting how boundaries exerted by local 
actors can also be formalized and reproduced by the state. 
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Acts of resistance against the state provide an important lens to understand the nature of 
state boundaries and how particular actors influence them. In his discussion of how hill tribes of 
Southeast Asia evaded control, James Scott (2009) breaks from the traditional literature on state 
formation. Contrary to the focus on centralizing, Scott describes local strategies to resist the 
state’s expansion, including: 1) employing physical distance by escaping to the hills (a territory 
Scott refers to as Zomia); 2) remaining illegible by not developing written text; and 3) cultivating 
resources that can’t be easily counted by the state. Scott’s central contribution is to understand 
how these historic clashes between the central state and groups residing in Zomia have shaped 
the nature of state power, boundaries between the hill-tribes and the state, and the sub-culture of 
Zomia. Other scholars similarly discuss how resistance provides an opportunity to examine how 
social groups push back on state boundaries. For instance, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson 
(1992) point out that self-determination movements have often shaped state ideologies. George 
Bisharat (1997) discusses how the Palestinian relationship to the land has contributed to the idea 
of Palestinian nationhood.  
A diverse literature, ranging from the French revolution to the development of local 
politics, emphasizes the importance of physical space to the construction of the boundaries. 
Roger Gould’s (1995) discussion of the French revolution points to how boundaries between the 
state and those elements resisting the state were shaped by particular neighborhoods. As these 
neighborhoods were inaccessible by the central elite, they created durable boundaries and 
became integral to the organization of the rebellion. Ronald Weissman (1989), writing about 
state formation in Italy, emphasizes the importance of place for political candidates. That is, their 
ability to navigate local boundaries allowed them to win local elections—again emphasizing the 
presence of local boundaries as well as their influence on the political processes of the state. 
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Scott (1985, 1990) and Asef Bayat (2000) underscore the importance of using discursive 
strategies and “everyday” practices to better understand the activation of boundaries between 
citizens and the state. In addition to particular acts and strategies of resistance, Scott (1990) 
directs our attentions to discursive strategies, what he calls hidden transcripts, where the 
dominated class is able to develop alternate strategies to challenge the status quo. Scott (1985) 
also talks about other cultural forms of resistance, such as playing dumb, acting slow, where 
individuals can resist the elite without disturbing the wider social order. Such practices are 
important to consider when examining cases that have not experienced wider forms of collective 
action. Bayat (2000) writes about similar acts of resistance, focusing on individual acts, which he 
claims that over time can inform cultural practice. It is important to underscore that Scott’s focus 
on the resistance patterns shaped in Zomia and Bayat’s on common practice are pointing to the 
need to examine more localized units of analysis to understand boundary-making. 
Revising Barth’s classic formulation, Andreas Wimmer (2008, 2013) argues that cultural 
difference is not enough to understand boundary-making, and makes a case for considering the 
social field, including the institutional landscape, distribution of power, and wider network. 
Wimmer links the agency of actors in drawing boundaries to how they are shaped by wider 
social fields, thereby linking cognition to social structures. For instance, ascription is a cognitive 
choice where people seek to align themselves with more powerful ethnic groups. At the same 
time, people are constrained by where they sit in the power hierarchy. Wimmer uses the idea of 
differential power contained in social networks to explain why individuals of African descent 
were included into Brazil’s nation-building project after independence but excluded in the United 
States’ (see also Marx 1999). 
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4.3.  UNDERSTANDING STATE/LOCAL BOUNDARIES IN PAKISTAN  
I draw on the institutional, cultural, and anthropological approaches to understand state 
boundaries in Pakistan. First, I draw on Weber (1978/1922) and Bourdieu’s (1977) focus on 
structures and associated status and practices to find evidence of state/local boundaries. I also 
invoke on Tilly’s (2004) discussion of the mechanisms that contribute to demarcating and 
managing boundaries. From the cultural literature I discuss the importance of rituals and 
practices and the importance of gatekeepers. I look for connections between practices and 
underlying cognitive structures. Finally, I draw on Barth’s (1969) understanding of ascription to 
underscore the agency of gatekeepers in shaping boundaries. I also explore how physical spaces 
and discourse contribute to boundary management (Gould 1995, Muir and Weissman 1989, Scott 
1985, Scott 2009). 
As it is important to locate the formation of state/society boundaries within particular 
social structures, such as kinship, I explore the role that kinship groups in Pakistan play in 
managing state/local boundaries. While kinship groups have historically played a state-like role, 
I argue that their current role in managing boundaries is based on the kinship group’s need to 
reproduce and maintain their status. Nicolas Martin (2015) emphasizes that due to the 
industrialization and the increase in service jobs, being a landowner does not carry the same 
status as it once did. He emphasizes that landlords have entered into national and local politics as 
a means to maintain and create status. I argue that while elections are one strategy landlords 
employ to preserve influence, it is important to examine a wider range of practices.  
Dispute resolution is an important local practice that allows kinship leaders to demarcate 
and manage boundaries. These practices also have a cognitive dimension as they contribute to 
shaping ideas regarding justice, where social order is considered more important than a fair trial, 
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and emphasize the importance of kinship and other local connections. These practices often 
establish moral boundaries between their communities and the state. The role of kinship elite 
also points to their important roles as gatekeepers.  
Space and physical distance shape these boundaries as well. While my field site does not 
fit Scott’s (2009) definition of Zomia, as it lies in the central plain regions, the idea of distance 
from the state is relevant in understanding local boundaries. Even though Pakistan has a modern 
state infrastructure, parts of the country are connected through roads that date from the period of 
the British colonial government. This physical distance emphasizes the conceptual distance from 
the state as well as the salience of local community.  
In the next section of the chapter, I examine how the role of kinship group in dispute 
resolution contributes to boundaries. I discuss the importance of spaces such as the dera in 
demarcating boundaries as well as the connections between deras. I also detail who some of the 
most influential gatekeepers are, which also reveals the nature of boundaries. Finally, I reveal the 




4.4.  BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT: PLAYING THE “STATE” 
 
Local kinship leaders in Pakistan carefully police boundaries with the state. While there is 
precedent for the historical autonomy of kinship groups, today people police boundaries for two 
reasons. First, control over state boundaries allows kinship leaders to maintain autonomy from 
the state. In other words, managing boundaries provides an opportunity for kinship groups to 
build political capital by playing a state-like role. Second, to a much more limited extent, kinship 
groups can influence who has access to state resources.  
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The modern-day state/local boundaries of Pakistan were partly shaped by the British 
government’s development of a civil and penal code in 1880 and 1860 respectively (Caton 2004, 
Gilmartin 2003). During the same period, the British colonial administration granted state-like 
powers to kinships groups, so that they could support the colonial governance systems. For 
example, the colonial administration appointed the heads of larger land-owning kinship groups 
as local tax collectors, or numberdars. In David Gilmartin’s (2003) analysis of cattle theft in the 
province of Punjab in 1913, he describes the evolution of a parallel mechanism of dispute 
resolution. His discussion underscores the salience of dispute resolution as a historical boundary 
management mechanism. He points to how kinship leaders chose when to invoke institutions of 
the state versus kinship-based methods of dispute resolution. For example, kinship leaders 
brought the theft of cows from private land “ from inside building and yard” to institutions of the 
state, drawing on their social contract with the colonial state as property owners (Gilmartin 
2003:53). At the same time, they continued to use customary forms of dispute resolution for theft 
from common property, which was seen by the villagers to violate “collective proprietary rights” 
(Gilmartin 2003:55). Gilmartin’s (2003) account of the colonial justice system evokes Tilly’s 
(2004) discussion of how the imposition of a new legal order may have contributed to boundary 
activation for theft from common land and deactivation of this boundary for other matters. 
Similarly, the role of local elite in navigating this boundary underscores the importance of 














While Pakistan has a modern judicial system, comprising lower courts in the districts, high 
courts in the provincial capitals, and a supreme court, a significant percentage of cases are 
mediated outside of the state-run system. There is no data on the number of cases that are taken 
to the informal dispute resolution processes. However, my research suggests that a significant 
number of villagers, if not a majority, choose to adjudicate their cases through the informal 
dispute resolution system at some stage. Individuals who file cases in the court often also seek 
out informal mediation at some point during the process or even simultaneously. One landlord 
who manages a dera or deradar voiced a common opinion: “Eventually cases that go to the 
government are resolved locally.” Based on estimates, there are approximately 2.1 million cases 
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pending within the Pakistani court system (Siddiqi 2016). Some people emphasize that the local 
dispute resolution system is much more efficient as compared to the state, especially given this 
tremendous backlog of cases. However, I argue that the existence of the local dispute mechanism 
is not only in response to the failure of the Pakistani judicial system, but also a strategy of local 
gatekeepers to cultivate capital and resist the state.13 Importantly, deradars don’t only provide 
access to their own kin or even people in their region, but to anyone who wishes to register the 
case. For certain deras associated with well-respected individuals, claimants come from within 
the larger region. For a villager, it is quite possible that they have interacted with the dera at 
some point in their lifetime for themselves or their kin. 
 
From my Field Notes: 
 
The day that I visited Nayyar Shah’s dera, there were over 25 individuals waiting for 
their cases to be heard. They were sitting around an open courtyard while Nayyar sat 
facing them on a table filled with case files and a note-pad. As I sat there over the course 
of the morning, I realized that the majority of individuals were not there for themselves 
but as a moral support or witnesses for others. In fact, there were only three pending 
cases that morning. They included a dispute about a contract to sell milk between two 
parties, a land dispute, and a divorce. Nayyar heard the argument of each case with the 
wider audience arguing with him from time to time. The discussions were not only verbal 
but Nayyar made detailed notes that he inserted into the case files. The trial at Nayyar’s 
dera was set-up very much like a lower court, creating a striking parallel with the state’s 
judicial mechanism (Field Notes October 2, 2016)                                                          13 Matthew Nelson (2011) similarly points to how the backlog of cases isn’t a deterrent for people filing cases in the 
lower courts. In fact, people file court cases to gain time or to put pressure on their opponents, so that they can reach 
a reach a more advantageous settlement outside of the courts. 
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The day at Nayyar’s dera suggested that, like the court system, local landlords organize hearings, 
maintain case files, and hear arguments. While they lack the means to investigate cases, they 
count on the claimants to collect and present evidence. In lieu of evidence, the deradars often 
rely on character witnesses. I was struck by the extent of the discussion and debate. The local 
dispute resolution system is often referred to as a panchayati system, referring to a council of 
elders, a process that is considered closed and hierarchical. There may be trials that are more 
hierarchical, but this one was not. Nayyar presents a new, modern face of deradars. While 
Nayyar was the ranking landlord, the “trial” was not passive. There was significant debate 
between the two sides as well as with Nayyar. Many individuals argued that he was giving too 
much time to one individual or ignoring the pertinent facts. While the claimants presented their 
cases, Nayyar weighed in, often asking questions to clarify the issue or managing the wider 
discussion. 
 The presence of a local dispute resolution mechanism allows individuals a measure of 
choice in addressing their grievances. While dispute resolution through kinship groups is an 
established process, dating back centuries according to Nawazish Shah, a local landlord and 
mediator, it is also an informal one. There are common, accepted processes involved, but local 
landlords and claimants have some discretion as to the rules that they apply. For instance, 
landlords may adjudicate minor cases directly. However, for larger cases, especially ones 
involving politically powerful people, individuals may confer with other deradars or refer the 
matter to their local elected representatives. Similarly, the claimant and the defendant can decide 
which dera to take their case. If they don’t trust a local landlord, they often can discuss and agree 
on a second candidate. Also, if the case has not been decided in their favor, individuals can ask 
another landlord to re-try it. And, individuals also retain the option to take their issue to the 
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state’s judicial system. While boundary management mechanisms can be politicized and 
managed carefully, the multiple avenues to seek justice also suggest that local claimants some 
have agency in where they address their disputes. In essence, the mediator and individuals 
involved play a role in activating this boundary, not unlike Barth’s (1969) discussion of 
ascription.  
 The cases that come to the dera often reveal wider political rivalries. For instance, the 
individuals who came to Nayyar’s dera to settle their dispute over the contract to sell milk came 
from over two hours away, brought multiple vehicles, and about a dozen men. Apparently this 
was the second time they had come to Nayyar and Nayyar asked them to come back for a third 
time with more evidence regarding the price of milk. I asked Nayyar why they would come such 
a distance at a considerable expense when the amount in dispute was not very high. He did not 
answer directly but suggested that the two sides are from different political factions, and this 
milk dispute reflects an ongoing political dispute. That is, this case may be part of their wider 
efforts to shame and threaten the opposing side. In this way, the dera is a site where different 
political interests play out and take shape. 
4.4.2 Demarcating Boundaries 
 
Deras, described as a central village institution, are the primary site of dispute resolution. In this 
way, the physical space of the dera symbolizes the state/local boundary (Lamont and Molnár 
2002).  
From my Field Notes: 
 
Omar Cheema’s dera is a grey concrete one-story structure, flying the Pakistani flag, 
and sub-divided into three sections. The first section is a partially covered, paved 
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courtyard. This main area can easily accommodate several dozen participants. I have 
seen Omar’s courtyard transform from a space where he hosts half a dozen men to 
discuss local politics to a dispute trial. (Field Notes February 16, 2015). 
 
 




The distinct areas of the dera also point to different dynamics of the dispute resolution process. 
The courtyard, providing a communal space, is the front-stage of the dera, and is accessible to 
the wider village (Goffman 1959). The accessibility of the dera suggests transparency as well as 
access, as any passerby can witness the proceedings. The openness contributes to a form of peer 
pressure. As the deradar has limited ability to sanction the participants, the openness of the trial 
helps to legitimate the proceedings to some extent. That is, the wider public is not unlike an 
informal jury, and informally endorses the decision of the deradar through their participation. In 
the cultural literature on the state, boundary management is seen to be a role of the state, one that 
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is felt through the symbolic show of power or enforcement of state rules (Mayrl and Quinn 2016, 
Mitchell 1999). However, in this case, it is the landlord and other local elites who play a 
powerful role in activating or demarcating the boundaries between state and society. In part, 
these boundaries are maintained through the various forms of role-playing undertaken by kinship 
members that in a court of law would include the judge, jury, and the witnesses. This role-
playing sets up the dera as a construct that rivals the influence of the state. 
Just beyond the courtyard, Omar has built an enclosed room, which resembles a large 
reception area. This room has even more seats, and also doubles up as a guest room for 
travelers, which usually include the local patrolling police units.  
As this room affords more privacy, I’ve seen Omar use it to conduct closed negotiations. 
Omar also uses this room in the colder winter months, so his dera is open throughout the 
year. Finally, Omar’s personal office faces the large reception hall where he holds 
private meetings. This is a smaller room with a western style desk and chairs, and can 
accommodate a handful of people. Above his desk, Omar has hung a picture of his father, 
who was also a deradar. Political posters of candidates that Omar has supported line the 
walls. (Field Notes February 16, 2015). 
The existence of a second space, the backroom, reveals that sometimes the front-room 
performances and back-stage negotiations can occur simultaneously. The front-room 
performances allow Omar to build consensus. At the same, time, through the backroom, he can 
rely on the persuasive powers that come with his position. Depending on the case, the role of the 
front and back room can be reversed as well. 
Individuals like Omar derive capital from their ability to manage boundaries. In part, 
Omar is able to host dispute resolution trials at his dera given the economic and political 
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isolation of his village, signifying a sort of distance from the state. Deras like Omar’s are likely 
to be found in villages where the state has limited influence on a daily basis. Their ability to exist 
is also based on their physical distance from the state (Scott 2009).  The larger deras that served 
as a site for dispute resolution were largely located in rural areas in Jaranwala and Chak Jhumra, 
where these are often the only places people can turn to during an emergency. Jaranwala was 
more physically remote with a limited infrastructure while Chak Jhumra was physically close but 
politically and economically isolated. There are deras in the city, but they have the feel of 
community meeting spaces rather than informal court rooms. While the location of Omar’s dera 
emphasizes distance from the state, the flag that Omar flew over his dera seemed to connote both 
state power as well as the role of the deradar as a gatekeeper to the state. As the posters on his 
wall suggested, he also plays a role in promoting local candidates, another way that he maintains 
influence. 
A dera’s influence is not only shaped by the socioeconomic position of the deradar, 
although being a landlord provides access. Nawazish, Omar’s grandson, commented that even 
though his family had smaller landholdings than others in the village, they maintained an 
influential dera. “You won’t find another dera like this one in this area.” It is important to point 
out by landlords, I am not necessarily referring to owners of feudal estates. While there are 
swaths of Pakistan, especially in the South, where you can find larger estates of hundreds of 
acres, in my field site, the majority of the landowners owned 3-10 acres of land, which allowed 
them to have the status of landowners and maintain their own dera. There were a handful of 
larger landlords as well. Some moved to the city and had appointed relatives to maintain local 
ties. However, landlords and individuals who frequented deras emphasized that a landlord’s 
status is based on local presence, so the influence of landlords who move away and manage their 
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interests remotely declines. For this reason, a former member of the national assembly (MNA) 
who owns 100 acres of land dedicates a significant amount of his time to the village as realizes 
that the status he derives from the land is insufficient (see also Martin 2015). 
Social order within the dera is not fixed, but is constructed based on the audience, the 
issue, and to some extent, the position of the deradar. While villagers have some ability to 
participate within the dera, it is important to locate the interactions within Wimmer’s (2013) 
understanding of a social field. In most cases, villagers will not have much room to oppose the 
decision of the deradar. While exerting boundaries, deradars can maintain a more formal, 
hierarchical position in the dera, signifying their role as a local leader. In contrast, in private, 
they can adopt their private personas and rely on existing social relationships to build consensus. 
For instance, even in my interviews, the deradars would present a different face of authority 
while seated in the courtyard instead of their more private quarters. While seated in the dera, one 
landlord argued that divorce has no place in Pakistani society, posturing for the wider group that 
had gathered in the courtyard. At the same time, when we moved inside to have tea, the deradar 
admitted that his own daughter was divorced. As a community, the dera establishes and 
reinforces a cultural schematic through which people maintain their local relationships. At the 
same time, through public displays, it also serves a means to reproduce that schemata or socialize 
its participants.  In particular, such displays shape ideas about the quality of justice received and 
the position of women (DiMaggio 1997, Swidler 1997). In this way, the dera not only orders 
people’s social relationships but also how they think about boundaries or cognitive structures 
(Mayrl and Quinn 2016). 
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4.4.3 Durable Boundaries  
My research shows that village-level deras are often are linked to a wider network of deras, 
underscoring the durable nature of boundaries.  
In one village, I came across a case that involved the shooting of a shopkeeper that was 
taken to two deras associated with Omar and Usman Cheema. Omar and Usman were 
from the same kinship group but not directly related, and both served as village deradars. 
I visited Usman’s dera first. He laid out the details of the case where two local teenagers, 
who were drunk, had fired at a shopkeeper over a dispute about the price of gas. 
Apparently, the shopkeeper was charging Rs. 10 (10 cents) more in the village than the 
city price to account for the cost of transporting it from the city on his motorbike. The 
dispute escalated and the boys shot the shopkeeper three times in the leg, arm, and 
stomach. Then they took the shopkeeper to their home and threatened to kill him. Usman 
heard of what happened and intervened. He told them that they could be charged with 
murder, so they should let him go. The shopkeeper’s family filed a case with the police 
and one of the shooters was in prison. According to Omar, the family of the shooter had 
approached him a few days later to ask him to make peace. (Field Notes February 16, 
2015). 
First, it is important to note that according to Usman, his role was not unlike that of the police. 
He was the first responder on the scene and asked the boys to let the shopkeeper go. He also 
played a role mediating between the shopkeeper’s family and the police. While the shopkeeper’s 
family was pursuing their police case, the family of the boys approached Omar to make peace—
pointing to how often there are often parallel processes ongoing for the same case. It is also 
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important to note that Omar and Usman’s deras had different roles in this process pointing to 
how deras operate within a nested hierarchy. 
Omar’s dera is described as a higher or more influential dera in the village. While 
Usman mediates in his living room, Omar has a formal set-up (described above). Usman 
claimed that both parties had approached him on the same day. The victim claimed that 
the police were not treating the case as attempted murder but a lesser charge of 
unintentional harm. The family of the boys, afraid of retaliation, wanted to make peace. 
Usman said that once the victim had cooled down he and Omar would help to make 
peace, suggesting that the case would eventually be mediated locally (Field Notes 
February 16, 2015). 
This link between the deras underscores how boundary-management is shaped by the wider 
power structure. On one hand, the traditions and practices of a particular landlord and his dera 
constitute the boundaries between his local community and the state. At the same time, the deras 
are linked, so that the larger, more formal dera shapes the activity of each village dera by 
reinforcing the dispute resolution processes and contributing to a common case history. It is 
important not to overstate the hierarchy as the links between the deras are informal.  
This hierarchy between deras is partly shaped by the deradar’s status and access to a 
wider political network. As suggested above, the deradar has a certain status from his position as 
a landowner, although access to land is not the only criteria. Distance from the state also allows a 
deradar to cultivate status. Distance from the state entails both physical distance as well as the 
ability of the deradar to operate with autonomy. For instance, Omar mentioned that even the 
lower courts have accepted documentations of the decisions that he has mediated as evidence—
suggesting the autonomy and legitimacy of his dera. Finally, a dera’s influence is shaped by 
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access to a wider political network, such as the police and elected officials whom the deradar can 
rely on to exert political pressure on his rivals.  In this case, Omar had greater political capital, 
which is why the family of the claimants turned to him to mediate peace. Usman’s role as the 
lesser deradar was to respond in the immediate aftermath of the incident. It is important to note 
that both deradars reinforced the importance of making peace once both sides had cooled down 
even though their sympathies lay with the shopkeeper, underscoring to how deras universally 
emphasize social order over justice. 
The existence of connections between deras, even informal ones, strengthens the idea 
that deras are an alternate to state-run justice agencies. That is, these deras are not merely site-
specific. Their connections and the uniformity of processes across deras suggest an internal 
structure and logic. All the deradars and local residents whom I interviewed outlined that they 
share a similar process, suggesting common, widespread understanding of the mechanism. One 
claimant may pursue his case in multiple deras simultaneously to ensure a favorable response or 
may appeal a deradar’s decision at another dera.  In most cases, villagers will appeal the 
decision of a local village-level dera to a more formal one. The original deradar may attend the 
new hearing in person and provide a justification for his earlier decision. But such actions are 
largely voluntary. Each deradar has his own jurisdiction, and is not subject to the ruling of 
another deradar. Even though the connections between the deras are loose, the networked deras 
represent what Tilly calls (2005) trust networks or networks characterized by high levels of trust 
among members, limited access, and wider opposition to the state. The networked deras suggest 
that trust networks not only structure social relationships within the network but also with the 
state. The network of deras represents the architecture of the trust networks. 
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4.4.4 The Gate-Keepers  
An understanding of the key mediators provides insights into the wider mechanisms of boundary 
management. As Lamont (1992) argues, some individuals serve as key gatekeepers in shaping 
boundaries because of their position as employers or culture producers.  While landowners 
historically served as mediators, there is greater variation in this role today. As discussed in the 
last chapter, individuals are able to cultivate capital by entering into and investing in reciprocal 
ties.  According to Asghar, my assistant, competing landlords draw on different strategies to 
develop their influence and construct their public roles. The manner in which they construct their 
roles to some extent shapes the local boundary. For example, some reference their family lineage 
setting themselves up as rivals to the state. Others emphasize their connections to the state and 
seem more like local liaisons to the state. This is not unlike Lamont’s (1992) discussion of how 
the differing position of the gatekeepers  in France and the United States shapes the nature of 
boundaries between the upper and middle classes. But, as Asghar points out, individuals may be 
born into certain roles but choose to strategically activate them in order to establish boundaries14.  
Women rarely serve as formal mediators, but some can informally intervene in cases 
involving women in their community. For example, in Ijaz’s village, the school principal helped 
the mother of one her students to convince her husband to let her teach at her school. Similarly, 
another local teacher convinced the family of one of her students to let her study even the family 
did not want her to complete high school. However, in general, the ability for women to mediate 
is limited by the strictly defined public/private boundaries. Even in instances where women 
played a role in dispute resolution, their intervention is consistent with widely accepted gender 
norms.                                                          
14 Personal Communication, January 27, 2015. 
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In this section, I provide an overview of the local actors leading the dispute resolution 
processes. It is important to keep in mind that mediators are often not acting alone, but with their 
kinship group. The three most common kind of mediators include: 1) larger landlords, 2) 
numberdars or customary revenue collectors, and 3) elected officials. More recently, especially, 
there are self-appointed mediators, who include more mobile women as well as local 
philanthropists who have cultivate respect through their good deeds. These roles often overlap, 
but I include them here, as each represents a different claim to legitimacy.  
4.4.4.1 Landlords As landlords, the families of Nayyar and Nawazish Shah have 
historically played a role in dispute management. However, while their family has an illustrious 
reputation in the area, their ability to play that role today underscores their own agency. Here 
Barth’s emphasis on ascription seems to apply. According to Nayyar, his family collectively 
holds 2500 acres of land in the village and his family has played a role in the governance of the 
village since when the area was first settled before the British colonial rule. In this role, their 
forefathers served as village heads and frequently resolved disputes, hosted outsiders, and 
provided a social safety net for villagers. However, Nayyar and Nawazish were not in line for the 
deradar’s role. Nayyar is the youngest son of his father, who is Nawazish’s elder brother. As 
Nayyar’s older brother was not interested in playing the role of mediator, Nayyar decided to take 
on that family role. Nayyar claims that as a boy, he was keenly interested in village politics. He 
often used to sit with his father while he made decisions, and, over time, his father started 
consulting with him on his cases. Similarly, when his brother died, Nawazish also made a bid to 
take over from his brother.  
As Nayyar and Nawazish are breaking from tradition, there is some friction between 
them. Even though they are from the same family, they organize rival deras that are located on 
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the same street. Nawazish complains how Nayyar is too young for this role, while Nayyar 
bristles at how his uncle undercuts him. This rivalry has persisted over the two year period that I 
was visiting their dera. Fueling their rivalry, they have developed distinctive styles of dispute 
resolution. Nayyar prides himself on swift, efficient justice, emphasizing his ability to resolve 
cases on the day they are submitted. Nawazish evokes the thoughtful, deliberate manner of an 
older gentlemen.  Sometimes, he hears cases half a dozen times before he rules. While Nayyar 
emphasizes his accessibility, Nawazish makes people wait hours before he’ll see them.  
Drawing on their family’s lineage is a common way that Nayyar and Nawazish construct 
boundaries. Both Nayyar and Nawazish underscore that the village is part of their family’s 
jurisdiction, an area where the police is hesitant to thread. Nawazish emphasized: “The police 
ask for our permission before they come to our district.” Nayyar and Nawazish live in Chiniot, 
which used to be a sub-district of Faisalabad, but was declared an independent district in 2009. 
Chiniot has functioning police stations and local courts, but Nayyar and Nawazish claim that 
their authority is more legitimate as their family has governed Chiniot since before Pakistan’s 
independence.  They claim that even the British colonial administration recognized their family’s 
right to rule. That is, they draw on their family’s historical autonomy to demarcate their 
boundary. The structuralist perspective would suggest that the authority of the Shahs is based on 
the historical role their family played in governing Chiniot and how that autonomy was 
recognized by the British. Instead, I underscore how the Shahs instrumentally draw on this 
history. In other words, by claiming a position that traditionally wouldn’t have been theirs based 
on their lineage, they are constructing their own authority. This is in line with my discussion of 
political capital as a construction rather than a structural position.  
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The Shahs also draw on their family’s role as spiritual leaders in the region. That is, they 
claim that they are Syeds or that their family is directly descended from the same family as 
Prophet Muhammad. As such their claim to legitimacy goes back even before the British 
colonial regime. Both historical allusions emphasize the myriad forms of boundary management. 
By emphasizing their independence under the British, the Shahs emphasize how their history is 
even older than the Pakistani state, emphasizing the durability of local/state boundaries. And, as 
Syeds or descendants of the prophet, they also claim a moral authority. The majority of landlords 
are not Syeds and do not hold a religious position. In fact, most landlords whom I interviewed 
were careful to point out that religion and dispute resolution did not occupy the same realm. But, 
the Shahs are a special case and have local spiritual followers, many who travel from afar to pay 
them respects, especially during festivals. By drawing on their family’s foundational role, they 
emphasize their authority through a construction of the sacred. At the same time, such boundary-
drawing is not only symbolic but draws from a wider cognitive schema that privileges religion 
(see also Mayrl and Quinn 2016). While the Shah use their moral authority to establish 
themselves as leaders, their rulings often evoke customary law more often than Islamic 
jurisprudence.  
4.4.4.2 Numberdars Another common way that people draw boundaries is by drawing on 
their family’s status as numberdars. For them, this was a position that the British administrators 
created for local tax collectors, who also were also usually landlords. Caton (2004) discusses 
how the British administration selected such individuals as representatives of the Crown, 
attempting to replicate the British aristocratic system—which it claimed was a more stable 
system of governance. Historically, the colonial administration provided numberdars with an 
acre of land and a share of the revenue that he collected (Nelson 2011). While the position no 
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longer formally exists, landlords who claim to be numberdars continue to play a role in dispute 
resolution. There may be thousands of numberdars, but not all choose to play this role. Some 
draw on their family’s history to establish their own dera and use the status of numberdar to 
cultivate capital. To that point, I’ve seen billboards with the contact information of numberdars 
outside villages—in an attempt to formalize a role that has become defunct in some areas. I’ve 
also seen numberdar written on a car’s license plate. The letters spelling out numberdar are even 
in the same color green as the Pakistani flag to make it seem like an official plate. In the same 
way that the state relies on symbols, such as the flag, the position of numberdars also has 
symbolic value given its historical ties (Mitchell 1999). By publicizing this connection, local 





Figure 5 Numberdar License Plate    
There is a discernable difference between the boundaries shaped by numberdars and 
families like the Shahs. Numberdars often are relying on the capital they gained from their 
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family’s past role within the colonial administration. For them, the state/local boundary 
symbolizes local autonomy but does not have the same moral heft as the boundary drawn by the 
Shahs and is more permeable. The police whom I interviewed reported how the numberdar is 
usually their first point of contact within the village when they are solving a case. For example, if 
there is an ongoing investigation, the police will generally come to the numberdars first to gather 
evidence. Part of their desire to approach the numberdar stems from the fact that police resources 
are incredibly limited, so they need to rely on numberdars for local information.  
Ijaz, a local numberdar, managed the boundary between his village and the state by 
serving as a liaison to the police.  I visited his dera on several occasions where he was mediating 
the case of Yasir, a man who claimed that his wife robbed him of his property. As his mediator, 
Ijaz was not offering to mediate with Yasir’s wife but advising him on how he must pursue the 
case in court. Ijaz also suggested that if he was successful in helping Yasir with his property, he 
would request a cut of the profits. While the Shahs have greater ability to demarcate or activate 
boundaries, Ijaz’s role pertains more to boundary management. That is, Ijaz policies the 
boundary so that he can develop political capital and profit from his relationship. In contrast, the 
Shahs claimed that they even hold the police at bay. Ijaz’s ability to manage the boundary is 
partly shaped by the personality of the local police chief. Some police may be more heavy- 
handed, but, in most instances, given the police’s lack of resources and to preserve Ijaz’s good 
will, they respect his boundary. 
4.4.4.3 Elected Officials State-local boundaries are not always distinct, and can overlap. 
The role of local elected officials as mediators reflects the overlap in the boundaries. Even 
though some of these deradars are also elected representatives, when undertaking dispute 
resolution they also rely on informal strategies. It is important to place such mediators within the 
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context of Pakistan’s history of local government, which reflects the government’s attempt to 
shape local boundaries. The lowest tier of local government, known as a union council, covers an 
area of half a dozen villages. The geographic distribution is not dissimilar to the dera. According 
to Ali Cheema, Asim Khwaja, and Adnan Qadir (2005), military-led governments in Pakistan 
have historically instituted the local system in order to gain legitimacy at the grassroots.15 
However, civilian-led governments have historically repealed it as it drew power away from the 
provincial government by establishing a parallel patronage system. Today, some provinces, 
including Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh have established elected local 
governments whereas elections took place in Punjab in 2015, but the local bodies were not 
functional until January 2017. The ruling party, PML, has opposed the local government system 
as undermining its centralization efforts and undercutting its political patronage networks 
(Express Tribune 2017).  
 Many former elected leaders equate the union council (UC) system to the dera system. 
One former head or nazim of the union council said: “The UC system is a panchayati system and 
it is a good system.  The government should support it, as it works well.” In drawing the link 
between the UC and the panchayati system, the Nazim emphasized that the UC system was a 
good one because it was local and drew on customary dispute resolution practices. In this way, 
the state seeks to graft onto and gain legitimacy from these informal processes and collapse the 
boundaries between the formal state and local system.  
The local elite use local government elections to consolidate their power and manage the 
boundary between the state and the local village. Very often, elected officials are local landlords, 
numberdars or their kin. For instance, Nayyar Shah ran for the position of UC nazim. He did not                                                         
15 According to Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir (2005), military-led governments have enacted a system of local 
government in 1959, 1979, and 2001 under Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul Haq, and Musharraf. The civilian 
governments that followed have repealed them. 
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win, but the ruling party recognized his popular support and appointed him the head of their local 
youth wing. While before the election, Nayyar claimed a moral authority, by running for 
election, he’s make a bid to formalize his power through the institutions of the state. Other 
landlords whom I interviewed did win the 2015 local election. This allows them to draw on their 
elected mandate to legitimate their local role and manage boundaries. Contrary to the intention of 
the Pakistani government, elected leaders manage the formal boundary of the state and their 
community very carefully to allow them to earn local capital. For instance, they can draw on 
their new formal powers to continue earning capital by, for example, mediating disputes and 
granting divorces. While Imtiaz, a former elected nazim, is no longer within local government, 
people still ask him to mediate their local problems—in other words, his formal role continues to 
allow him to generate capital.  
The history of the local government ordinance (LGO) that devolved power from the 
provincial to district governments in 2001 emphasizes the role of the state in boundary 
management. While military-led governments developed the LGO to recast local/state 
boundaries to win legitimacy, the provincial governments have repealed it as a way to penetrate 
local networks. Similarly, the local elite partly instrumentalized the LGO to gain state resources 
for local development and gain formal powers to divorce—which allowed them to further build 
capital. This example suggests that state/local boundaries are circumscribed by attempts of 
various central and local actors to gain legitimacy. That is, local boundaries are shaped by 
individual desires to gain capital as well as the mechanisms created by the state to win loyalty. 
This case emphasizes the importance of linking individual incentives to the wider structures as 




4.4.5 Drawing Boundaries: Jurisdiction of the Dera  
An understanding of the different cases that are addressed locally and ones taken to the police 
point to the nature of boundaries and how local residents experience the state. Historically, 
villagers claim that most disputes concern zan (women), zar (wealth), or zamin (land).16 Further, 
as these issues pertain to relationships among kinship groups, they are handled locally. When 
drawing or demarcating boundaries, most kinship leaders noted the following dynamics: 1) 
nature of the case which they often refer to as the seriousness of the case; 2) whether issues of 
honor are involved, especially issues involving women; and 3) local feuds within kinship groups.  
Almost all the mediators from all three categories noted that they prefer to resolve 
“small” or what they considered non-serious cases locally. As I discovered, a wide range of 
issues fall into the category of small cases, including theft, property disputes, and minor felonies. 
From this perspective, kinship leaders play a larger role in the day-to-day dispute resolution as 
compared to the state.  
The large range of cases adjudicated by kinship leaders underscores the considerable 
influence of kinship. To this point, Saeed, a local mediator exclaimed: “If it is a small case, “we 
take it back from the police.” He claimed that “it is better if the case is dealt with locally.” In this 
statement, Saeed invokes local/kinship boundaries and establishes a clear precedent for handling 
cases locally. He argues that the police/judges are kleptocratic or often will require bribes before 
they will take on cases. As a result, residents don’t trust the judgment of the judicial system and 
fear that the police will rule in the favor of the highest bidder. “If you go to the police, you waste 
your time and your money.” Other mediators noted that the police are inefficient and lack the                                                         
16 Zar, zan, and zamin is a common phrase, invoking ideas of honor (Nelson 2011). 
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means to conduct a full investigation. In other words, at least for issues related to property, 
kinship groups demarcate boundaries between the state and kinships groups on moral grounds. 
The institutions of state are rapacious while kinship groups are credited with acting in good faith 
and being selfless. As Nelson (2011) suggests most litigants are not actually deterred by the 
delays and costs associated with the courts, and in fact, often file cases to gain time. In other 
words, they use the courts instrumentally to allow for time to come to a customary, out-of-court 
settlement—also pointing to the existence of state/local boundaries. For some, part of rational for 
this boundary is based on the absence of the state. The distance from the state mentioned above 
and costs involved in traveling to an urban center also contribute to developing the local 
boundary. 
 
From my field notes: 
 
Abdul Ghanzanfar, a local landlord, described an incident where two men came to seek 
his help in the theft of a cow. One was the victim, and the other, a friend of the victim. 
Ghanzanfar has a serious, thoughtful countenance, and listens carefully. He said that he 
likes to be of service to his community, especially as he has a knack for character 
analysis, Before he became a landlord, Ghanzanfar was a textile engineer, living in the 
city. He says that he got weary of the city where he barely knew his neighbors and people 
did not have regard for each other. Since his return to the village, Ghanzanfar mentioned 
that local residents often brought their cases to him. He attributes this to his availability, 
his education, and his selfless attitude (Field Notes, February 18, 2017). 
While Ghazanfar came from a land-owning kinship group, his desire to become a mediator 
points to his own agency. He described to me how he cultivated the role of mediator as a means 
to give something back to his community. Further, it’s striking that rather than his education, he 
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emphasized his innate ability to understand people—something that he claims helps him 
maintain the social order. 
During his conversation with the two men, he engaged the victim’s friend in 
conversation, and over the course of the conversation, determined that the culprit was 
actually the friend. He took the victim’s friend aside, and accused him of stealing the 
cow. When I asked him how he had known, Ghanzanfar said that he was suspicious of his 
solicitous nature. The friend, who was taken aback by his frankness, admitted that he in 
fact was the thief, and he would bring the cows back, as long as Ghanzanfar would 
protect his honor. Ghanzanfar agreed. He asked the thief to tie the cows in his dera at 
night, and he would protect his name (Field Notes, February 18, 2017). 
Ghazanfar’s agreement with the thief suggests that he was more concerned with maintaining 
order than he was with the merits of the case. He maintained that if the victim’s friend was 
discovered as the thief, it would have resulted in a feud that could have factionalized the wider 
village, as these two friends would have called upon their families and the kinship group to take 
their side, and thus lines would have been drawn between friends. While telling this story, 
Ghanzanfar highlighted the importance of maintaining social order. According to him, when 
cases go the police, they get politicized and often people enter into litigation for fairly minor 
issues.  In this way like Mayrl and Quinn (2016), Ghanzanfar suggests that traversing local 
boundaries often reflects an individual’s self-interest rather than the interests of the community. 
By maintaining the boundaries of the traditional system or emphasizing the communal interest, 
he is able to maintain peace. By emphasizing his skill at character analysis, he emphasizes his 
own moral authority to adjudicate the case. That is, boundary management involves the moral 
authority of the mediator and an understanding of the greater public good, which is consistently 
 113 
defined by social order rather than justice. In fact, most landlords equate the two. Like the Shahs, 
Ghanzanfar also draws a moral boundary. But, in his case, it is based on his ability to maintain 
the social order. It is also important to note that Ghazanfar is not only drawing a boundary, but 
by equating justice with social order, his boundary shapes people’s expectations regarding 
justice. 
The boundary between the state and the village on issues related to property does not 
exist only in rural areas that are far from the institutions of the state. Businessmen in one of the 
grain markets in the city also reported having their own association to mediate issues related to 
the sale of grain. The association was composed of all the grain merchants working in the 
district, who informally nominated a head of the association. Members refer any disputes related 
to pricing, competition, and theft to the association instead of taking them to the police or civil 
courts. The presence of alternate dispute resolutions even in the city underscores the importance 
of boundary management related to property issues where institutions of the state are considered 
kleptocratic. 
Along with theft, landlords often mediate land disputes, especially involving boundary 
disputes. According to my informants, such cases are pretty common and exacerbated by the 
poor land records and unna. The irrigation channels in much of Punjab are not paved, so it is 
easy to gain a foot or two of land by moving them to your neighbor’s land. As the formal land 
records are incomplete, people invariably come to the dera to adjudicate such disputes. The 
boundary drawing for such cases seems to emphasize the importance of local knowledge, 
especially regarding the history of land ownership. The numberdar plays an important role for 
such land cases, as he is still involved in land transactions. Gilmartin (2003) noted that 
historically issues involving land transactions are adjudicated locally whereas the courts 
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established under the British dealt with crime. To some extent this trend has continued today. 
The desire to adjudicate land cases directly resonates with the Scott’s (2009) idea that local 
residents seek to hide their economic resources from the state and draw on strategies to make 
them illegible. Dispute resolution around land seems in part to be designed to shield local 
economic interests from the state’s kleptocratic eye. In addition, as Nelson (2011) notes, the 
important role of the numberdar in informal and formal land transactions privileges the colonial 
era, customary law and undermines the legal framework of the Pakistani state. In effect, this 
practice ensures that land-ownership remains among agnates, preventing the transfer of land to 
women, as stipulated by the state’s Shari’ah or Islamic law. 
4.4.6  Intersection of Boundaries  
The instances that individuals took their property disputes to the police instead of solving them 
locally also provide insights about boundary management. In fact, during a visit to the local 
police station, I found a cow whose ownership was in dispute tied in front of the police station 
while the case was pending.  According to the sub-inspector, the cow was merely the scapegoat 
in a kinship dispute that had been simmering for nine months. Many people refer to cases that are 
taken to the police stations as acts of passion. People refer to the concept of unna defined as ego 
that leads to social rupture to explain how such cases come about. Local residents defined 
instances that people went to the police for the sake of their unna or due to emotion and 
factionalism. In other words, landlords and other residents would instrumentalize the institutions 
of the state as a means to gain political leverage for local cases. In this way, state actors reinforce 
customary dispute resolution practices. 
A member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) whom I interviewed reinforced the idea 
that people often come to the police when they are jazbati or moved by their emotions. She went 
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to say: that “peace is found in the parai (another word for panchayat), whereas in the police 
station people end up spending money. She implied that people typically turn to the police when 
they are overwhelmed by their emotions, invoking the “crime of passion argument.” For 
instance, I would often hear that people would register a false case to seek revenge in a local 
feud. Members of the local police also confirmed this trend. But once they are in their “rational 
minds,” they would simply approach the local panchayat. The fact that the MPA as a 
representative of the state is drawing this boundary is striking. In part her comments refer to the 
dual role played by political actors. In addition to their state role, political representatives often 
continue to mediate local cases. But when they play the role of mediators, they don’t necessarily 
count on the police but follow the more informal mediation process.  
The strategic use of state institutions discussed above points to greater nuances in our 
understanding of power in Pakistan. In classic structuralist terms, the power of the state is 
defined as through the ability of its institutions to manage, incentivize and coerce its citizens into 
complying with its rules (Weber 1978/1922). But more useful is Issac Reed’s (2013), 
understanding of hegemonic power. Reed, drawing on Stephen Lukes (1974), outlines the 
relational, discursive, and performative aspects of power beyond the rule-making power of state 
institutions. The ability of kinship groups to use state networks for their own cases refers to 
Reed’s definition of relational and performative power. As local residents revealed, registering a 
case at the police station is not an easy task as it requires both money and connections. Here 
access or power is contained within the individual’s social and political networks. Power also has 
a performative quality, as cases filed in the police station are potentially witnessed by dozens of 
kin. Police reported that for certain cases, kinship members will come to the police station by the 
truckload. In this way, individuals are also able to shame their opponents through the act of filing 
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cases. The ability of kinship groups to strategically use the institutions of the state illustrates 
more about the dimensions of power than suggested by a purely structural account. 
4.4.7 Criminal Cases   
This boundary between the state and local community is dissolved or deactivated, in Tilly’s 
(2004) terms, to some extent for criminal cases. One landlord noted:  “A big case, theft, dacoity 
[armed robbery], murder, or where people are hurt, then in such cases, it is necessary to go to the 
court.” In the first instance, they seemed to imply that the serious nature of the crime necessitates 
the formal tools of the state. In most cases, the deradars employ mediation to resolve local 
disputes. However, when there is a big grievance such as murder, mediation may not be possible. 
This resonates with the idea expressed by the female legislator above, that individuals go to the 
police when they are in an emotional state, and seek vengeance. Further, kinship leaders take on 
cases in part to build political capital. Taking on controversial cases, such as murder, where the 
deradar can suffer from reputational risk, alienate potential supporters, or develop enmity with 
one group does not provide an opportunity to build capital.  In fact, Nayyar Shah attributed his 
electoral defeat in the 2015 local government elections to his role as mediator. Here, local 
leaders are dissolving the boundary, instrumentally, as taking on controversial cases could affect 
their local capital. However, as suggested in the example above, some criminal cases are 
mediated locally. Both Omer and Usman suggested that in the case of the shooting of the 
shopkeeper, chances were that both sides would come to them once they had cooled off. The area 
where Usman Cheema’s dera is located is considered a dangerous place where even the police 
loathe to trend. In that case, distance from the state may partially explain why they think 
mediation is possible for a criminal case. 
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 The gatekeeper’s background, nature of the criminal offence, the kinship group of the 
people involved, and the ability of the deradar to earn capital may also shape boundaries. 
Nawazish Shah revealed how he had mediated a case involving the death of a teenager in 
his village. The teenage boy was a traveler and had been found shot. When the boy’s 
father who was from another village came to claim the body, Nawazish Shah approached 
him to condole. He mentioned that he remained perplexed by the killing, as the boy 
wasn’t even from the village, so he couldn’t have had a feud with anyone. That night he 
went to the village and preached. He gathered the villagers and told them that if sins are 
acknowledged in this life, the crime will be forgiven in the next. But, left 
unacknowledged, the perpetrators would burn in hell. The sermon in the village 
seemingly worked, and the next day a group of cattle thieves came to confess.  They 
admitted that they had accidentally shot the boy. They were planning a robbery in the 
same house where the boy was staying and while escaping, they accidentally shot him 
(Field Notes March 21, 2016). 
 
Nawazish Shah’s narration of the case highlighted his role as a spiritual leader. That is, he 
emphasized that he went to village where the shooting took place because the killing perturbed 
him and he felt responsible. His narration of the story to me and others in his dera was solemn, 
and as he spoke, the bustling dera felt silent. People interrupted his narration from time to time 
to exclaim in wonder. Both his intervention and his narration underscored his moral capital and 
ability to manage boundaries. He later attributed his ability to find the perpetrators as well as 
broker peace between the two parties as a sign of God’s grace.  
In the meantime, the boy’s father had filed a case with the police and they had arrested 
someone else. Nawazish took the cattle thieves to the boy’s father and said that these are 
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the killers of your son, but they did not mean to kill him. They are willing to accept your 
punishment. Nawazish took the thieves to court and the police arrested them. Nawazish 
then told the father that the cattle thieves did not intend to kill him and the bullet had hit 
the boy accidentally. He said that it was his right to punish them, but in Islam, intention 
counts for something. Over the course of three months, Nawazish convinced the boy’s 
father to forgive the cattle thieves and accept their monetary contribution for his son’s 
death. Together they went to the court and the boy’s father asked the judge to release 
them. The judge initially did not accept the request, as he thought the boy’s father was 
under duress and suggested to the father that he think over to his decision over a period 
of time. Three months later the boy’s father gave a written statement to the court, and the 
cattle thieves were released. (Field Notes March 21, 2016). 
Nawazish Shah’s ability to mediate between the two parties in this instance also came from the 
fact that the death was accidental. Nawazish depicted both parties as victims and stood to gain 
relationships with both by mediating the case. Second, the boy’s family was poor, and having a 
deradar like Nawazish Shah, who was also a spiritual advisor, was a source of honor, so 
Nawazish was able to convince him to mediate. His ability to mediate this case has won him a 
great deal of capital. He claims that lawyers and judges often ask him how he was able to bring 
the two sides together. In this way, he uses his spiritual authority to draw a moral boundary 
between his dera and state based on his ability to deliver a higher justice than the court could 
have achieved. That is, he claimed that at best the courts would have sentenced the cattle thieves 
to death, but he was able to not only save the thieves but allow both sides to come to a peace. It 
is important to note that while his position allowed him to mediate a sensitive case, his ruling, 
like Ghazanfar’s helped to maintain the customary social order. Part of the ability of the landlord 
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to mediate such cases is based on Islamic scripture that codifies punishment for criminal offense, 
including blood money. In this way, Nawazish was able to draw on an existing precedent and 
boundary management mechanism.  
 An examination of when people draw boundaries reveals that that cases involving 
property or economic transactions are usually addressed locally whereas criminal cases are 
reported to institutions of the state. Often, in drawing boundaries, people cite that their local 
deradar is more selfless and less corrupt than state officials, drawing a moral boundary. At the 
same time, kinship leaders like Ijaz are not above their self-interest. But, who draws the 
boundaries matters. As local leaders, Ijaz and others have the ability to shape the narrative on 
boundaries or a discursive power (Reed 2013).  Further, some deradars such as Nayyar and 
Nawazish Shah are spiritual leaders and can also draw on their moral authority, illustrating the 
multiple dimensions of boundaries. 
4.4.8 Private Sphere of the Family in Pakistan  
Not unlike many parts of the world, landlords draw a strict line between affairs of the family and 
the state. Disputes involving women in many instances are handled locally and within the family. 
Based on interviews, such disputes include issues of divorce, settlement, return of dowry in 
instances of divorce, and child custody. Many of these cases never even make it to the dera, 
signifying the strict boundaries. In fact, women’s participation in the dera is fairly limited, with 
exceptions made for age. According to Tasawar, an important deradar, the dera is a male space, 
and, it would be a source of great dishonor if family cases were brought there. When I asked him 
how such cases would be handled—he replied, that if he learns of any issue involving a woman, 
he will go to her house as a sign of respect. The deradar plays the figurative role of a patriarch, 
allowing him access to people’s homes. However, he also admitted that often he will not even 
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learn about such cases, as most individuals within his village would prefer to resolve such 
matters within their respective families. Other deradars have said that they on occasion will 
entertain family disputes, but those are the exception not the norm. 
The boundary between the private sphere of family and the wider community does not 
only involve domestic family disputes, but generally pertains to issues involving women. 
 Saeed, a local mediator, relayed a case, where there was a dispute between two 
neighbors, a soldier and a business man, involving money one owed to the other. The 
dispute got heated and the businessman hit the soldier. Coming out in support of her 
husband, the woman struck the businessman on the head with a large stick. As the 
woman’s blow created a serious wound, the businessman’s family wanted to approach 
the police. However, Saeed intervened immediately and encouraged them not to go to the 
police, as the reputation of a woman was involved (Field Notes January 21, 2015). 
 Saeed’s case revealed how the wider community intervenes to protect the state/kinship boundary 
when women are involved. In this case, even though the victim wanted to go to the police, Saeed 
talked him out of it.  Saeed emphasized that the wife was only supporting her husband and if the 
police got involved it would compromise her honor. Saeed’s intervention provides evidence of 
how people police boundaries using soft coercion. Even though the two parties did not seek his 
help, he said that he intervened, as in the heat of the moment, the businessman may have taken a 
step that would have exposed the military man’s wife to prison. If the businessman had persisted 
in his desire to punish the military man and his wife, Saeed claimed that he would have 
summoned a larger group of people to intervene, which would have been harder to refuse.  
The exception to the strict boundaries for women also illuminates women’s role in 
Pakistan. Tasawar mentioned that sometimes he adjudicates kidnapping cases. The use of the 
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word kidnapping is a misnomer, as these cases do not involve actual kidnapping. As, there is a 
high pressure for women to marry within their own kinship groups, women who chose their own 
spouse, especially one from outside the kinship group, are a source of dishonor. The entire 
village ostracizes such women. The family typically refers to such cases as kidnappings in order 
to save face in front of the village. As these are incidents where an outsider penetrates the private 
sphere of family, it is permissible for village elders, such as Tasawar to mediate. In other 
instances, villagers mentioned that they had also approached the police to register a case of 
kidnapping, which had also ended up in court. Registering a false kidnapping case with the 
police is another way that individuals instrumentalize institutions of the state for their own 
personal feuds and vendettas.  
While the dera does not sanction punishment for the other kinds of cases mentioned 
above, the penalty for penetrating the domain of the family is harsh. This underscores the 
impenetrable nature of boundaries. According to Tasawar, in such cases, there are three common 
outcomes: 1) the family members find the woman, annul her marriage, and marry her off to 
someone else; 2) the family accepts the marriage; and 3) the family members punish the couple. 
In such cases even when there is capital violence, individuals will rarely go to the police. The 
practices that Tasawar describes are not uniform. Some villages are more accepting of the 
woman’s desire to choose her own spouse. In one area, which was marked by greater distance 
from the state a woman I interviewed laughed and mentioned that such restrictions did not apply 
to them. She proudly admitted that she and her husband had a “love marriage,” referring to the 
fact that she chose her own spouse. But experiences relayed by this woman suggested that such 
love marriages are rare even within the city. It is important to note that in most instances, the 
state kinship boundaries are more firmly drawn for women and men. The difference in how men 
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and women perceive these boundaries in large part has to do with the fact that the family’s honor 
is shaped by the how women conduct themselves.  
There are two boundaries at play, one between the family and the local community and 
the second between the local community and the state. For women, the state and public sphere 
work simultaneously in order to reinforce the boundaries of the private sphere. To this point: 
Ijaz, a local landlord, mentioned a case of where a girl in his village was killed by her 
brother, a policeman, because she was talking to a village boy at night. The policeman 
caught his sister on a surprise visit to his home village. According to Ijaz, he shot both 
his sister and the boy after confronting them. Stories of his killing spread in the village, 
and according to Ijaz, the villagers condoned the killing, as they felt that the couple’s 
transgression warranted this punishment. The case was neither reported to the police nor 
did a panchayat form to deal with the police officer (Field notes January 27, 2015).  
Again in this case, the institutions of the state and the village worked together to reinforce the 
public/private boundaries. According to Ijaz, the wider police force was aware of this incident, 
but decided not to get involved. Similarly, both families decided not to report the incident. It is 
important to note that in such incidents—landlords apply local customary practices rather than 
ones established by religion. This example reinforces the need to examine the construction of 
state and local boundaries by issue. In some cases, such as economic transactions, they work 
separately, but for other instances, they reinforce each other. These boundaries effectively work 
to eliminate women from public life and shape how the state sees women. That is, although there 
are laws protecting women, the unwritten rules of the dera have effectively superseded the 
state’s laws. Laws regarding the protection of women aren’t always as flagrantly dismissed as 
they were in this case. However, in places such as Ijaz’s village, which are some distance from 
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the state and where individuals, such as Ijaz and Tasawar maintain those boundaries, it becomes 




4.5  MANAGING BOUNDARIES   
The boundaries between the state and local kinship groups are preserved through strategies of 
soft and hard coercion. While the section above discussed boundary management for particular 
issues, here I extend that discussion and explore the underlying mechanisms of enforcement. 
According to Sheraz and Usman, local landlords, deradars, cannot enforce their judgments on 
particular cases through sanction because they don’t have the tools to punish their members. 
Instead, they rely on degrees of social pressure or soft coercion.  There are three sources of social 
pressure: 1) the position of the deradar itself; 2) their family and kin; and 3) the wider 
community. This fits Reed’s (2013) characterization of power as relational, performative, and 
discursive.  
The deradar’s influence is both structural and relational. For instance, the deradar’s 
ability to apply pressure rests on his status or structural position as a landlord, but this position 
only becomes salient through reciprocal exchange. This underscores the relational nature of their 
authority. Deradars apply social pressure when the grievance first occurs as well as during 
mediation to manage boundaries, such as the strategy Saeed employed by dissuading the 
businessman from going to the police. Nawazish Shah also employed soft coercion when he 
intervened in the accidental killing in his village. Nawazish Shah and Saeed both have moral 
authority. Nawazish has a much more influential role as a spiritual advisor. Saeed does not play 
such a spiritual role, but he has built moral capital for himself through his charitable works. The 
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penalty for not following the deradar can lead to social rupture or the wastage of years of 
cultivating capital.  
Family and kin also apply pressure for people to accept the deradar’s decision. Cases are 
tried in front of their communities and kin, so people who attend can attest to the fairness of the 
trial and serve as witnesses. As witnesses, they can also shame the participants into accepting the 
agreement—suggesting that power is enshrined in their performances during the dispute 
resolution process. It is important to consider that local residents share social ties with their 
wider kinship group, and such ties are reproduced through social rituals such as marriages and 
funerals. Kinship groups also comprise the only social safety net for most individuals. In lieu of 
any kind of state or private support, individuals turn to their kinship group when they need a 
loan, a job, or a character reference. Here, the kinship network, also containing relational power, 
is a source of resources and wider social acceptance. A certain part of social capital is supporting 
your kin member against the other side, so kin don’t always apply pressure for their members to 
accept the decision of the deradar. But as Ghanzanfar and others have pointed out, kinship 
members in many instances push for social order as ongoing enmity can embroil kinship 
members in conflict for years. So after an initial show of support, there is social pressure through 
the kinship network to make peace. As many deradars have alluded to, making peace is more 
important than justice. 
When soft coercion does not work, kinship leaders can apply more pressure. According 
to Sheraz, “in instances where individuals don’t listen to us, we can compel them to listen.”  
Here, the power is partly discursive. When I asked him what he meant, he went on to say that 
kinship leaders have various strategies, including registering a false case against them in the 
police. At times, the threat of state pressure is as effective as registering a case. In other 
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instances, individuals are simply summoned to the police station instead of having a case filed 
against them.. Sheraz explained that a deradar’s influence will diminish if people are seen as not 
following their advice, so he has to find a way to compel them to keep his unna or pride intact.  
This emphasizes the state-like role of kinship groups, as they, in certain situations, strategically 
ease boundaries to coerce local residents.  
Not all instances of coercive pressure involve institutions of the state, and kinship groups 
can also alienate members who don’t comply. Sheraz mentioned he had applied such an 
injunction against his own cousin. In consultation with other kin, Sheraz had created a rule that 
villagers would only serve one dish at a funeral. According to Sheraz, this was to save villagers 
from going into debt. Such an injunction was unusual, but at the time, the government of 
Pakistan had passed a similar rule about weddings, so perhaps this was Sheraz’s way of asserting 
his own authority. When his aunt passed away, Sheraz’s cousin arranged a funeral where he 
organized an elaborate meal to mark the occasion. Sheraz admitted that it hurt him to do this, but 
he declared that the entire village could not attend the funeral. In this case, Sheraz’s cousin was 
not transgressing the village state/boundaries, but flouting a village rule. Through his harsh 
response, Sheraz contributed to solidifying the boundaries of his village. He admitted that it hurt 
him to enforce this injunction against his cousin, but he had no choice, as he needed to preserve 
this authority as a deradar. 
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4.6  CONCLUSION   
The Pakistani case suggests that viewing the state through an institutional/functional lens 
presents a rather limited understanding since non-state actors, play a state-like role. This role is 
evident in the local dispute resolution process. This process allows us to experience how people 
manage and constitute boundaries with the state. Particular gatekeepers play an important role in 
shaping boundaries.  While some of these individuals may have served as traditional leaders, 
their role in the community today in part is derived from their ability of manage boundaries. 
Using Barth’s (1969) understanding of ascription, I show how people inscribe and erase 
boundaries based on symbolic or moral issues. For instance, people draw boundaries that 
emphasize the selfless nature of kinship groups in comparison to the kleptocratic state. Others 
draw moral boundaries based on their ability to maintain social order.  
Drawing on Tilly’s discussion of particular mechanisms that cause and constitute 
boundaries, I show how that boundaries are not static. For instance, individuals often seek 
informal mediation for issues involving economic transactions, demarcating boundaries. The 
gatekeepers also apply social pressure or police boundaries, urging people to seek their 
assistance rather than take the issue to the police or the court system. For issues involving 
criminal offenses, individuals deactivate boundaries, as taking on such cases could lead to them 
developing enmity and undermine their political capital. They instead refer these cases to 
political leaders and/or the police. However, for certain cases where kinship leaders can maintain 
capital, they will even investigate a murder. These boundaries are especially drawn for issues 
involving women. For such cases, the state and kinship groups work together to exclude women 
from public life.  
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The focus on non-state actors allows us to problematize the public/private dichotomy that 
undergirds our understanding of the state. An examination of how local boundaries work 
similarly to relegate women and economic issues into the private sphere of kinship emphasizes 
the dual role played by kinship. In much of the literature, this intersection is thought of as 
clientelist and states with such connections are characterized as clientelist states (Eisenstadt and 
Lemarchand 1981, Lieven 2011). However, this macro level characterization not only obscures 
the role of kinship groups but also dynamics of community formation. As the discussion of 
Nayyar’s dera shows, in spite of the hierarchy, there is also discussion and debate. I focus on 











5. 1  INTRODUCTION   
Jürgen Habermas’ influential model of the public sphere has overemphasized the role of the 
national state and shrouded important political communities at the local level. Habermas 
theorized that the public sphere emerging from modernity enabled wider political participation 
and influence over the state (Calhoun 1993, Emirbayer and Sheller 1999, Ferree et al. 2002, 
Habermas 1989, Squires 2002). In this way, Habermas closely linked the public sphere with the 
state—both as a part of political society and the target of public advocacy. While scholars have 
criticized Habermas’ model for not paying sufficient attention to how the sphere inherently 
privileges middle-class males and reproduces structured inequality, many continue to employ the 
model to depict the citizen-state relationship and political participation (Calhoun 2002, Calhoun 
1992a, Calhoun 1992b, Eley 1992, Fraser 1992, Hohendahl 1992).  
My case study on Pakistan points to how Habermas’ state-centric model of the public 
sphere is not relevant in many contexts outside the West where the central state is weak and not 
necessarily a target of claims-making. A Habermasian analysis of Pakistan’s public sphere would 
suggest that Pakistan’s public sphere is very limited and exists only in elite urban circles. Since 
the mid-2000s, there has been a proliferation of the national media in Pakistan. However, even 
today, corporations own the majority of the media, which ensures a culture of self-censorship to 
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avoid crackdowns by the government and the right-wing religious parties. The government and 
the right-wing also carefully monitor universities, and professors who deviate from the 
mainstream are harassed. There are a number of high profile cases of liberal professors who have 
been charged under the country’s blasphemy laws. The government also monitors student 
organizing very carefully and has historically banned student political groups that are perceived 
to be against the government. 
In this context, I describe how deras or village level courtyards serve as local public 
spheres or important places to exchange information in Pakistan. In Chapter 4, I discuss how 
these deras delineate the boundary between the state and the local community. Here, I focus on 
their communal aspects or how, as public spheres, they contribute to fostering a sense of social 
cohesion. I argue that deras have their own internal logic and local practices, which foster a 
sense of social cohesion and reproduce interpersonal ties.  
 I first describe the dera, and how kinship groups manage the space and the flow of 
information. By employing the dera as my unit of analysis, I explore the dynamics of political 
participation. My analysis highlights the fungibility of the public sphere as a concept, especially 
how the public sphere serves as a local political community in Pakistan with relevance for 
kinship-based societies more broadly. Second, I show how interactions within the dera are 
performative and foster solidarity among members—aspects of the public sphere that have been 
under-theorized. While performance within the public sphere is not unique to Pakistan, this case 
advances our understanding of how the public sphere engenders affective ties. 
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5.2.  LITERATURE   
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere has elicited an extensive response and critique that falls 
into two categories: 1) a critique that it ignores power asymmetries that exclude women and 
marginalized populations from participating in political life (Benhabib 1992, Calhoun 2010, 
Calhoun 1992b, Eley 1992, Fraser 1992, Somers 1993) and 2) lack of attention to cultural 
aspects of the sphere, including solidarity (Adut 2012, Calhoun 2002). As there is an extensive 
literature on the former, I don’t address it at length here. Instead, I contribute to the literature on 
political culture and discuss how studying interactions in the sphere can illuminate the process of 
establishing social ties or solidarity (Adut 2012, Calhoun 2002, Goffman 1959). I begin by 
critically examining the link between Habermas’ model of the public sphere and the more recent 
focus on counterpublics and the state, and suggest how this assumed connection shrouds 
important dynamics of the public sphere. Second, I draw on the subaltern emphasis on local 
structures, experiences, and rituals to understand deras as distinct local political communities 
(Chatterjee 1993, Guha 1999). Finally, I draw on Goffman’s (1959, 1983) theory of interaction 
to illuminate how kinship groups use performances to engender loyalty.  
5.2.1 Subaltern Counterpublics  
While scholars have extensively critiqued Habermas’ model of the public sphere for its lack of 
attention to the systemic exclusion, the assumed link to the state has been under-examined (Adut 
2012, Calhoun 1992b, Fraser 1992, Kluge and Negt 2016). Influenced by the Frankfurt school, 
Habermas theorized that the public sphere, privileging rational discourse, would mitigate the 
divisions between the market and the state, and result in a more democratic society However, 
according to Margaret Somers (1992), while Habermas proposed a triad model of society, 
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including an interstitial sphere in between the market and state, he was not able to overcome the 
classic public/private dichotomy. That is, Habermas theorized that the family was the primary 
source of socialization for individuals, not the process of participating in the sphere. Further, for 
Habermas, the public sphere was a bourgeois sphere, shaped by the logic of market forces 
(Habermas 1989, Somers 1992). In essence, the private/public dichotomy is built into Habermas’ 
model, which, as a result, has obscured the public role of non-state actors, such as kinship 
groups.17 
To address the issue of asymmetrical access in Habermas’ sphere, scholars have 
described alternate sites of participation or subaltern counterpublics. The assumption is that a 
single public sphere is not accessible to the majority of the population, but that citizens can 
influence the mainstream public sphere and the state through alternate, more local sites (Asen 
and Brouwer 2001, Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1992, Habermas and Cronin 1998, Squires 2002, 
Young 2000). For Catherine Squires (2002), the idea of a counterpublic encapsulates both 
inclusion or participation of marginal groups as well as particular ideologies that run counter to 
the mainstream. While the idea of subaltern counterpublics addresses the power asymmetry 
within Habermas’ model, it continues to privilege the state and does not pay enough attention to 
the processes of socialization within these alternate conceptualizations. That is, like Habermas, 
the more recent scholarship focuses on how these subaltern spheres can influence the state’s 
decision-making and extend democratic rights of participation to a wider population. This 
literature also assumes that these alternate sites of participation are part of one national public 
sphere (Ferree et al. 2002, Fraser 1992). 
                                                        
17 The influence of the state in private or civic life has also been neglected through this approach, but that is beyond 
the focus of this paper. 
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While scholars conceptualizing the idea of the subaltern counterpublics continue to treat 
the state as an important site of claims-making, they underscore the need to disaggregate local 
actors involved in the public sphere and the wider political society—an important theoretical 
distinction that is consistent with my focus on subnational actors (Alexander 2008, Calhoun 
2002, Rankin 1993). Craig Calhoun (2002) identifies civil society actors, including professional 
and neighborhood associations as well as community groups, as playing a role in facilitating 
political participation and making claims. 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Mimi Sheller (1999) as well as Margret Somers (1993) highlight 
different arenas where the public sphere can arise—challenging the dominance of the state. 
Emirbayer and Sheller (1999) differentiate between social, economic, and political interfaces of 
the public sphere. In this way, they emphasize the fungibility of the concept and the myriad 
informal and formal contexts where the public sphere may emerge. However, it is important to 
note that their conceptualization of the three interfaces is consistent with the division of labor 
within a modernist society (Parsons 1991). This formulation makes its application within 
Pakistan’s kinship-based society more difficult where political and social roles are woven tightly 
together and disaggregation is not fruitful. In her study of 18th century labor rights in England, 
Somers (1992) underscores the importance of local actors, such as professional associations, and 
local social networks. In this way, Somers also disassociates the public sphere from the state.  
The dominance of the Westphalian state in Habermas’ model is explicitly questioned in 
the more recent literature on the transnational public sphere. According to Nancy Fraser (2007), 
the rise of international organizations, such as the European Union, eclipse the state in political 
decision-making, as do increased migration and the widespread use of Internet technology, 
making the state less relevant as a target of claims-making (Calhoun 2007b, Castells 2008, 
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Soysal 1997). While the focus on the transnational public sphere opens a fruitful area of 
research, examining how international structures and modes of communication are shaping a 
new transnational political community, it does not theorize about the role of the state in such a 
society. Instead, scholars see the transnational public sphere as another site of claims-making 
(Fraser 2007, Soysal 1997). In fact, given the unprecedented number of transnational forums that 
link local actors to an international audience and allow them to bypass the state, scholars 
working on the transnational public sphere have missed a critical opportunity to theorize about 
local public spheres.  
5.2.2 Subaltern Focus on Experience 
 
In Pakistan, as the relationship between the state and citizens is a peripheral one, the focus on the 
state eclipses local sites of participation and how they foster ties. Along these lines, Ranajit Guha 
(1999) and Partha Chatterjee (1993), important contributors to the subaltern literature, caution 
scholars not to essentialize various segments of society, such as economic, civil, and political 
spheres, as such an analysis results in a teleological argument that society evolves from a pre-
modern kinship based one to modern society with a division of labor along these three 
dimensions. On a similar note, Amy Allen (2012) underscores the need for critically evaluating 
the link between the public sphere and modernity to understand how the post-colonial context 
shaped associated power asymmetries (Allen 2012, Postone 1992). To address the colonial 
influence on scholarship related to the state and the public sphere, scholars of the subaltern 
reinforce the need to examine particular spaces where people congregate and the practices 
associated with those spheres (Chatterjee 1993). An examination of such spaces brings to the 






Performances in the public sphere can help us understand social ties between actors—what 
Calhoun calls solidarity (Adut 2012, Calhoun 2002, Warner 2002, Warner 2003). As Ari Adut 
(2012) emphasizes, “publicness transforms all action into performance” (Adut 2001: 244). 
Adut’s focus on performance comes from his critique of Habermas’ inattention to how a public 
forms. That is, according to Adut, Habermas and others have focused on the links between the 
public sphere and democracy rather than focus on how information is exchanged. Adut 
highlights performance as one important communication strategy. For scholars such as Michael 
Warner (2002, 2003) and Adut (2012) focusing on performances in the public sphere usefully 
directs our attention to how information is experienced (as witnesses), how it spreads, and how it 
engenders solidarity. According to Adut (2012), witnessing and other interactions around a 
public event forms people into a transitory community, thereby elucidating the micro processes 
of community formation. Adut’s (2012) notion of performance also allows us to better 
understand the power dynamic between people who play a role in creating or publicizing news or 
performers and those who witness or spectators. In addition, according to Emirbayer and Ann 
Mische (1998), witnessing includes first-hand experiences as well as witnessing events 
vicariously, which has the potential to shape a wider “imagined community” (Anderson 2006). 
One consequence of the performative part of the public sphere is its ability to generate 
stereotypes. For example, Adut, drawing on Jack Katz (2001), notes that frustrated drivers 
caught in congested L.A. traffic often perform their stereotypical ethnic identities in order to 
blow off steam.  
 The power dynamics of performers and spectators is also a central component of Erving 
Goffman’s (1959) front room/back stage discussion. Through the use of this metaphor, Goffman 
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illustrates how societal norms and ideas of proprietary shape public social interaction (1959).  It 
is important to note that in the Pakistani case, social interaction in the public (the front room) is 
governed by an idea of risk along with societal norms.18 The Pakistani public culture has evolved 
in a way that people censor themselves in the public to avoid critique and backlash by the 
government or their political opponents. James Scott (1990) also points to how communities 
employ different discursive strategies depending on the audience—combining Goffman’s idea of 
social interaction and Habermas’ discursive focus. Randall Collins (2004), in his extension of 
Goffman’s work on social interaction, emphasizes how interactions, especially within closed 
communities, can incite strong, embodied emotional connections (2014).  
 The idea of space has particular salience to understanding dynamics of the public sphere. 
According to John Agnew and James Duncan (1989), the idea of place has been steadily 
displaced by the idea of a more ephemeral community. More recent studies of performance focus 
on how particular localities evoke links to former movements; however, there is less focus on 
how spatiality guides social interactions (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000). Edward Muir and 
Ronald Weissman (1989) emphasize the importance of spatiality in their historic comparison of 
Venice and Florence and cite how closely knit neighborhoods gave rise to successful national 
politicians, as geographic proximity of their neighborhoods allowed them to create an important 
local political base. 
 In addition to studying how people relate to each other in a public space, studies of 
performativitiy often include a focus on particular communication strategies (Gilroy 1993). For 
example, Iris Marion Young (2000) emphasizes how oral dynamics such as rhythm and tone 
provide insights into the relationships of the participants. Pia Wiegnmink (2011) and Chantal                                                         
18 Anastasia Piliavsky (2013), writing about India, similarly argues that people’s public participation in India cannot 
be collated with their political beliefs or collective behavior as public behavior and private attitudes often vary. 
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Mouffe (2007) focus on how speakers use humor and narrative to gain traction with their 
audience or to construct social ties. Scott (1985) also discusses how villagers use performance 
strategies such as humor or “playing dumb,” which allow them to push back against class 
hierarchies in public spaces. 
 
 
5.3  OPERATIONALIZING THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
 
I employ the dera as my unit of analysis to understand the public sphere in Pakistan (Chatterjee 
1993, Guha 1999). To that end, I am interested in how the dera facilitates political participation. 
My focus on the dera, as a relatively closed space, allows me to move beyond front room 
performances and examine political participation in a much more nuanced way, especially as 
participation in the more formal state-run processes, such as elections or public debate, is limited 
or non-existent.  
My focus on how the boundaries of the dera are maintained allows me to explore how the 
dera functions as a distinct political community. In this way, I decouple the public sphere from 
the state and avoid what Somers (1992) refers to as the public/private dichotomy within 
Habermas’ model.  That is, a study of actual practices allows me to explore both the state-like 
and the more communal functions of the dera.  
In this chapter, I am interested in how the dera engenders a form of solidarity. To that 
end, here I connect how state/local boundaries contribute to engendering solidarity and social ties 
within kinship groups. Drawing from Adut (2004), I also explore how performances within the 
dera can elucidate wider social and political ties within the village. In particular, I examine both 
how witnessing a public event first-hand, as well as vicariously, constructs political 
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communities. In this way, I draw on Collin’s (2004) theory of interaction chains to link the 
dynamics of the space, namely one with defined boundaries, with the visceral experiences of 
participants. According to Collins, the social ties and a sense of community emerge from the 
embodied practices and the emotions that they arouse.  
 
5.4 DERA AS LOCAL PUBLIC SPHERES   
Unlike Western public spaces, the dera is not anonymous or neutral, as it is often located within 
someone’s private property—which is perhaps one reason why deras have not been considered 
part of the public sphere. It is important to note that no two deras are alike, but in this section, I 
discuss some general characteristics. As discussed in chapter 1, deradars, or the hosts of deras, 
are usually among the most prosperous men in a village. However, based on my observation, 
being well-connected is just as important as being prosperous. My research assistant’s father, 
Ali, manages a busy dera even though he ran a modest household. Local residents come to his 
dera to discuss local politics, as they trust his political opinions. However, outsiders, like me, are 
seen with suspicion. Ultimately, the deradar determines who has access or the boundaries and 
the topic of interaction. In this way, the dera is not a part of a wider public sphere, as suggested 
in the literature, but a specific one tied to a particular neighborhood and the personal influence of 
a kinship leader.  
 Another way that deras differ from the Habermasian ideal is that the people attending are 
not strangers bound by common interest, but often are directly related or share some social 
connection given that they live in the same village or community. The importance of the leaders 
and the kinship ties between members suggests that what binds people together is not only 
rational common interests but social ties—what Calhoun (2002) calls solidarity. Collins’ (2004) 
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micro-theory on interaction provides insights into how solidarity develops. He notes that ritual 
interaction, involving a small group where participation is limited to group members who share 
emotions or experiences, can engender social connections (2004). I describe political 
participation and boundary management within two kinds of deras: informal and formal ones. I 
then offer some conclusions about how each provides insights into the dera as a political 
community. 
 










While informal deras are located within individuals’ homes, they comprise a neighborhood level 
public sphere and foster a sense of community. I consider Ali’s dera to be informal. Ali, who is 
about 65, can simultaneously seem gregarious and impassive. He used to work as a security 
guard at a government research lab. Ali’s dera is located in the congested neighborhood where 
he lives, one where the homes share adjoining walls and are connected by a small lane — just 
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wide enough to let a small automobile through. His street has a mosque on one end, the 
construction of which Ali helped to fundraise for, and a small corner shop at the other. Even 
though Ali lives in the central town of Faisalabad, in a relatively prosperous area, the 
government cannot be counted on to carry out street repairs when needed. The residents of Ali’s 
community often have to lobby their contacts in government or even raise funds themselves, 
suggesting a level of autonomy from the state. Ali’s dera physically consists of three or four 
white plastic garden chairs that are set up either outside his front door in the summer or in the 
front room of his house in the winter. Either way, individuals from his community congregate in 
the evening after work or on Sundays.  
Often scholars writing about authoritarian contexts note that personal, client networks 
thrive as citizens are not able to directly access the state (Scott 1977, Stokes 2007). My research 
suggests that this characterization of Pakistan as a clientelist society is incomplete. While in 
some instances, Ali does help people in his neighborhood with their personal requests, such as a 
government job application, his dera does more than foster clientelist connections. It also serves 
as a platform for the community to address local development and as a safe space to discuss 
candidates for local elections. To this point, Ali’s dera has three features that suggest that it is 
more than just part of his private residence. First, while Ali’s dera is located within his private 
property, individuals do not need a formal invitation to visit. Second Ali’s dera is not only 
accessible to his own kinship group, but also serves as a central meeting point for the wider 
neighborhood. While Ali’s space is open, it is carefully managed. For example, outsiders like me 
who are not from his neighborhood would find it difficult to gain access. Third, the legitimacy of 
Ali’s dera is partly based on Ali’s self-cultivated knowledge of the government. According to 
Ali, as he was affiliated with the state, over time, he developed a reputation as being 
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knowledgeable about the state and politics. People continued to visit his dera to discuss elections 
and local politics even after he retired from the government, a trend that over time established his 
front room as a central meeting place for his neighborhood. As Sonia Livingstone (2005) argues, 
even actions that take place in private settings can draw on wider cultural traditions, and, in this 
way, are part of the public sphere. 
The role of Ali’s dera during times of elections exemplifies how the dera forms a sort of 
political community—one organized around a particular leader. Ali organizes community 
meetings for local residents to meet with candidates or generally to discuss politics.  He doesn’t 
necessarily have a personal relationship with the politicians who approach him, as one would see 
in a typical clientelist network. Instead, politicians contact him to organize local meetings for 
them, since his dera is a central meeting place within his neighborhood. He doesn’t always 
comply with these requests, especially when he doesn’t support a political candidate. For 
example, he organized meetings in the adjacent neighborhood where the family had a local 
business, a short distance from his home—suggesting that he mediates a wider community than 
the alley where he lives. In fact, boundaries of the dera are partially determined by the network 
of the individual in addition to the physical space itself. As participation in formal public events 
becomes publicized for the wider community, genuine discussion may be more likely to occur 
anonymously behind closed doors.  
While the dera to some extent links the local sphere to the state, especially during times 
of elections, it has more salience as a purely local public sphere as opposed to one which links 
local communities to the national level—or Fraser’s (1992) concept of subaltern counterpublics. 
Again, the idea of a “counterpublic” is a useful notion, as it directs our attention to local 
structures and actors. However, Fraser’s concept of the counterpublic assumes that the public 
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sphere can widen the space for democracy. The dera enables people to participate politically to 
some extent, but given the asymmetries of power between the deradar and the members, it does 
not necessarily foster wider democratic rights. As Chatterjee (1992) emphasizes, contemporary 
theories about the public sphere—driven by modernity and the associated bifurcation of 
society—do not help us understand spaces like the dera, which are at the intersection of private 
and public spheres.  
Residents described ties among the members in personal, affective terms in contrast to 
the rational ones emphasized by Habermas. When I asked kinship members why they came to 
Ali’s dera, they would say that they trusted him, he was not self-interested, and was a good 
Muslim. Such responses suggested that deras emerge out of a process of trust-building between 
the deradar or head of the dera and the rest of the community. In other words, the legitimacy of 
Ali’s dera derives from his personal reputation established over time. As Ali closely mediates 
exchanges at the dera, the individuals who frequent the space share social ties with him and the 
other members—especially as they may also be members of the wider kinship group. Affective 
ties do not preclude sharing the more “rational” common concerns (Collins 2004). However, 
defining interactions within the dera as rational would be reductionist, especially as participation 
involves some risk, which I describe below. In this way, membership in the dera could be 
described in terms of a trust network or closed communal networks where the kinship leader 
plays a central role (Tilly 2005). In addition, there are a series of rituals that cultivate social 
capital described in chapter 3 in which the participants of Ali’s dera engage that further cement 
their relationships in the dera, such as participating in marriages of family members and 
cultivating relationships through gift exchange, for example, during the birth of a child (Alavi 
1972, Eglar 1960). 
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5.4.2 The Formal Dera    
 
Figure 7 Formal Dera, Faisalabad    
Formal deras are different from informal ones and, in many respects, serve as alternatives to the 
state in a particular community. In fact, formal deras demarcate the boundary between local 
communities and the state as discussed in chapter 4. The kinship leaders whom I interviewed 
noted that the number of the formal deras has decreased overall due to the high cost of running 
them, as well as urban migration. But I found at least one large formal dera in most regions 
where I traveled. Many of them continue to play a state-like role. For example, local residents 
continue to approach these deras and the landlords associated with them to seek counsel in 
ongoing disputes, involving land, business, and family matters.  
Given the continuing role played by kinship leaders in managing village affairs, the space 
of the formal dera is more defined. The dera of Sheraz, a local landlord, was housed in a 
separate building from his home and lined with wicker chairs and a charpoy, a traditional woven 
day bed, providing enough seats for 20-30 individuals. The sheer scale of the room distinguished 
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it from Ali’s informal dera, a private place where neighbors would chat. In contrast, Sheraz’s 
dera had the feel of a formal reception area. While the dera was within Sheraz’s private 
property, it was also considered a place of public access. It was connected to the main house by a 
door, so that Sheraz’s wife could send in food for the most important guests—underscoring that 
deradars need to extend the hospitality of their home to maintain their public position. People 
frequented Sheraz’s dera when they needed information during elections or for something simple 
like a school application process. They did not require an invitation to come to Sheraz’s dera, but 
Sheraz still had some discretionary authority over who had access. Formal deras that I 
frequented in Pakistan typically have at least two layers, areas of more public access, such as the 
room where Sheraz receives his guests, and a smaller, more private meeting space. Most 
importantly, these private rooms can be closed off, as necessary for backroom negotiations. 
 In addition to its more defined space, Sheraz’s more formal dera can be distinguished 
from Ali’s informal one, as it was organized more formally and it had direct links to the state. 
First, unlike Ali’s dera, Sheraz plays a formal role in mediating people’s disputes, and keeps 
regular hours in his dera. When I asked Sheraz about the difference between the two deras, he 
also exclaimed that his dera was more historically authentic as compared to Ali’s, which he 
claimed was more like a simple gathering place. What he meant was that the set-up of his dera is 
modeled after and evokes a British-era style structure where a local landlord may have conducted 
official business on behalf of the state.  
 Second, while Ali serves as a gatekeeper to the state, especially during times of elections, 
Sheraz’s role in this area is more defined, given his family’s political interests. Deras provide 
access to information regarding the workings of the state, electoral candidates, and how to vote. 
In addition, according to Sheraz, if there are particular development issues that the village is 
 144 
facing, such as lack of access to gas or electricity, he plays an active role in problem-solving, 
either by guiding local residents to the right government channel or talking to the government on 
their behalf. In comparison to Ali’s dera, which served as a space to hold political discussions, 
Sheraz’s dera felt more like the meeting of a state representative. This image is emphasized by 
the fact that Sheraz’s family has owned land in the village since the British developed 
Faisalabad. His cousin had also served as the head of the local municipal authority in the mid-
2000s, creating a direct link with the state (Latif 2013).  
 Managing the flow of information through the dera allows deradars to manage village 
boundaries and to maintain their influence. According to Sheraz, landlords often initiate 
competing information campaigns to maintain their influence. For example, flooding is a 
common problem in these villages during the monsoon season, as many of the village streets are 
at a lower level than the river and most villages do not have a sewage or drainage system. During 
a particularly intense rainy season, another landlord in the village campaigned to raise awareness 
of this issue and to motivate people to collect funds to raise the level of the main village street to 
avoid flooding in homes. When Sheraz and his uncle learned of this campaign, they launched a 
Machiavellian counter campaign, as part of which, Sheraz went door to door telling people that 
such a project would actually increase flooding in people’s homes, as the design was flawed. 
When I asked why, Sheraz’s uncle responded if people were getting better information and 
services from another dera, it might undermine the position of Sheraz’s dera. “If we let them (his 
members) escape, then our hold would slowly weaken.” His uncle admitted with a laugh that as a 
result of his campaign “people immediately lost interest in raising the street level, which most 
likely would have worked.” This is indicative of how landlords use their position as knowledge 
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brokers to assert their influence in the village. Access to information does not result in more 
democratic rights, but instead it is used as a tool to garner loyalty to a particular dera.  
In its role in local governance and development, local information flows, and elections, 
the dera represents an intersection between local political community and the state. The 
legitimacy of the dera as a political community is based on the landlord’s ability to establish 
social ties by engaging in reciprocal practices and rituals. The deradar also contributes to 
shaping the local political community through managing information flows. Finally, those who 
manage formal deras play a dual role as a state-like local actor and as a liaison to the state during 
special times like elections. That is, in the first instance, the deradar establishes the legitimacy of 
the dera by providing services such as mediation, through which, the landlord establishes a 
system of governance that runs parallel to the state. In the second, by managing even the most 
fundamental relations with the state—including, on occasion, voting—the deradar again 
reinforces the state/dera boundaries. This underscores that while the dera may provide a link to 
the state, in the majority of cases, it also has salience apart from its relationship with the state.  
The concept of the dera problematizes the public/private dichotomy that has given rise to 
the concept of the public sphere. I discuss these dimensions in the next section, which involves a 





5.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCE   
The performative aspects of the public sphere contribute to establishing the dera as a political 
community and shaping ties among members of a dera and the wider village—a form of 
solidarity. Kinship leaders use performances in the public sphere to reinforce the salience of their 
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deras. According to Danial Dayan (2005), practices of the public—which in the Pakistan case 
involve performative rituals—help them constitute themselves into “imagined communities” 
(Anderson 2006, Dayan 2005). Similarly, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) point to how publics  
can arise from public rituals—such as the opening of the parliament. The trials at the dera create 
a spectacle that contributes to defining the local village community. Witnessing performances 
allow people to experience village-level events in a personal way. As the performances include a 
large number of local actors, they possibly create a group effect, which may foster emotional 
connections among participants (Collins 2004, Katz 1999).  
From my field notes (2012): 
 
During one of my visits, Sheraz provided an account of a recent event he had adjudicated 
where one villager had accused another of stealing a cow. He noted that major feuds 
could erupt in the village from this seemingly minor theft. In this case, both parties were 
from Sheraz’s wider kinship group, the Jat, a land-owning group. Sheraz and other 
landlords reported that such cases, involving theft or familial disputes, come to him fairly 
routinely; there may be one or two every month (Field Notes July 3, 2012). 
 
 Sheraz’s accounting of the mediation process revealed that there are a cast of characters that 
play a role in performances around the trial and, thus, shape how the news of this incident 
spreads in the village. These include Sheraz, the kin of the accused and the victim, as well as 
individuals who help Sheraz “investigate” the case. Dramatic displays of kinship solidarity at 
village trials contribute to creating a narrative reinforcing the salience of kinship (for its own 
members and the rest of the village) (Latif 2013).  
Unlike in a civil court, individuals do not stand on trial alone within the dera, but as 
members of a particular kinship group. In this way, kinship groups also incur risk, as the 
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loss of face for one member could potentially lower the standing of other kinship 
members and may also include financial losses. Often the participating kinship members 
must also collectively shoulder a financial risk, as in this case, Sheraz asked for the 
accused to provide a monetary guarantee in the amount of the market rate for a cow, or 
$2,000—a substantial amount for a villager. The accused often raises the funds for such 
a guarantee, known as a bila, by collecting it from the wider kinship group. When I asked 
kinship members why they take on the risk, they explained that it is difficult to refuse their 
kin in case they ever need a similar favor (Field Notes July 3, 2012). 
In this case, this first performance of the wider kinship groups, attending the trial in 
numbers, served two purposes: it provided a show of strength for the wider village and allowed 
Sheraz to elicit public agreement from both parties to abide by rules that he set forth.  While I did 
not witness this particular trial, kinship members and police whom I interviewed noted that they 
often attend such events in large numbers—a trend that I was able to witness during other trials. 
In the first instance, the number of kinship members gathered conveyed the status of the accused 
through his kinship ties. That is, even though the accused was charged with a crime in a public 
gathering, he had the backing of his kinship group, suggesting that their public performance 
helped to maintain his status or credibility in the trial.19 In addition, the presence of the kinship 
members bolstered Sheraz’s authority and legitimated the trial by establishing informal rules of 
conduct. That is, the presence of the extended kinship group puts peer pressure on the defendant 
and claimant to accept the final verdict. Sheraz explained that this social pressure is necessary, as 
he has no power to sanction either party—and has to rely on their word of honor and the backing 
                                                        
19 It is important to note that this show of strength was possible for both groups as they were from the same kinship 
group. Often cases involve someone from a service or lower-standing kinship group, where they have to rely on the 
support of the mediator to participate in such a trial. Asymmetrical access to the dera is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but I highlight it as a future area of study in Chapter 6. 
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of their respective kinship groups (Latif 2013). This idea of shaming is also consistent with 
Adut’s (2012) discussion of how a public sphere can provide social pressure through scandal. 
The physical location of the dera is also important in understanding the performative 
aspects of the trial—highlighting the important of place. When Sheraz mediates a case, the trial 
does not take place behind closed doors, but in his dera, which is located at the center of the 
village and open for all visitors to see. The transitory community that forms in the dera is very 
much tied to the dera as a particular physical space. During my time visiting Sheraz’s dera, 
people walked in and out of the dera at their leisure. Sometimes, individuals stop by for a quick 
chat and a smoke on the hookah, a traditional pipe, or to catch-up on the local news as they go 
about their business.20 If there is an ongoing trial, the two parties with a dispute are given an 
allotted time to convene, but the dera remains open to visitors, unless it is a particularly 
contentious case like a murder trial or involving a close family member. As such, dispute 
resolution at the dera becomes a display, a scene for the men of the village to witness first-hand, 
forming a loose public. As Warner (2002) argues the idea of a public incorporates both a 
universal ideal, such as the greater citizenry of a country, and the idea of impromptu witnesses. 
In other words, as witnesses, kinship members become interlocutors in the proceedings. Their 
ability to witness the trial not only serves to reinforce the salience of the trial, but also makes 
them reliable narrators for the rest of the village that was not able to attend. While initial trials 
are open to the public, the decision-making is closed. At the same time as the trial is ongoing, 
Sheraz and other deradars engaged in backroom negotiations, which I’ll discuss below (Latif 
2013).  
                                                        
20 Zeynap Korkman (2015) considers divination cafes in Turkey as feminized public spaces. The deras in Pakistan 
provide a similar space for men.  
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 The performances of the dera are incredibly powerful, as they are not only conducted in 
the landlord’s courtyard, but are also on display throughout the village. Such performances also 
suggest that the public sphere is not a “disembodied and idealized public sphere” but one shaped 
by the actions and performances of individuals involved (Gardiner 2004). These additional 
performances effectively widen the scope of the sphere to include the entire village—linking 
publicity to the formation of a community. 
One afternoon, my research assistant and I traveled to the site where the hunt was taking 
place. In this case, apparently a cow had been stolen the night before and the khoji (or 
customary tracker) was tracing the tracks of the cow. While this was not a big theft, the 
incident had attracted half a dozen individuals who were following the khoji. According 
to my research assistant, often times, a cow hunt is not considered legitimate or authentic 
unless the village witnesses the khoji’s trail. I followed the khoji for about an hour as he 
led the group of villagers across the village, commenting out loud about the possible 
number of thieves and the direction they had taken. In this way, the actions of the khoji 
almost seemed intended to flush out the thieves, who could possibly be among the wider 
group of spectators—a performative element. While the quality of the information 
gathered may be suspect, the performance was legendary. In this case, the khoji’s 
investigation took him all over the village, as he sought to track the hoof prints of the 
missing cow in plain sight of the community, allowing the villagers to see that justice was 





Figure 8 The Khoji 
 




This second performance reinforces how the dera can publicize such events, leading to a 
de facto community of observers. Even individuals who don’t attend the preliminary trial 
become distant spectators. Such performances resonate with Adut’s notion of scandal, as there is 
endless speculation as to who the culprit might be. Sheraz emphasized that the whole village 
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tunes in to this performance, as cows are integral to the economy, and it’s in everyone’s interest 
to locate the culprit. In fact, the historical literature of the greater Indian Subcontinent contains 
many narratives on cow theft (Gilmartin 2003). Such scandals again have little to do with 
democracy but more about shaping local relationships. For example, in the lore of the village, 
just as you have master khojis, you also have master thieves. In the areas where I conducted my 
field work, the residents of the villages, mostly migrant agriculturalists from India, often accused 
the more nomadic, indigenous settlers of the Punjab plain regions of being master thieves and 
referred to them dismissively as Jangalis or men from the jungle.  Although the accused in the 
cow theft case was not from the “Jangali tribe,” this population is often the subject of gossip 
when such trials are conducted.  The public nature of the dera fuels and propagates the 
stereotypes regarding the “Jangali,” as villagers regale the audience with jokes and myths about 
the Jangali population. One landlord, when discussing another case of a stolen cow, emphasized 
that he had discovered the cow thief to be Jangali, “as only a Jangali would be mad enough to 
steal a cow with a distinctive mark on its chest”—a point that drew laughter from the entire dera.  
Such performances serve to establish relationships between the story teller and his audience and 
structure relations in the wider village. The humor, in this case, can delineate boundaries, but 
also prevent open confrontation between the two kinship groups. 
Scholars, such as Goffman (1983), suggest that witnessing information can help 
spectators appreciate multiple dimensions of an exchange and evoke a visceral reaction (see also 
Durkheim 2001). In particular, Sheraz describes a third performance where, through the use of 
religion, the mediator elicits a visceral group response.  
In addition to convening kinship groups and the khoji’s investigation, Sheraz mentioned 
that there is a third performance. As the evidence provided by the khoji was inconclusive, 
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Sheraz and representatives from both kinship groups took the accused to the mosque to 
swear his innocence on the holy Quran – a well-practiced ritual known as the halaf 
where the accused is made to publically swear to his innocence in a holy place, such as a 
mosque or a shrine of a religious leader. Mediators compel the accused to take the halaf 
when the evidence is inconclusive. As the mediators have limited resources, mainly the 
evidence provided by a khoji or character witnesses from the accused’s kinship group, 










Sheraz described the halaf as an example of how he employs Islam strategically to legitimate the 
trial—however, the trial was not considered to be an Islamic practice. In fact, deradars are 
careful to point out that local religious leaders or clerics have no role in the trial, emphasizing 
how boundary management has a local dimension as well. The halaf presents another example of 
how performance compensated for lack of evidentiary support in the trial. In other words, if the 
khoji’s investigation does not yield conclusive evidence, mediators like Sheraz have to rely on 
other strategies, such as the halaf. By referencing Islam, the mediator reminds all the individuals 
that they are part of the same community of faith—evoking a visceral connection that helps to 
build consensus around the case. In addition, even if they believe that the accused has not acted 
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in good faith, they have limited ability to challenge the accused after he has taken the halaf, 
without calling into question his faith—something that most villagers would avoid (Latif 2013).  
Sheraz’s final verdict of “not guilty” further emphasizes the performative nature of the 
trial. Sheraz admitted that the accused was probably guilty; however, the village peace was better 
kept by building consensus. In effect Sheraz was emphasizing that the trial was more important 
for providing a performance of justice rather than upholding actual evidentiary standards. That 
is, the public nature of the trial allowed the victim to air and receive recognition for his grievance 
and at the same the accused was vindicated publically — allowing them both to save face. In this 
way, the trial evokes Goffman’s (1959) work on saving face or how individuals conform to 
particular social norms to maintain order. The performances at the dera also allowed Sheraz to 
build a wider narrative about the trial and the overall process. The news of the trial spread more 
widely through the public performances that took place outside of the dera as well as through the 
many witnesses. However, at the same time, even though many people were involved in the 
trials, such as the khoji and the kinship members from both sides, two or three main kinship 
leaders made the final decision. Sheraz and others have pointed out that usually at the same time 
as the proceedings are taking place within the dera, Sheraz is also helping to mediate a private, 
backroom conversation with the two sides to broker peace. This aside establishes the duality of 
the dera as a stage with front-stage performances that are maintained through back-stage 
negotiations (Goffman 1959, Latif 2013). 
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5.6  CONCLUSION   
My research suggests that the existing model of the public sphere has obscured a study of state-
like actors, such as kinship groups as well as spaces such as the dera and how they promote 
political participation. The dera as a unit of analysis problematizes the use of the private/public 
dichotomy associated with the modernist paradigm to theorize the public sphere in societies such 
as Pakistan. As conceived by Habermas and reinforced in the literature, the public sphere 
continues to demarcate a space outside of the family, one critical to shaping the relationship 
between citizen and state (Calhoun 1992b, Habermas 1989). In contrast, the dera represents a 
hybrid between the public and private spheres. On the one hand, it is located within private 
spaces, draws on the personal networks of the deradars, and gains legitimacy from the 
participation of local kin. Yet, as I illustrate, the dera also can serve as a wider political 
community and facilitate political discussion during elections as well as serve as a platform to 
promote local development projects.  
Examining the interactions generated by the trial discussed above reveals several aspects 
of how deras work as a political community. First, more than national-level political events, the 
dera is concerned with issues emerging from the village or community, such as cow theft — 
reinforcing the need to examine public spheres outside their link to the state. Second, space is 
critical to understanding how deras work. That is, the ability of deradars to form political 
communities comes from the fact that their deras are centrally located within certain 
neighborhoods, an aspect emphasized by Agnew and Duncan (1989). That is, deras can foster 
wider political communities as they provide a central place for people to convene as well as 
witness and publicize key events within the village.  
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The affective ties between villagers are linked to their participation in the dera—a 
relatively closed space with a boundary that kinship leaders police quite strictly, evoking Tilly’s 
concept of trust networks (2005). Ali’s dera was theoretically open to anyone in the community, 
but he used his discretion to regulate who could attend. The circle of attendees was kept pretty 
small, mitigating the risk to participants. 
The example of the cow theft also suggests the role of performance in shaping ties. For 
example, the presence of kinship members during the trial reinforced the salience of kin. That is, 
regardless of the outcome of the trial, the public display of support allowed the members to 
maintain their status. In addition — the second performance of the khoji’s investigation that led 
through the entire village reinforced the legitimacy of the trial to the villagers. Finally Sheraz’s 
instrumental use of religion in a sacred place, such as a mosque, reinforced communal ties. 
According to Collins (2004), jointly experiencing an interaction, such as an event in the village, 
intensifies the experience for participants—thus creating strong emotional ties, a form of 
solidarity. At the same time, participating also reinforces social roles and boundaries with others 
in the village—such as the jangali population –– serving as a powerful form of socialization.  
The use of performance was the biggest difference between the informal and formal dera. 
While performance is not limited to the formal dera, given the smaller scale of the informal dera, 
the interaction among participants is more discursive. The discursive and limited membership of 
the informal dera also suggests tighter boundaries. In contrast, as a performative space, the 
formal dera drives publicity in the village or plays a central role in trafficking information. 
Through performance, the formal dera helps to construct and reinforce kinship and communal 
ties among participants. As kinship leaders often apply soft or coercive pressure tactics to bring 
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local issues to the dera instead of the police, the formal dera effectively demarcates the boundary 
between the communal and village sphere. 
My research on the dera not only shows key facets of an important institution, but also 
helps to inform a future research agenda.  In order to advance research on the public sphere, 
especially in the non-Western context, we need to operationalize the concept within spaces like 
the dera. It is only through observing exchanges within the dera that I was able to identify the 
role of kinship groups in managing the public sphere. My detailed ethnographic study of the dera 
also helped to illuminate how performance shaped social ties between members. Finally, by 
outlining the building blocks of the public sphere in Pakistan, I show that future work on 
Pakistan’s political development needs to consider kinship groups as political actors who 
influence state boundaries and processes. Further, more broadly, my research points to the needs 
for problematizing the distinction between public and private in order to fully appreciate the 










Scholars have considered states to be important drivers of change throughout history, but 
especially in the twentieth century (Calhoun 2007a, Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1975). To that end, there 
has been extensive scholarly focus on the state’s internal borders or its pervasive influence on 
society (Foucault 1977) as well as its external borders, which have given rise to concepts of the 
nation-state and nationalism (Calhoun 2007a). Much of the scholarship on states has emphasized 
state structures, focusing on how early state structures evolved (Fischer 1975, Skocpol 1979, 
Tilly 1975). Others have characterized state structures using Weber’s (1978/1922) typology, 
distinguishing between rational-bureaucratic states, governed by rules that specify a division of 
labor for state actors, and others that are patrimonial or characterized by the personal ties 
between rulers and their subjects (Charrad 2011, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). In this structural 
approach, there is a tendency to treat states as conceptual monoliths. That is, as Mayrl and Quinn 
(2016) emphasize, given the complexity and purview of state structures, the concept of states 
have a take-it-for-granted quality. Further, it is difficult to conceptualize the boundary between 
states and society as much of the scholarly focus is on the tremendous power and purview of 
states. 
 In response to the early structural focus, cultural theorists illustrate how states are more 
than structures and also represent ideas (Steinmetz 1999). By showing how states are 
constructions, cultural theorists often point to how the boundaries between states and society 
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intersect (Berezin 1999). This allows us to identify state boundaries and ways in which they 
work. However, the emphasis of cultural theorists is on the myriad rituals and symbols of state 
power that reveal its pervasive influence. In this way, cultural theorists also partly contribute to 
the idea of the state as a conceptual monolith. Further, they do not theorize about how boundaries 
between states and society are created and maintained, which impedes our understanding of state 
formation as well as people’s lived experience of states. 
This conceptual dominance of the state has obscured the role of non-state actors in 
various areas of governance as well as how these actors contribute to shaping the boundaries 
between the state and society. As Scott (2009) writes, there is an entire history of non-state 
people in South-east Asia, who have resisted encroachment by the state—thereby shaping state 
boundaries in subtle ways that have been ignored given the dominant narrative of the state. 
While kinship groups in Pakistan are not typical actors within Scott’s definition of Zomia, I 
argue that they help us conceptualize the formation of internal state boundaries. Scott’s approach 
and the one that I employ in this project point to the salience of adopting both an interactional 
and structural lens. Boundary management incorporates both these dimensions, as it allows us to 
examine how local actors such as kinship groups operate in a wider structural field of power 
(Wimmer 2013) as well as the strategies and practices they use to resist the state. The lens of 
boundary management underscores how contestations between state and non-state actors are 
integral to understanding state formation. I show how kinship groups use their capital to shape 
local/state boundaries. The process of boundary formation also highlights how communal spaces, 
such as the dera, serve as important micro political communities. Next I discuss these two 
principal findings of this project. I then discuss how my research findings can inform a future 




6.1  RECONSIDERING THE STATE 
 
Scholars often define states like Pakistan, as failed, kleptocratic, and in crisis (Ahmed 2002, 
Bøås and Jennings 2007, Cohen 2002, Diamond 2000, Kukreja and Singh 2005). The focus on 
state failure conceptually privileges a functional-structuralist understanding of state institutions 
that I argue has limited salience in people’s lives. Rather than begin with state failure to 
understand Pakistan, I suggest we begin with why Pakistani society works as well as it does. The 
answer to this question reveals a plethora of non-state actors, including kinship groups, who 
adjudicate disputes, provide critical social safety nets, and liaise with key state representatives on 
behalf of their members. The lens of boundary management further helps to demystify the state 
by directing our attention to the key gatekeepers who demarcate state and local boundaries. 
Gatekeepers who manage boundaries claim different sources of authority: some claim their 
historical right to rule, others invoke their spiritual powers, and others emphasize their charitable 
works in the community. As such, kinship leaders draw on different tactics and sources of capital 
in distinguishing between their jurisdiction and that of the state — underscoring the complex 
nature of boundaries.  The role of gatekeepers underscores that we cannot assume the coherence 
of the state, as it is constructed through negotiations between these actors and the central elite.  
The interactions between gatekeepers and the state allow us to see how boundaries are 
demarcated and policed. For instance, kinship groups have established parallel mechanisms of 
dispute resolution, which demarcate local/state boundaries. The dera and, to a lesser extent, the 
dispute resolution mechanism of other organizations, like the grain associations, represent those 
boundaries. I argue that such practices have to be contextualized within the landlords’ desire to 
rebuild the capital that has been eroded through changes in the wider economy. These boundaries 
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are solidified through a process that landlords and local residents readily acknowledged across 
my different sites. There is also some evidence pointing to networking and coordination between 
deras, which further highlights the durable nature of local/state boundaries. Landlords police or 
manage these boundaries through soft and hard means of coercion. As kinship networks are one 
of the few means of support for people when they need a loan, job, or a character witness, it is 
difficult for people to go against their kinship group. Kinship leaders also use threats, often 
drawing on their relationships with state actors—in other words, kinship leaders instrumentalize 
institutions of the state to police boundaries (see also Martin 2015). These parallel mechanisms 
extend to land-related disputes as well as other economic transactions where local kinship groups 
emphasize different forms of moral capital, setting themselves apart from greedy, corrupt state 
officials.  
During criminal cases, the state becomes a more salient actor, as kinship leaders claim 
they don’t have the tools to resolve cases. Others emphasize that such cases destroy their capital 
instead of building it. However, I show, some spiritual leaders can use their knowledge of 
Islamic law to mediate criminal cases, including murder through their dera. In family cases, state 
and non-state actors often work together to police the private/public boundary to exclude women 
from the public sphere. For instance, families and the police will often bury crimes against 
women who chose their own spouse. This reveals the patriarchal nature of the state. However, 
my characterization of the state as patriarchal is not based on an Weberian understanding of state 
authority, but one based on how practices of kinship group shape or subvert the rules of the state.   
6.1.1 Seeking Kinship in the State  
While the role of kinship leaders in policing boundaries and shaping the jurisdiction of the state 
is clear, more research is necessary to understand how non-state actors like kinship groups 
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directly shape institutions of the state. My research provides examples of how the police directly 
ask some kinship leaders to adjudicate disputes. For instance, Nayyar Shah reported that local 
police invited him to serve as a police mediator, whereby the police station seemed to become an 
extension of his dera. Further, other elected leaders compare the local government system to the 
panchayati or local dispute resolution system, suggesting that the state is seeking to replicate the 
culture of the dera to seek legitimacy. In addition, justices of lower courts suggest that many 
cases involving women that are registered with the police never make it to trial because women 
receive a lot of pressure from their families to withdraw their cases. This initial evidence 
suggests that the dera culture shapes the functioning of state institutions more directly, as local 
actors are able to exert coercive pressures on them. States actors also sometimes draw on legal 
precedent from informal, out-of-court settlements in their verdicts. Both emphasize the 
importance of investigating how non-state actors shape state practices more directly. This 
research will allow us to theorize about additional mechanisms of boundary management from 
the state’s perspective as well as the how kinship actors directly shape the state’s field of power.  
While kinship actors are important in developing and enforcing boundaries, they are not 
the only actor, suggesting the need to examine the role of a wider range of non-state actors in 
boundary management.  For example, in my field site of Chak Jhumra, residents reported a high 
level of gang activity. Based on my interviews, these gangs overlap with political parties and 
kinship structures. While it may not be possible to penetrate the gangs directly, I found that local 
residents are willing to talk about how these groups influence their relationships with the state as 
some of these gangs literally manage the physical boundaries of local communities by 
establishing informal toll plazas, like the ones established by the state, to collect a road tax from 
passersby. 
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 Another important local actor that has been not been examined include groups with an 
explicit Islamist ideology. While some of these groups operate as political parties, others set 
themselves up as a rival to the state and provide a range of social services. For instance, 
nonprofit organizations report that religious charities, associated with the militant group like 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are often the first responders during national emergencies such as floods. 
Further, states and nonprofits work with them to deliver emergency supplies, as newspapers 
reported during the national floods of 2010. There has been little written about them due to 
obvious issues of security and access, but recent evidence suggests that these groups are not 
operating on the fringes of society but rather are playing a central state-like role in some areas. It 
is not clear how these religious charities cut across kinship groups. But, given their increasing 
importance, especially in border areas, it is vitally important to understand their role in local 
governance, where they intersect with the state, and how they legitimate themselves to local 
residents. While it may not be possible to meet players like LeT, my research suggests that 
people involved in their charity wings are much more accessible. It may also be possible to talk 
with their supporters within the communities. 
The role of physical distance from the state also needs to be studied further. An initial 
comparison across my three sites suggests that physical distance matters. For example, the dera 
culture is far more pervasive in Chak Jhumra, the farthest from the state, than my other areas due 
to its economic and political neglect. Similarly, the boundaries between the local community and 
the state seem more durable in Jaranwala as compared to Samundiri given its physical isolation. 
All of my research sites within the district of Faisalabad are relatively close to the thriving 
economic heartland of Pakistan. The evidence of these boundaries even in relatively accessible 
and prosperous areas suggest that the boundaries would be even more salient in areas that are 
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much further away from the state. These include the Southern parts of Punjab and Sindh in the 
South, where feudal landlords govern. Similarly, parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
which border Iran and Afghanistan, have rugged mountainous landscapes and the state 
infrastructure is even more limited as compared to my sites. These areas do not have the same 
kinship structure as the plains of Punjab but rather social groups that Barth (1969) refers to as 
more tribe-like, suggesting that they are loosely bound by kinship yet are governed by a 
structured set of internal rules. A comparative study of different regions with distinct social 
actors and associated practices will allow us to examine the various mechanisms of boundary 
management—contributing to Scott’s (2009) concept of Zomia.  
My research provides an important start to understanding the state through the lens of 
boundary management. I identify the importance of kinship groups in shaping those boundaries 
by drawing on various forms of capital. I also show how interactions and performances are vital 
to understanding boundaries. To further theorize about boundary management, it is necessary to 
adopt a comparative perspective that investigates: 1) the role of kinship within the state; 2) the 




6.2 EXPLORING DYNAMICS OF A PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
 
A structuralist analysis of Pakistan’s public sphere suggests that it is very limited and exists in 
urban circles. Such a structuralist analysis draws on Habermas’ definition of a public sphere, 
which includes institutions that played a pivotal role in democratization in the West, such as 
newspapers, cafes, and publishing houses. While this space is carefully controlled in Pakistan, 
my research points to how there is comparatively more openness in the villages and an 
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opportunity to share political opinions in trusted spaces. I suggest that changing the unit of 
analysis from the national sphere to a local one points to the importance of spaces such as the 
dera in providing access to information and fostering dialogue.  
Scholars may consider thinking of the dera as a local public sphere to be an idiosyncratic 
understanding of the concept, as deras exist on private land and the deradar or landlord has 
discretion as to who may enter. While the dera is private, I emphasize that it also has an internal 
order and structures interactions. For instance, the dera is open to the wider community, not just 
people in the deradar’s private circle. This dynamic of the dera is most visible during local 
elections when the deradar hosts political candidates running for local elections. Local residents 
also underscore the communal ties and the trust they share with the deradar and other members 
of their dera, especially within an informal dera.  
The experience of informal deras challenges the characterization of kinship-based 
societies as clientelist. I don’t discount the presence of patronage, as deradars may use political 
connections to divert public funds to their community and kinship groups (Martin 2015, Nelson 
2011). But, in my research area, such examples of patronage exist only at the highest levels, if at 
all. Deras, such as the one run by Ali, do not necessarily contribute to patronage politics, but 
provide a space for residents to share opinions, meet local candidates, and sometimes consider 
community projects, like rebuilding the local mosque. In this way, they form what Chatterjee 
(1993) calls a political society. Chatterjee argues that such spaces foster a tradition of political 
participation, which is important as villagers are largely excluded from the formal politics of the 
state. Martin (2015), in contrast, argues that it is problematic to characterize such spaces as 
participatory given their hierarchical nature, especially pointing to the exclusion of members of 
service-providing groups. I do not make any normative claims about the ability of spaces such as 
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the dera to foster democratization. However, I argue that a structural analysis of the dera 
obscures an important political process, one which frames people’s experience of the state. The 
dera also reveals how social hierarchy is shaped by interaction. I suggest ways in which we need 
to further theorize about asymmetrical access to the dera below. 
 
6.2.1 Linking Asymmetrical Access to Citizenship 
 
 
While the deras are accessible to local men, they are characterized by asymmetrical access, 
excluding members of the service-providing kinship groups and women. Understanding the 
mechanisms of this exclusion can elucidate the role that stigma plays in society as well as the 
construction of citizenship more widely. Much of the literature on the social hierarchy between 
landowning and service-providing kinship groups draws on a Marxist lens (Alavi 1972). 
However, my research suggests that while there are clear social boundaries between groups that 
provide services and landlords, these boundaries are shaped by people’s personal relationships 
and their interactions.  Members of service- providing groups are often at the center of the dera, 
arranging for tea and snacks, and running errands. Other members of service-providing groups 
have access to the dera, but only at the fringes. I’ve seen landlords ask such members to give up 
their seats when more important people arrive. The ability of members from service groups to 
speak also varies based on who is present. In the private presence of landlords and their families, 
members of service-providing groups are interactive and may even use their personal 
camaraderie to criticize the landlord—suggesting that in spite of the hierarchy, they have a 
measure of agency. In other cases, members of service-providing groups are ostracized, made to 
sit on the floor, and given different dishes than the landlords. This initial evidence suggests the 
salience of the interactional lens in understanding different dimensions of social hierarchy. I 
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provide some evidence of these interactions, but more empirical data is necessary to understand 
how institutions like the dera reproduce stigma and what strategies people use to mediate this 
social hierarchy and attain social mobility. It is also necessary to understand how the dera serves 
as a mechanism for reproducing inequality between the landowning and service-providing 
groups more widely in society. For instance, as landlords are critical to mediating interactions 
between members of service-providing groups and the state, they indelibly shape how the state 
sees these actors. 
  
6.2.2 The Invisible Category 
 
 
The exclusion of women is more extreme in the dera as compared to service-providing groups. 
While landlord’s wives play a role in supporting the hospitality available at the dera, they are 
invisible otherwise. In a few instances, I have seen older women in the dera who are on missions 
for their family—reinforcing their role as caregivers. The deradar will usually take them to the 
side of the main gathering to ask what they need. But women do not participate in the wider 
political conversations. The literature on women and Islam overwhelmingly points to their 
exclusion, a finding that my research supports. However, while women are not present in the 
dera, it shapes their lives and perception of themselves. The daughters of a deradar revealed that 
their father will sometimes talk to them about cases involving women in their village. The 
deradar may also call on his wife to mediate cases involving women. There is also a group of 
women, such as school teachers, female councilors, and women in service jobs, who have more 
mobility due to their professions, and may also service as informal mediators or a source of 
information for other women in the village. It is important to document the role of such women 
and their agency in navigating stringent public/private boundaries. Such examples of women’s 
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mobility help to reveal nuances of boundaries that are obscured by the dominant narrative of 
exclusion. Therefore in future research, it is necessary to examine both how women circumvent 
boundaries as well as the mechanisms of exclusion to understand how public/private boundaries 
shape women’s lives. These mechanisms will allow scholars to better theorize about the 
construction of citizenship for women in Islamic, kinship-based societies such as the one in 
Pakistan.  
Citizenship in the West is often defined as a social contract between its residents and the 
state (Paine 1999). Given its recent history of statehood, the Pakistani state represents more of an 
idea than a reality, an idea that draws on a mish-mash of Islam, the concept of religious freedom, 
and Punjabi culture. It is also shaped by powerful political influences including Afghanistan, 
India, Iran, and the United States. Further, given the paucity of services provided by the state and 
its virtual absence from the countryside, the idea of a social contract is elusive. Instead, the 
relationship between citizens and states is mediated and shaped by non-state actors, the 
mechanisms of boundary management, and local political spaces, such as the dera. Going 
forward, it is important to highlight structures like the dera and the practices it fosters, including 
ones that exclude service- providing groups and women, as such practices are key to 
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